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Theories of Referendum and the Analysis of Agenda-Setting 
Abstract
The referendum is often considered to be a form of direct democracy, and is often 
justified in terms of results representing the will of the majority. This view is disputable 
for three reasons: i) based on the results of social choice theory, it may be argued that the 
outcomes of referendums may be arbitrary and open to various interpretations; ii) it is 
debatable what the role of popular majorities should be in decision-making; many 
theorists of democracy think that unchecked majority rule should not prevail; iii) because 
of the differences in agenda-setting, there is considerable functional variation between 
referendums. Different forms of referendums have also been justified by different 
theoretical arguments: popular initiatives have been promoted by radical democrats, 
whereas referendums used as a check on legislature have been supported by 'Madisonian' 
democrats.
In the analysis of agenda-setting it is important to distinguish i) how and by whom the 
referendum is initiated and ii) on what kind of issues they may be held. The influence of 
the referendum on the political agenda depends on whether the referendum is initiated 
by representatives {ad hoc or optional referendum); or by a certain number of citizens 
(popular initiative); or whether it is a check on laws passed by the parliament 
(mandatory, suspensive and abrogative referendums). Furthermore, these distinctions are 
important for understanding the strategic character of referendums, ie. the strategic use 
of optional referendums by the representatives (parliamentary parties, president etc.), or 
the representatives’ anticipation and reaction to the possibility of the other forms of 
referendums.
Referendum in 22 democracies are classified, and their 'functional properties' (Smith 
1976) are analysed. In order to get a more precise picture on how referendums function 
as a part of political systems and how political actors use the referendum, three cases, 
Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland, are analysed. Although the idea of giving the people 
a say is the common element of all forms of referendums, the differences between 
agenda-setting institutions explain why, how and under whose control ‘the people’s 
voice’ is heard.
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1. INTRODUCTION
1.1 An Overview
The historical experience of referendums may be characterized by certain dualism. 
There are some successful practices of direct democracy in stable democracies, for 
example in Switzerland, Denmark and Ireland, but also many examples of manipulative 
abuse of referendums by authoritarian rulers. Also, often the political calculations 
behind the referendums initiated by democratic governments are too obvious to avoid 
cynicism about the institution. Furthermore, the fact that the referendum seems to 
represent purely a majoritarian form of democracy and thus can be perceived as a threat 
against minorities is an often repeated argument against the referendum. On the other 
hand, the referendum has been seen as an excellent way of increasing citizens’ 
participation and deliberation on public issues, and the increase of popular participation 
due to referendums and other direct-democratic institutions has been seen as a step 
towards further democratisation of societies.
Referendums have become an important part of political life in many parts of the world, 
both in democratic and in non-democratic countries. After the First World War, and 
especially after the establishment of the League of Nations, the referendum has been 
used to solve various territorial disputes. Also during the decolonization process in the 
1950s and 1960s, the referendum has been used to legitimize the declarations of
6
\independence and the constitutions of the newly independent states (See for example 
Butler and Ranney 1994). After the collapse of the Soviet Union, a parallel phenomenon 
has been experienced in Eastern Europe, where referendums have been used to 
legitimize the declarations of independence and the new constitutions, and also to settle 
the most disputable constitutional issues. In West Europe the use of referendums has 
recently become more frequent because of the European integration process. 
Referendums have been used as a means to legitimize the transfers of national powers 
to European organisations.
The referendums held by authoritarian governments tend to bring about outcomes which 
are almost unexceptionally supportive for the governmental policies. In this kind of a 
situation, a referendum may be considered as "a handy tool in the hands of dictators to 
boost their legitimacy" (Smith 1976). Hitler used the referendum in this manner to 
establish the Nazi regime: in the referendum held in November 1933, the National 
Socialist government was approved by 93.4 % of the voters with 92.2% turnout, and in 
March 1936, the Reichstag list and the Fuhrer were approved by the majority of 98.1% 
of Germans, with the turnout of 98.9%. More recently, referendums like this were held 
in Eastern European countries under the Communist rule. In 1968, the constitution of 
the German Democratic Republic was accepted by 94.5% of voters. Some S o t  \  
American, African and Asian countries have also experienced these kinds 
referendums. One of the recent examples of a referendum exploited by a dictator come, 
from Iraq. In the referendum in October 1995,99,96% of Iraqi voters supported Saddam 
Hussein's regime and the turnout was announced to be 99,49%.
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There are several ways in which these kinds of results are manufactured: giving only one 
alternative, lack of secrecy, persecution of dissidents and straightforward forgery of 
voting slips are methods used. Referendums like these are often used to support the 
argument that the promise of direct democracy has not matched with the practice. On 
the other hand, unfair referendums held in dictatorial countries should not be used 
against all referendums. The situation is similar with that of elections: the fact that the 
results of the elections are manipulated and forged in many parts of the world cannot 
really be used as a reason to argue against all kinds of elections. The crucial question is 
rather: what kinds of referendums and elections are fair and enhance democratic values?
The development of modem information technology has made the idea of nationwide 
or even international direct democracy more realistic (See McLean 1986). Technically, 
through interactive mass communication, it would be possible to hold referendums on 
almost every part of legislation. Citizens' preferences would be registered, probably 
using full information on voters' preferences over multiple policy alternatives, and the 
political decisions would be made according to these preferences, using either 
majoritarian or positional aggregation methods. Although the utopia of citizens' 
government has become technically possible, and the possibilities of cheating are, 
perhaps, possible to be ruled out, only very few would be ready to widely apply it in 
practise. Indeed, for most of the people this kind of government sounds like a nightmare 
- at least it does not match with the ideals of well-functioning democratic government. 
It would bring about inconsistent collective decisions; individual opinions would likely 
be formed too hastily and be prone to manipulation. Moreover, it is questionable what
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would be the significance of this kind of citizens’ participation. As Sartori (1987,283) 
argues:
"The gist is that the greater the number of people involved, the less effective is their 
participation - and this is to the vanishing point. Thus, when vast territories and entire 
nations are involved, direct democracy becomes an unusable formula. I have also and 
concurrently held that an electronic, "referendum democracy", while technically 
feasible, would be disastrous and, in all likelihood, suicidal."
1.2 Conceptual History and Definitions
The discussion on direct democracy is as old as the idea of democracy itself: first forms 
of democracy were based on the direct participation of the free citizens, and the classical 
theory of democracy deals with this type of government. The first historical models of 
direct democratic institutions are the Athenian democracy and the plebiscites of the 
Roman Republic, whereas the theories of representative democracy are much more 
modem, originating from the early days of English parliamentarism and Italian 
republicanism. The direct-democratic institutions in the modem world have followed 
rather different paths of development in different countries.
In Switzerland the direct-democratic traditions of the cantons and communes, which 
may be traced back to the Middle Ages, are considered to be the historical background 
of the current direct-democratic institutions. In France the classical democracy of 
antiquity and Rousseau's ideas of popular sovereignty were influential during the 
revolutionary era. Later on, the French revolutionary ideas and Napoleonic plebiscites 
influenced the development of the federal-level direct democracy in Switzerland. In the
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English-speaking world, on the other hand, the current direct-democratic institutions had 
other predecessors. Cronin (1989) mentions the Levellers in the mid-17th century 
England as the first modem supporters of direct democracy. The Levellers demanded 
the direct election and public recall of officials. The first forms of American direct 
democracy, the town meetings among the settlers in New England, were influenced by 
this kind of radical protestant political thought. The progressivist movement in the late 
19th century and early 20th century echoed the spirit of the early forms of American 
direct democracy. As a result of this movement, the referendum was adopted in many 
states together with other measures of direct democracy, such as the initiative and the 
recall.
The word 'plebiscite'1 is sometimes used to refer to referendums which are used to 
reinforce the power of the political establishment, and which are, therefore, considered 
to be rather undemocratic. Silvano Mockli (1994) uses the word plebiscite to refer to ad 
hoc referendums, which are used in situations when those in power consider it suitable. 
With the word referendum he refers to enduring and constitutionally regulated 
institutions. Because the word plebiscite has a rather ambiguous meaning and a negative 
connotation I will avoid using it. This is also because the clear distinctions between the 
functions of different forms of referendums are difficult to draw. I will refer by the word 
'referendum' to all institutions in which the citizens vote upon a policy issue, regardless 
of the motivations and functional differences between various forms of them, although 
I agree with Mockli that the distinction between ad hoc and constitutionally regulated 
referendums is to a certain extent important in explaining the capacity of the
10
referendums to enhance democratic values. ‘Plebiscitarianism’, on the other hand, refers 
to forms of policies in which the political leaders directly appeal to the alienated 
‘masses’, and in which there is lack of mediating political organisations. The word 
‘populism’ has also a negative connotation, and it refers to politicians and policies which 
appeal to the most unenlightened and ignorant ranks of the people. Finally, elections 
with one dominant policy issue are sometimes called 'referendums' on this issue. The 
idea of the election being a single-issue referendum can be regarded as a part of political 
rhetoric used in the struggle on the formulation of the political agenda.
1.3 Outline of Thesis
There .are several systematic studies on the referendums. Suksi (1993) compares 
constitutional provisions for the referendum in most of the countries in the World, and 
has done a systematic content analysis of the constitutional regulation of the institution 
in both democratic and non-democratic countries. Other comparative studies have been 
published for example by Butler and Ranney (1978 and 1994), whose books contain 
descriptive analysis of referendums in certain Western democracies. Comparative 
research has been done also be some German-speaking scholars like Mockli (1993). One 
of most recent comparative studies is 'The Referendum Experience in Europe' (1996), 
edited by Michael Gallagher and Pier Vincenzo Uleri, which has a systematic approach 
and also includes certain useful classifications. It also deals with the Eastern European 
experiences on referendums. In addition to cross-national comparisons, there are studies 
which focus on one country. For example, Kobach (1993) discusses the Swiss
11
referendums and Cronin (1989) the referendum and other direct-democratic
institutions in the US states.
It is typical to start the normative discussion on referendums and other forms of 
‘direct democracy’ with the notions of the citizens' sovereignty and 'the will of the 
people'. This may be quite misleading when looking at the existing forms of 
referendums. As a Swiss researcher Rhinow (quoted by Mockli 1993) had put this: 
"The conceptions of the self-government of the people and identity-democracy as well 
as mythology of the people as a willing subject are prone to disappear."1 This is in 
accordance with the main argument of the thesis: the discussion about the referendum 
as a method of revealing the will of the people is too simplistic and, at worst, 
misleading, and it does not comply with theories of democracy in modern, large 
political entities. The Part I  of the thesis deals with the problems of democratic 
theory. According to the economic theory o f democracy or the preference conception 
o f democracy, there is a certain correspondence between the individual preferences 
and the collective decisions in democratic societies. This implies the use of certain 
preference-aggregation methods such as the pure majority rule. Condorcet (1785) 
first pointed out that the majority rule may be intransitive in situations in which there 
are more than two alternative and at least three voters. Later on, related to 
Condorcet’s findings, Kenneth Arrow (1963) proved that all social choice procedures 
which satisfy a few minimal criteria of fairness and logicality are potentially 
dictatorial. William Riker (1982) has interpreted these results so that democracy 
cannot be about the fulfilment of the will of majority, because in many collective 
choice situations there is no single alternative which is preferred by the majority.
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Furthermore, the majority rule may be in contradiction with some other preference- 
aggregation methods which may have some other valuable properties.
These arguments, based on logical analysis, have been seen as a counterargument to 
those ‘populist’ theories of democracy according to which democracy is essentially a 
system in which the political decisions reflect the will of the people. As Budge (1993, 
153) notices, this argument in itself is not only against nationwide direct democracy but 
all kinds of decision-making institutions which apply majority voting: "The attempt to 
mobilize social choice theory against direct democracy seems to encounter the familiar 
pitfall of arguing against the possibility if democracy as such, rather than any particular 
form of it." The question is, therefore, what kinds of specific problems of preference- 
aggregation there are in representative and direct democracy. -
The models of social choice theory illustrate the logical problems of majoritarian 
theories of democracy. They can also be used to point out some of the problems of 
preference-aggregation within a single institution working under certain decision­
making rules, such as the referendum. However, they are based on rather restrictive 
assumptions and are not sufficient to characterize the complexities of large democratic 
systems. First, social choice models do not take into account the problem of the 
intensities of preferences. Not every group of individuals feels equally strongly about 
all issues. Second, preference-aggregation is only one stage of democratic process. The 
stages preceding it, the definition of the issues and alternatives and opinion-formation, 
may actually be far more important. Third, in modem representative democracies, there
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is no single political institution in which 'the decision-making' would take place. 
Political outcomes should be seen as a result of an interaction between different political 
actors with differing interest within certain institutional constraints. Finally, it may also 
be argued that democracy does not need to be perceived narrowly in terms of preference- 
aggregation, but rather in terms of some external values which the democratic process 
is expected to bring about.
The contestation for power, accountability of those in power and institutional checks and 
balances are the essential element of liberal theory democracy. In liberal theory, 
democratic process is not considered to be a value in itself, but rather it is expected to 
engender certain other values, such as maximization of individual liberty and welfare. 
The value of democracy is in the 'outputs' it brings about, a limited government which, 
to certain extent, acts according to the wishes of the public. In participatory theory of 
democracy, on the other hand, participation in the democratic process is seen as a value 
in itself. It also emphasizes the importance of'inputs' of the democratic process, such as 
public deliberation and participation, which are assumed to engender better reflected and 
more reasonable public opinion.
Therefore, the theoretical analysis of referendums requires consideration on various 
theories of democracy, and more profound analysis of how referendums relate to the 
institutions of representative democracy and how they function as a part of political 
process. Also, the normative evaluation of referendums depends on the overall view of 
democratic process, whether it is seen as a method to maximize individual ends, or a
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process which has value in itself. The use of referendums may be justified by both lines 
of argument: different types of referendums may be considered to be corrective with 
respect to the representation of popular interests and a check on the parliamentary 
majorities; but they may also be considered to enhance popular participation and 
deliberation.
Gordon Smith (1975,294) points out that the label of ‘ referendum’ refers to a variety 
of situations, and that these situations may only bear very superficial similarity between 
each other. Therefore, it is not to be expected that there would be 'a general theory of 
referendums'. Smith argues: "There is almost no connection between the window- 
dressing referendum operated by a dictator to bolster up his regime and the earnest 
deliberations which regularly take place in the Swiss cantons."
In the Part I lo i  the thesis, referendums in 22 countries are examined. Because the aim 
of the thesis is to discuss the question how the referendum fits to the pattern of 
democratic government, I will focus on the countries which have been democratic since 
the World War II, Anglo-Saxon and Western European democracies. All these countries 
are democratic in the sense that there are fair elections with competition between the 
parties. This means that I will exclude those cases in which the referendum has been 
used as a legitimization of totalitarian governments or as a part of the transition to 
democracy.
Following Gallagher and Uleri (1996), I will argue that the main distinctions between
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referendums may be made according to how and by whom they are initiated and who 
makes the legislative proposal to be voted upon. There are many functional implications 
which follow from the differences in the initiation and agenda-setting procedures.
One may differentiate ‘three worlds’ of referendums in the 22 democratic countries in 
the sample. Lipjhart (1984, 200) stresses the difference of the popular initiative 
compared to the referendum: "The referendum by itself entails a very modest step 
toward direct democracy but, combined with the initiative, it becomes a giant step." In 
the first world of referendums the citizens have a right to raise issues on the political 
agenda through popular initiatives, and make decisions upon them in referendums. It 
may be therefore argued that the popular initiatives are forms of ‘direct legislation’ 
which exist alongside with representative democracy. The initiatives are taken to polls 
several times yearly and often many proposals are voted simultaneously. This is the case 
in Switzerland and in the Western US states.
Countries like Australia, Denmark, Italy and Ireland, belong to the 'second world' of 
referendums. In these countries the referendum is regulated by the constitution and it is 
an integral part of the legislative process, but they are typically only used as a 
retrospective check on legislation passed by the parliament. There are no institutional 
provisions providing the citizens the right to raise issues on political agenda. The 
referendums are either demanded by some political actors or they are constitutionally 
required on certain types of issues, typically on constitutional amendments.
16
Most of the Western democracies are occasional users of referendums and belong to the 
'third world' of referendums. In these countries, referendums are used at ad hoc basis, 
when the parliamentary majority makes the decision on having a referendum. Often this 
procedure has not been constitutionally regulated at all. Furthermore, the countries 
belonging to 'the third world' have experienced only few referendums throughout their 
history. Such countries as Finland, Norway and Britain belong to the third world of 
referendums, whereas for example France and Sweden, perhaps, would be somewhere 
in the middle of the 'second' and the 'third world'. Finally, in some countries 
referendums are not used at the nation-level at all, for example in the Netherlands. In 
Western Germany the referendum has been controversial after the World War II, and 
since then it has not experienced any referendums at the federal level.
To illustrate the differences between referendums in different political systems, certain 
cases of referendums in Sweden, Denmark and in Switzerland are analysed. The 
Swedish referendum on nuclear power represents an ad hoc or optional referendum, and 
especially the party-political tactics related to the use of the referendum will be 
discussed. In the case of Danish referendums on European integration, the referendum 
was used as a check on representative decision-making, and thus as a conservative 
device. In the Swiss case the popular-initiative-based referendums are examined, 
especially their influence the political agenda. In all three cases, the features of 
referendum campaigns are discussed, especially deliberation, opinion-formation and 
participation related to the referendum. In the Swedish and Danish cases the approach 
is more descriptive, and the emphasis is in the political interaction and strategies related
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to the referendums. In the Swiss case the approach is more analytical and systematic, 
because the multiplicity of referendums makes it more important to assess overall 
influence of the institutions and more difficult to pick a single representative 'case'.
Finally, it is argued that there are links between the functions of various forms of 
referendums and different theories of democracy. Referendums based on popular 
initiatives may be considered to be a measure of popular self-government and 
participatory democracy, whereas law-controlling referendums are considered as a check 
on the parliamentary majority, and therefore they are more ‘Madisonian’ or conservative 
in character. In conjunction of the case studies, different practices of referendums are 
contrasted with the theoretical justifications given for them, and the problems of the 
current practices in fulfilling the normative ideals are discussed.
The Part I  of the thesis, consisting of Chapters 2 and 3, are theory-ridden and rather 
non-empirical. The empirical examples are used just as examples of the theoretical 
arguments. In the Chapter 2 the issues related to preference-aggregation in direct and 
in representative democracy, and the problems of majority rule are analysed using the 
concepts of social choice theory. In the Chapter 3 the relationship between the members 
of two different 'families’ of theories of democracy is explored, and the possible 
arguments for and against the referendum based on these theories are discussed. The 
Part II of the thesis is more empirical, and it is based on the description and analysis of 
existing institutions and practices of referendums. Chapter 4 is the first empirical 
chapter, and it contains a classification and a comparison of institutions in 22 democratic
18
countries and in California. The Chapters 5, 6 and 7 present case studies. The purpose 
of the case studies is to illustrate how the existing institutions of referendums are used 
by political actors to promote their own goals, and to what extent the political reality 
matches with the theoretical and normative justifications given to different forms of 
referendums.
Notes
1 The word plebiscite comes from the Latin words plebs, which means the common people, commoners, 
and scitum, a decree.
2 "Die Vorstellung einer Selbstregierung des Volkes und einer Identitatdemokratie sowie die damit 
verbundene Mythologisierung des Volkes als Willensubjekt sind endgtlltig zu verabschieden."
19
PART I: THEORY OF REFERENDUM
20
2. Referendum and the Will of the Majority
2.1 Arguments for the Majority Rule
In this chapter, three different issues related to the majority rule are discussed. First, I will 
consider different arguments put forward for and against the simple majority rule. Second, 
I will deal with the problems related to the definition of ‘the will of the majority’ in 
representative and in direct democracy. Third, I will question the meaning of the whole 
notion of ‘the will of the majority’, and the theories according to which democracy is 
essentially about the majority rule. The first four sections of this chapter mainly deal with 
choices between two alternatives, and from the section 2.5. onwards choices between more 
than two alternatives are considered.
Social choice theory examines the ways in which the individual preferences may be 
aggregated into social choices. The most central concept of social choice theory, preference, 
refers to the orderings in which individuals set certain alternative choices according to their 
values and tastes. The currently dominant view of democratic voting may be called the 
preference conception o f voting, which is based on individualist premises and on the idea 
that the concepts like ‘the public interest', 'the common good' and 'the will of people' may 
only be determined on the basis of the individual preferences. Furthermore, the votes 
expressing individual preferences should be aggregated into outcomes which please as many 
individuals as possible (Lewin 1991,7).
21
Brian Barry (1965, 58) puts forward a rule named the Majoritarian Principle: all disputes 
which require political settlement should be settled by majority vote, or by elected persons 
in accordance with the sentiments of the majority. The concept of the majority, however, 
means different things in different contexts. It may refer to the simple majority or the 
absolute majority. An alternative which wins a simple majority gets more votes than the 
other alternative in a pairwise comparison. The alternative winning the absolute majority is 
the one which gains more than half of the total votes. According to the special majority rules 
the winning alternative must gain at least some specified proportion of the votes, for 
example 2/3 or 5/6. Furthermore, the majority rule must be distinguished from the plurality 
rule, which defines the winner as the alternative which gains more first preferences than any 
other alternative. (Riker 1982,45.)
The reason why the simple majority rule is a superior choice method in cases in which there 
are only two alternatives is quite obvious. As Buchanan and Tullock (1962) argue: 
"Whenever a choice has to be made only a decision made by a simple majority will ensure 
that more are satisfied by the result than frustrated." Douglas Rae (1969) looks at the 
problem of choosing the decision-making rule as a problem of constitutional choice. He 
begins with the assumption that a rational individual favours a certain decision-making rule 
in a way which "optimize(s) the correspondence between his schedule of values and the list 
of policies which are imposed". In terms of individual preferences and imposed policies, 
there are four possible outcomes:
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A. Individual supports a proposal, but it is not imposed.1
B. Individual opposes a proposal, but it is imposed.
C. Individual supports a proposal, and it is imposed.
D. Individual opposes a proposal, and it is not imposed.
According to Rae (1969,42), rational individuals choose the decision-making rule by the 
following criterion:"One should choose that decision-rule which minimizes the sum of the 
expected frequencies for (A) in which the committee does not impose a policy which his 
value schedule leads him to support, and (B) in which the committee imposes a policy which 
his value schedule leads him to oppose." Following this criterion, and assuming that an 
individual is as likely to be on the winning as on the losing side, a rational individual ends 
up choosing the simple majority rule, because it maximizes the probability that the 
individual will ‘have his way* with respect to a given proposal. Rae does not assume that 
individuals are motivated by self-interest, but his account is based on a broader conception 
of ‘political individualism’, which means that political decisions should correspond 
individual values, regardless of whether they are based on self-interest, altruism or public 
interest.2
There is at least one important limitation in Rae's construction: an individual has a reason 
to choose majority rule only if it is as likely to end up on the winning side as on the losing 
side. This is not often the case in real-world politics, in which there usually are groups that 
tend to be in majority or in minority. In other words, the use of the majority rule cannot 
necessarily be justified in Rae’s terms in societies in which there are clear divisions between
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majority and minority groups.
Alsi Buchanan and Tullock (1962) discuss the problem of choosing the decision-making 
rule. Their argument is that the simple majority rule is not unique as a decision-making 
method, and that there may be good reasons for choosing some other rule. They show, 
especially, that the majority rule is not necessarily the best decision-making rule on the 
issues concerning the production of the public goods. Their analysis is based on the 
distinction between two kinds of costs involved in this kind of situation, ie. the decision­
making costs, caused by the bargaining for reaching the decision, and the external costs, 
which are the individual’s losses caused by the decisions which are not according to 
individual’s preferences. As the size of the majority required for a decision increases, the 
external costs tend to fall and the decision-making tend to costs rise. Buchanan and Tullock 
describe these costs by two curves, and the curve representing the sum of these curves 
depicts the total costs for an individual who participates in collective action. The optimal 
majority requirement lies at the lowest point of this curve which is described in the figure 
below.
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Figure 2.1 Optimal Decision-Making Rule by External Decision-Making Costs:
decision­
making
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number of individuals required 
to take collective action
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total costs
number of individuals required 
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Source: Buchanan & Tullock 1961.
A fundamental limitation of Buchanan's and Tullock's model is that it is an analysis of the 
production of public goods, and it may be appropriate only in these kinds of problems. In 
their analysis effectivity or Pareto-optimality is taken as the ideal for political decision­
making: the optimal political decision-making would be like perfect market condition which 
brings about only effective decisions. In Buchanan's and Tullock's model the only reasons 
for departing from the unanimity rule or Pareto-optimality, are the high decision-making 
costs caused by unanimous decision-making. Barry (1965,313) argues that Buchanan and 
Tullock’s construction favours the political status quo:
"The authors point out that there is no special reason to suppose that this will occur at the
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50 per cent mark. But it is evident that the only reason here for diverging from unanimity as 
a requirement for valid decisions is the cost of bargaining. In other words, the assumption 
underlying the construction of the 'total cost curve' is that each person has explicitly accepted 
the status quo. It has no relevance to the normal situation where there is no pre-existing 
agreement on status quo."
The protection of the political status quo is justified only if there is a pre-existing agreement 
on it. There are, however, many problems to be solved in the political arena, such as moral 
problems, distributive problems and problems of coordination, to which the assumption of 
the pre-existing consensus on the status quo does not necessarily apply. Therefore, the status 
quo is often not a politically neutral alternative, but an alternative supported by a certain 
group of individuals. The following examples, originally given by Duncan Black (1955), 
describe the difference between the situations when the requirement for qualified majority 
only blocks decision-making, and the situation when the requirement for qualified majority 
is in favour of some group of individuals. In the first example, there are "...a hundred persons 
on a hayride and a fork in the road looms ahead; 74 want to go right and 26 left. With a 
simple majority rule they will go right, but with a three-quarters majority rule they will stop. 
This does not, they say, represent the a 'victory' for the 26 over the 74 because the 26 don't 
get what they want either." If, on the other hand, the set-up is changed in the way, that there 
are hundred persons are approaching a river, "...26 want to stop for a bathe while the other 
74 want to go on. If as before the rule says that 75 are needed before the cart goes on, this 
does represent 'victory' for the 26, who have got precisely what they want." (Barry 1965, 
315.)
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According to Barry, most political choice situations resemble the latter example, in which 
the status quo is not a third, neutral alternative, but favoured by some group of individuals. 
The protection of the status quo, for example by the requirement for a qualified majority, 
then favours any sufficiently large group in minority, because they get their way regardless 
of the opinions of the majority. In these kinds of situations the requirement for a qualified 
majority effectively means 'the tyranny of a minority'. Of course the case may also be like 
in the first example that there are two groups in the society which want to go equally far in 
opposite directions. In this case it may be justified, especially if they were approximately 
equal in size, that they should compromise and stay where they are.3 Furthermore, certain 
issues may be characterized as asymmetric: staying in the status quo may not rule out future 
moves from it, whereas moving from status quo may rule out the possibility of returning 
back. In other words, in some situations it may be more difficult to reverse either of the 
options. It was argued in the Scandinavian EU-referendums that the yes-choice, the 
membership in the EU, is more ‘final’ than the no-choice, staying out.
Buchanan's and Tullock's analysis is based on the assumption that individuals' preferences 
are based on self-interest. This assumption may be criticised for being too narrow and not 
being sufficient for describing the nature of the individual interests in politics. As Rae (1969, 
43) asserts:
"...we are interested in political problem in its own right, and this must not be submerged in 
the conceptual (sometimes even ideological) path of economic individualism. We do not 
wish, therefore, to conceive the problem of having one's way as a means to success in a 
larger economic game, but to leave the source of individual values open to the unspecified 
"value schedules" of individuals."
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By using the concept of ‘value schedule’, Rae meant that individuals do not necessarily 
make decisions following to their self-interest, but they may also justify their choices by 
their perception of the good of the whole society. As mentioned before, the preference 
conception of democracy does not give any special value in altruistic or public-regarding 
preferences, because the good of the society is just derivable from the good of each 
individual. This may lead to difficulties in political problems which are zero-sum like, or in 
the cases when individuals get satisfaction from other people's misfortunes. As Goodin 
(1983, 77) argues: "Allowing social decisions to turn on individual preferences might, in 
communities of sufficiently bloody-minded individuals, produce some pretty onerous 
outcomes." This is the problem which is broadly discussed in the liberal theory of 
democracy, and it provides the most powerful argument against majoritarianism.4 These 
questions will be discussed in the following chapter, but before this, I will examine some 
other problems of the majority rule.
2.2 Representative and Direct Democracy - Ostrogorski Paradox
The simplest argument for representative democracy in large political entities is that the 
complexity of the issues and the time needed for reaching decisions makes direct democracy 
impractical and virtually impossible. Representative democracy is therefore often regarded 
as the only possible form of nationwide democracy, and the representative institutions are 
established in order to avoid the high costs caused by popular participation in decision-
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making. Democracy in modern states and also in other large organizations may be 
understood so that the people delegate their decision-making power to the representatives, 
and the opinion of the majority of the representatives is thought approximately to equal to 
the will of the majority of the people.
There are reasons why this idea can be criticised. First, as it will be shown later in this 
chapter, democracy may not be defined in terms of the fulfilment of the will of majority, 
because it is not logically possible to determine the will of the majority on some political 
issues. Second, the relationship between direct and representative democracy is not as 
simple because the representatives do not just reflect the opinions of the people they 
represent. Third, the nature of the representative decision-making differs from ‘direct 
democracy’ in many crucial respects.
Some authors have suspected that the failure of representatives to achieve political 
decisions which reflect the opinions of the majority of the people may simply result from the 
inherent logic of representative decision-making. Early in this century, a Russian political 
scientist, Moise Ostrogorski (1902) argued that all kinds of mischief may follow when issues 
are mixed together in elections'. The problems of preference-aggregation in representative 
democracy have been formally analysed by Rae and Daudt (1976) and Lagerspetz (1995; 
1996). The following example shows how representative democracy may distort the will of 
the majority in a situation in which there are several issues with two alternatives. This idea is 
named by Rae and Daudt as the Ostrogorski-Paradox, and it may be summarized as
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follows:
(1) There are several political issues (>2). Each party has a clear-cut position on each issue, 
and each group of voters has definite preferences over the alternatives.
(2) On each issue, there are two alternatives and either of the alternatives is supported by the 
majority of voters.
(3) Issues are independent and non-complementary.
(4) In parliamentary elections, each voter chooses the party with which he agrees on more 
rather than fewer issues, and his vote is uniquely determined by his ordinal issue preferences.
(5) The electoral system is completely proportional, i.e. the allocation of parliamentary seats 
is fully in proportion with the allocation of the votes between the parties.
(6) There are two parties (A and B), and each takes a distinct, clear-cut stand on each issue. 
Now, let us assume that
(7) On each issue, party A takes the view of electoral majority and party B takes the minority 
view. But, paradoxically, it may be the case:
(8) Party B representing the views supported by the minority in each issue wins the majority 
of the parliamentary seats.
The following table describes a situation in which this happens: 
Table 2.1: The Ostrogorski-Paradox
Groups of Voters
Issues
(i) (2) (3)
X (20%) a b b 60%
Y (20%) b a b votes
Z (20%) b b a forB
V (20%) a a a
W (20%) a a a
Referendum outcomes a a a
60% prefer alternative a on each issue.
Party A's political programme consists of the issue position a on each issue (a, a, a) and party 
B has the programme (b,b,b). The groups of voters (X, Y, Z, V, W) are equal in size (20%).
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If there were a referendum on each of three issues, the alternative a  supported by the 
party A would get the majority of 60% in each referendum. However, in an election 
groups X, Y and Z would vote for the party B, because represents their preferences in 
two out of three issues. Therefore, the party B gets a majority of 60% of the 
parliamentary seats (assumption 5). Rae and Daudt call this kind of situation an inverted 
majority decision.  Inverted majorities are caused by the use of a compound method, 
majority vote among the representatives. Rae and Daudt argue that the inverted majority 
is not probably very likely but it is possible when there are at least three issues and four 
groups of voters with different preferences. (Lagerspetz 1995, 51-52; Rae & Daudt 
1976, 391-393.)
The Ostrogorski-Paradox proves that representative democracy may distort the will of 
the majority just because it is a compound social choice method. Misrepresentation 
follows from the inherent logic of representative democracy, and it does not depend on 
whether the voters cast their vote for parties or individual representatives who have an 
imperative mandate, in other words, who are obliged to follow the opinions of the 
majority. All that matters is that the voters do not choose between separate issue 
positions but bundles of positions. Rae and Daudt also prove that there is a relationship 
between the Ostrogorski-paradox and the Condorcet-paradox (discussed later on in this 
chapter). Actually, in every instance of the Ostrogorski-paradox there is an underlying 
Condorcet-paradox. This is examined for example by Bezembinder and van Acker. 
(Bezembinder & Van Acker 1985.)
Moral philosopher Elisabeth Anscombe (1981) has pointed out a paradox which is the 
reverse of the Ostrogorski-Paradox. She shows that even if the decisions are made in 
referendums following the preferences of the majority, the majority of voters may find
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that most decisions are against their preferences. The same table which described the 
Ostrogorski paradox can be used for illustrating the Anscombe-Paradox:
Table 2.2 The Anscombe-Paradox
Issues
Groups of Voters (i) (2) (3)
X (20%) a b b
Y (20%) b a b
Z (20%) b b a
V (20%) a a a
W (20%) a a a
Referendum Outcome a a a
(Source: Lagerspetz 1996.)
Now, if the issues are voted upon in separate referendums, the outcome is {a,a,a). The 
majority of the voters (groups X,Y,Z), however, prefer the alternative b in two out three 
issues. Furthermore, the majority of voters would have been better off if the decisions 
were made by compound method, in other words, by the representatives. This implies 
that the majority of the voters would prefer representative to direct decision-making 
and, therefore, it may be argued that direct democracy is against the will of the majority. 
This example supports the argument that ‘the will of majority’ is dependant on the way 
in which it is defined.
Moreover, the Anscombe paradox captures a problem of social choice only if it is
assumed that the preferences on the issues are non-separable. Anscombe paradox is not
a paradox if it is considered to be appropriate to vote on the issues separately. The
Ostrogorski paradox may come up in situations in which the issues are assumed to be
separable. Based on this, one could argue that normative support for referendums must
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be based on a belief that preferences on some issues are separable. This condition was 
stated in the assumption 3 of the Ostrogorski paradox, according to which the outcomes 
are independent or the preferences are separable if there is no causal dependence 
between them or if the issues are not complementary. In other words, the value of each 
outcome for a given voter on issue i does not depend on his estimate of the outcome on 
issue j.
The Ostrogorski paradox reveals the logical possibility of the misrepresentation of the 
will of the majority in representative democracy in situations in which quite ideal 
conditions apply. The assumptions put forward above rule out, for example, such 
explanations for inversion as that parties offer programmes lacking issue positions 
(assumption 6), or that the electoral system is not fully proportional, or that voters 
choose parties on the basis of some other criteria than the issue positions (assumption 
4), or that the representatives do not follow the preferences of the voters.
2.3 Intensities of Preferences in Direct and Representative Democracy
It seems to be quite plausible to argue that individuals are not equally interested in all 
issues but they tend to feel more strongly about certain issues than about the others. In 
other words, individuals may have asymmetric intensities of the preferences. Lagerspetz 
(1995) represents the following example in which there are three groups of voters, 
which are equal in size. The issues that some group of voters considers as especially 
important are printed in bold.
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Table 2.3 Representation and Intensities of Preferences
ISSUE
(1) (2) (3)
GROUP OF X a a b
VOTERS Y a b a
Z b a a
If a referendum on each issue was held, the outcome would be (a, a, a), whereas in an election 
party B, representing the position b, would get all the parliamentary seats. This happens if 
it is assumed that the voters trade off their views so that they cast their votes in the election 
only according to the issue in which they have the most intensive preferences, and are thus 
ready to accept decisions which are against their will in the less salient issues. This example 
shows that direct democracy would actually be against the will of the people if the intensities 
of the preferences are taken into account, and that in some situations the individuals may 
prefer representation to direct democracy.
The problem of the voters in the referendum of mentioned in the above example was that 
they were not able to trade their votes. In representative democracy there is a more limited 
number of voters than in direct democracy, which makes it easier to have information about 
the other voters’ preferences, to form coalitions, to have communication and to make 
agreements.
34
Representation also makes bargaining and vote-trading possible between the voters. Vote- 
trading means that the partners of the trade agree to vote against their interests in less salient 
issues and receive a vote of the partner in more salient issues. Therefore vote-trading 
functions as a mechanism which brings the intensities of the preferences into decision­
making. The argument for vote trading has been put forward by Buchanan and Tullock 
(1962, 145). According to them a voter can improve his welfare "if he accepts a decision 
contrary to his desire in an area where his preferences are weak in exchange for a decision 
in his favour in an area where his feelings are stronger." Vote trading or logrolling has also 
been analysed by for example Riker and Brams (1973) and Schwartz (1977). Rikerand 
Brams put forward an argument against logrolling: they point out the fact that vote trading 
causes external costs for those who do not carry out such trades and that there is a ‘Paradox 
of Logrolling’, which means that it may be the case that traders gain from the logrolling 
individually (have positive incentive for it) but everyone, the traders included, will 
eventually be worse off if such trades are carried out.
This raises some questions of the nature of preference-aggregation and democracy, especially 
the question whether the intensities of the preferences should be taken into account at the 
first place. However, as a conclusion of the above discussion one may argue like Butler and 
Ranney (1978) that a referendum as a preference-aggregation method tends to represent more 
‘blunt’ form of majoritarianism than any forms of representative democracy, because there 
fewer mechanisms to count the intensities of the preferences. Furthermore, majoritarian 
instruments, such as the referendum, are not considered to be appropriate for the decision­
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making on issues which have very asymmetric influences on different groups of the society, 
and in which the vital interests of certain groups of citizens are at stake. However, as it will 
be pointed out later on, the referendum is not necessarily always strictly majoritarian, and 
in some contexts it may actually be used for protection of the interests of minorities.
2.4 Separation of Issues
As the Ostrogorski paradox illustrates, direct democracy may be characterized by the 
separation of issues. The separation of the issues is not, however, necessarily the correct way 
of framing political problems, because issues may be interdependent in character. It may be 
the case that voters prefer the two separate political states of affairs a and b to the status 
quo, but they prefer the status quo to the state of affair in which both a and b prevail. For 
example, Lacy and Niou (1995) have proved the fact that if some voters have non-separable 
preferences over multiple propositions, the majority rule may fail to select the policies 
preferred by the majority.6
The following example shows a simple case when this happens. There are three voters and 
two issues, let them be the construction of a coal energy plant and the construction of a 
nuclear power plant. The voters do not know each other’s preferences and therefore they 
cannot vote strategically. The voters vote as follows in two referendums held simultaneously 
on these two issues:
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coal energy nuclear power
N(o)
Y
Y
voter 1 Y(es)
voter 2 N
voter 3 Y
The yes-votes are the majority in both issues, i.e. both the nuclear power plant and the coal 
energy plant will be built. The voters have, however, the following preferences over the four 
possible policy outcomes of the two issues:
The preferences of voters 1 and 2 are non-separable over the two issues, nuclear power and 
coal energy plant. This means that voter 1 supports the development of coal energy, and 
voter 2 supports nuclear power to the status quo in energy politics, but they both would 
prefer maintaining the status quo to the development of both forms of energy. According to 
the preferences over the four possible policy outcomes the majority preference relation is YN 
P NY? NNY YY. If the non-separability of preferences were taken into account, the outcome 
would be that the coal power plant will be built but not the nuclear power plant. 
Furthermore, the outcome of separated referendums (YY) turns out to be the majority loser 
when the issues are treated as non-separable. In other words, in this kind of situation, voting 
on nuclear power and coal energy issues separately could only distort the will of the 
majority.
voter 1 
voter 2 
voter 3
YN P! NY  P, NN P, YY 
NY  P2 YN P2 NN P2 YY 
YY P3 YN P3 AT P3 NN
The dependency of preferences is naturally a problem only if the two issues are voted
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simultaneously, and when the voters do not know the preferences of the other voters, because 
in this case they could reveal their preferences strategically. Also vote trading is a potential 
solution to the problem. Strategic voting and vote trading are more possible in representative 
democracy, in which there are fewer members and therefore better conditions for 
communication and interaction. The problems caused by non-separable preferences are 
therefore most likely to materialize in omnibus referendums, i.e. referendums in which there 
are many issues to be voted upon. These kinds of referendums are common in the US states 
and also in Switzerland. In Switzerland the problem may emerge because sometimes 
initiatives are voted together with the governmental counter-proposals on the same issue, and 
because recently it has become possible to cast a 'double yes' vote, a yes-vote both to the 
initiative and the counterproposal (see Chapter 7).
The possibility of interdependent preferences, again, displays how the outcomes depend on 
the procedures used. It may also be regarded as another theoretical reason for supporting 
representative democracy - in addition to the disregard of direct democracy of intensities of 
preferences discussed earlier. As Lacy and Niou (1995,19) conclude the problems of the 
inseparable preferences in 'referendum democracy' and put forward an argument for 
representative decision-making:
"The important advantage of legislatures over direct democracy is that voters in a legislature 
are better able than voters in a referendum to communicate their preferences and coordinate 
their votes. People voting on a referendum are forced to cast blind votes that consider neither 
the outcome of votes on related issues nor the preferences of other voters. Legislatures 
encourage communication and coordination, forms of political participation often 
overlooked by proponents of direct democracy, yet these forms of participation are crucial 
to the selection of optimal social outcomes when people hold non-separable preferences."
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2.5. The Majority Rule and Other Preference Aggregation Methods
The first four sections of this chapter dealt with binary choice situations. Now choices 
between more than two alternatives will be considered. In the cases with more than two 
alternatives the simplest social choice method would be probably the plurality rule, 
according to which the winner is the alternative which gets more first preferences than any 
other alternative. The plurality rule is used for example in the first-by-the post elections. The 
limitation of the plurality rule is that it does not take into account voters' preferences over 
all alternatives, because only voters' most preferred alternatives are counted. As first pointed 
out by the French mathematician Jean Charles Borda (1784), the plurality winner of a three- 
candidate election may be a majority loser, in other words, there may be contradiction 
between the plurality rule and the majority rule. The following example shows a simple case 
with three alternatives when this happens:
Table 2.4 Contradiction between Plurality Rule and Simple Majority Rule
Group 1: 40 % of voters a P, b Pt c
Group 2: 30% of voters b P2 c P2 a
Group 3: 30% of voters c P3 b P3 a
In the example displayed in table 2.1,70% of voters prefer b to c, 60 % of voters prefers b 
to a, and 60% of voters prefer c to a. This means that there is a transitive majority preference
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relation is b P c P a and that the alternative b is the majority winner and the alternative a is 
the majority loser. However, the alternative a, the majority loser is be the plurality winner, 
because 40% of the voters considers it as the most preferred alternative, in other words, a 
gains more first preferences than any other alternative. Apart from the plurality rule, the 
majority rule may also contradict some other intuitively fair preference-aggregation methods, 
for example the positional preference-aggregation method introduced by Borda.7
2.6 Intransitivity of the Majority Rule
The problems of majority cycles have been very central to social choice literature since 
Kenneth Arrow's ‘Social Choice and Individual Values’ (1951). Institutional and normative 
implications of the problems of the majority cycles have been dealt with for example in 
William Riker's ‘Liberalism against Populism’ (1982). The problem of cyclical majorities 
was found out by French mathematician and philosopher Condorcet (1785/1976)8. He 
examined the following question: what is the analogy of the majority rule, in which more 
than 1/2 of the given votes is required, in the cases in which there are more than two 
alternatives? Condorcet's ideal decision-making rule in such cases is based on information 
of voters' full preference orderings over all alternatives. Condorcet defines the majority 
winner in the choice between more than two alternatives so that the winner is the alternative 
which is supported by the majority of the voters against any other alternative (Condorcet 
winner).
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Condorcet demonstrated the major defect of the method of defining the majority winner by 
pair-wise comparisons, which is the intransitivity o f the majority rule. Condorcet's findings 
were a result of his efforts to develop a probabilistic theory of voting. Later on, the problem 
of cyclical majorities has been treated as a problem of ordinalist welfare economics. This 
means that the problem affects both the 'preference' and the 'epistemic' conception of 
democracy which will be discussed in the following chapter. In terms of social choice 
theory, the possibility of cyclical majorities means that the preferences of a group of 
individuals, aggregate preference orderings, need not be hierarchically ordered but can be 
circular. The following example shows a simple case when this happens. There are three 
voters who have the following preferences over three alternatives:
Table 2.5 Cyclical Majority Preference Relation
Voter 1: xPj yPjZ
Voter 2: y  P2 z P2 x
Voter 3: zP 3jtP3y
The majority or Condorcet-winner is the alternative which is supported by the majority 
against all the other alternatives in pair-wise comparisons. In the example above there is no 
Condorcet-winner, because x is preferred to y, y  is preferred to z, and again, z is preferred to 
x. This can be expressed by the following notation: x P y  P z P x. This means that the 
majority preference relation between the all three alternatives is cyclical. More generally, the 
Condorcet-winner does not exist in cases when there is a cycle between the alternatives on 
the top of the preference ordering, a top cycle.
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This problem is also the essence of Kenneth Arrow's General Impossibility Theorem in 
'Social Choice and Individual Values' (1951). The concept of social choice function refers to 
all methods of aggregating individual preferences into social choices. Following Riker (1982, 
116-118), Arrow's theorem means that no social choice function can simultaneously satisfy 
certain conditions which may be divided into conditions of rationality (logicality) and 
fairness. Arrow's conditions of rationality are the following:
I Connectivity: For each pair of alternatives x and y, either x is weakly preferred to y(*Ry), 
in other words, x is considered at least as good as.y; or y  is weakly preferred to x  (yRx). This 
means that either x is preferred to y  (xPy) or_y is preferred to x (yPx), or there is indifference 
between x  and y  (xly).
II Transitivity: If x is preferred to y  and y  is preferred to z, then x is preferred to z. If x is 
preferred to y, and there is indifference between y  and z, then x  is preferred to z. 
Furthermore, if x weakly preferred as y,and y  is weakly preferred to z, then x  is weakly 
preferred to z. Arrow's theorem deals with the ideals of democratic preference-aggregation, 
and in this context it is reasonable to require that individuals' preference orderings satisfy this 
condition, because it captures the intuition of the minimal rationality of a choice.
Arrow's conditions of fairness are as follows:
HI Unrestricted Domain (U): All possible preference profiles, i.e. all permutations of 
individual preference orderings over the set of possible outcomes, are allowable. No 
individual preference ordering is ruled out. The justification of the condition of unrestricted 
domain goes as follows: If social choices are to be based exclusively on individual
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judgments, then to restrict an individuals' judgments in any way means that the social 
outcome is based as much on the restriction as it is on individual judgments. The discussion 
on the condition of single-peakedness later on is related to this condition.
The following conditions of fairness are based on the idea of positive responsiveness, in 
other words, on the principle that the outcome of a social choice method depends on voters' 
participation:
IV Monotonicity or Positive Association: If a voter raises the valuation of the winning 
alternative, it should not become a loser. The condition of monotonicity may be justified as 
follows: the purpose of democratic preference-aggregation methods is that the outcomes are 
based on people's participation. In this respect it would be bizarre if the social choice method 
would count individual preferences negatively.
V Citizen's Sovereignty: A social choice is imposed if there exists an alternative x, which 
is a winner for any set of individual preferences. The condition of citizen's sovereignty seems 
quite reasonable, because if it is not satisfied, the social choice has nothing to do with voters' 
preferences and democratic participation is meaningless.
Conditions IV and V enter in the proofs of Arrow's theorem in the form of the condition of 
Unanimity or Pareto-optimality P which goes as follows: If everyone prefers alternative 
x to y, the social choice function does not choose y. The conditions of monotonicity and
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citizen's sovereignty together imply Unanimity.
VI Nondictatorship (D): According to Arrow, non-dictatorship means that there is no 
individual whose preferences are automatically society's preferences independently of the 
preferences of all other individuals. This should be interpreted that there is no such 
individual i whose preferences are identical to the social choice, no matter what everyone 
else’s preferences are. Sometimes the condition of non-dictatorship is (mis)understood as 
follows: there does not exist such an individual i that no matter what z’s preferences are, they 
will be identical to the social choice, no matter of the preferences of everyone else. MacKay 
(1980,8) and Riker (1982,118-9), for example, have justified this condition on the grounds 
that the method of social choice should not be just rubber stamping of one person rule, 
because the whole idea of democracy is making collective choices. This is obviously true, 
but is not the correct interpretation of what is required in Arrow's theorem. Arrow's condition 
simply requires that any social choice function always makes the choice that at least one 
individual desires, but this does not mean that this individual is a particular individual i. 
Dictators in Arrow’s theorem’s sense do not necessarily even know that they are dictators. 
Therefore, the concept of ‘dictatorship’ has a very specific meaning in Arrow’s theorem 
which differs from the general interpretation of the concept.9
VII Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives (IIA): According to this condition, a social 
choice method chooses the same alternative as the collective choice every time it is applied 
to the same preference profile. This condition, like other conditions of fairness, requires that
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the social choice is based only on voters' preference orderings over the alternatives. This 
condition is quite controversial because it rules out for example all the positional aggregation 
methods, such as the Borda count. Furthermore, it rules out the possibility that the intensities 
of the preferences were taken into account when aggregating preferences. In fact, one 
possible cure for the problem of intransitivity of the majority rule is to take the intensities 
of the preferences into account for example by allowing vote-trading.
The contradiction between the conditions of rationality and fairness results in the cases 
where the majority preference relation is cyclical or intransitive, for example x  P y  P z P x 
of the table 2.5. Now, if one of the alternatives is chosen, the outcome is necessarily imposed 
by a particular voter or coalition of voters, which appears to be the dictator. Therefore, the 
essence of Arrow's theorem can be summed up as a possibility of contradiction between the 
conditions II (transitivity) and IV (nondictatorship). This means that all decisive social 
choice methods which choose one alternative (single-valued social choice functions) are 
potentially dictatorial in Arrow’s sense. (See for example McKay 1981).
A very important corollary of Arrow's theorem is so-called Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem 
(Gibbard 1973, Satterthwaite 1975), which proves that every decisive social method (ie. 
chooses a single alternative) is either manipulable or dictatorial, if there are more than two 
alternatives and at least three voters. Manipulability means, first, that voters may have an 
interest to vote strategically, in other words, to misrepresent their preferences, and that 
voting can be characterized as a game-like situation. This has serious consequences for the
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interpretation of the outcomes of social choice methods, because there is no guarantee that 
voters have represented their true preferences. Second, manipulability means the possibility 
of agenda-manipulation, which means that those who control the agenda and the voting 
procedures may achieve the outcomes they want by structuring the procedures.
In order to be successful, however, both forms of manipulation (strategic voting and agenda- 
manipulation) require information on other voters' preferences. This kind of information is 
normally not equally distributed in the society and hence the access to information becomes 
an important power resource in the voting situations. This point is sometimes used to argue 
the merits of representative decision-making compared to referendums, because the 
representatives tend to have better access to information on the preferences of the other 
voters than the ordinary citizens. This is because there is a limited number of voters, and also 
because the representatives are more likely to be aware of the strategic character of the 
voting situations. Therefore, it may be argued that the representatives have better capacities 
for strategic voting, which is an important way of counteracting the manipulation power of 
the agenda-setters.
2.7 The Theoretical and Practical Significance of Cycles: Single-Peakedness and Multi­
dimensionality
Theoretically, the frequency of the majority cycles depends on the number of alternatives 
and, to lesser extent, on the number of voters. For example, when there are three alternatives,
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x, y and z, the following six (3 x 2 x 1 = 6) orderings are possible: xyz, xzy, yxz, yzx, zxy, 
zyx.10. When the number of alternatives is three, the probability of cycles rises from 0.056 
up to about 0.09 as the number of voters increases. This means that in the choice between 
three alternatives, the probability of cycles never exceeds 0.1. However, the probability of 
cycles approaches the limit of 1.00 as the number of alternatives increases. (Abrams 1980, 
92-93.)
These probabilities are based on purely theoretical calculations. For example, it is not very 
realistic to assume that all preference orderings are equally likely. In reality some preference 
orderings are more likely to be chosen than others. It may be argued that the preference 
profiles, which consists of all individual preference orderings, tend to fulfil the condition of 
single-peakedness. (Riker 1982,121.) The basic idea of the condition of single-peakedness 
is that voters assess the alternatives with respect to a single attribute. In other words, voting 
takes place in a policy space with one dimension. In this case voters' preferences may be 
described in a one-dimensional continuum. In Figures 2.2a and 2.2b below voters' 
preferences over the alternatives x, y and z are described in such a coordinate in which the 
points in the horizontal axis represent the alternatives and points in the vertical axis represent 
the positions of the alternatives in voters' preference orders. If voters' preference orderings 
are all strong, they can be described with three points in the coordinate. If these points are 
combined with line segments, we may get four types of curves: monotonically increasing, 
monotonically decreasing, curves with a peak in the middle, or curves with a through in the 
middle. (Nurmi 1987, 17.) Figure 2.2a displays a single-peaked preference profile and
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Figure 2.2b a non-single-peaked preference profile:
Figure 2.2: Single-Peaked and Non-Single-Peaked Preference Profile 
2.2a 2.2b
1
2
3
x y z
1
2
3
x y z
If the preference profile is single-peaked, the majority preference ordering is transitive and 
the alternative preferred by the median voter is the majority winner, in the figure 2.2a the 
alternative^ preferred by voter b. The condition of single-peakedness is in contradiction with 
the condition of Unrestricted Domain in Arrows' theorem, and it implies transitivity of social 
preference orderings.
The political interpretation of single-peakedness is that there is only one ideological 
dimension, for example the traditional left-right. In such situations voters' preferences tend 
to be single-peaked. For example, a left-wing voter supporting the nationalization of 
industries prefers the centrist position of maintaining status quo over the right-wing position 
of further privatization. The reasons why voters' preferences are single-peaked can be found
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in political culture which creates a common view of the political dimension, the criterion 
according to which the alternatives are ranked. It may also be argued that the relevant 
political dimension is created and maintained by certain kind of political discourse.11
The single-peakedness condition belongs to a larger set of Exclusion Conditions, which 
includes also other logically possible solutions to the problem of intransitive social choices. 
Single-peakedness is probably the most plausible of these conditions but not the only one. 
In addition to it, there is also the condition of single-troughedness, which may be plausible 
in some contexts. (See Miller 1983,738-739.) In general, exclusion conditions apply only 
in situations in which there is only one political dimension. Balance conditions may prevail 
also in such situations when exclusion conditions do not apply, in multidimensional voting 
situations. For example, national elections can be better described as a multidimensional than 
a single-dimensional voting situation, because political choices are typically made according 
to multiple criteria. The voters have to choose between candidates or parties which represent 
different positions in multiple issues prevalent in politics and raised in the electoral 
campaign. The electoral voting may be characterized as voting for alternatives which 
represent a bundle of positions on certain issue dimensions, for example, voting for party A 
which supports more defence spending and less welfare spending than party B. When this 
is the case, the voting situation can be described with multidimensional spatial models. The 
main assumption of the spatial models is that the voters make their choices between the 
candidates or the parties using the information of the their positions on separate issues. Each 
voter has an ideal point, and he or she votes for the candidate or the party which represents
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the position which is the nearest to their ideal point.
The idea of equilibrium conditions is based on ‘the symmetry of disagreement’, in which the 
opposing preference orderings ‘balance out’ each other. If the number of voters is odd and 
if the preference ordering can be paired in a way that the orderings in each pair are opposite 
to each other, then the majority preference ordering is transitive. The situation can also be 
described as a tie which is broken by the remaining unpaired ordering, the majority 
preference ordering being identical to this ordering (Miller 1983,739). For example in figure 
2.2b voters' a and c preference orderings are the opposite and balance out each other and the 
alternative z  preferred most by the remaining voter b is the majority winner.
Plott (1967) has demonstrated that in multidimensional voting situations balance conditions 
typically do not work, and therefore it is very uncommon that any alternative would turn out 
to be the majority winner. Moreover, McKelvey (1976) has proven that if Plott's balance 
condition is not met, the transitivity of majority rule fails entirely and a majority preference 
cycle covers the whole alternative space. On the other hand, Richard Niemi (1969) has 
shown that the probabilities of the occurrence of top cycles reduce to tiny proportions also 
in this kind of cases when there is a reasonable consensus on the issue dimensions in the 
multidimensional case. This, again, raises the question how the ‘political dimensions’ are 
constructed, which draws the attention to political culture, and the political discussion 
preceding the decision-making, in which the qualities of alternatives are judged. 
Furthermore, the separation of issues may be seen as a cure for the problem of the cyclical
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majorities. Barber (1984,204-205) argues that the intransitivity of the majority rule is more 
typical to representative democracy, because the separation of issues and issue-by-issue 
voting in direct democracy decrease the number of political dimensions, and thus increase 
the possibility of the transitivity of the majority rule.
There are also some other ways out of the chaos created by cyclical majorities. It may be 
argued that all decisive decision-making institutions impose equilibrium upon the majority 
cycles. The outcomes generated by institutions may be called structure-induced equilibria, 
which is a result of certain procedures, on contrast to the pure equilibrium of the situations 
in which the majority winner is chosen. The social choice methods tend to have some more 
or less arbitrary mechanisms of breaking the majority cycles. In multistage voting methods, 
such as the elimination and amendment agendas used in the parliamentary and committee 
voting, the chairman may be decisive because he is able to the order in which the alternatives 
are voted upon. The social choice methods used in referendums and elections typically break 
the cycles by taking into account only the voters’ first preferences.
More generally, the social choices fundamentally depend on the agenda used in the choice 
situations. Political agenda-setting may be defined generally in terms of the selection of i) 
the issues on which collective decisions are made, ii) the possible policy alternatives on 
these issues, and iii) the procedures by which the social choices are determined. With respect 
to the importance to the final outcome, this process is at least as important as the actual 
preference-aggregation. In elections and referendums, the political issues, alternatives and
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procedures are largely defined by some kind of political elite, ie. parties, bureaucrats and 
MPs, and also the media, and the electorate just react to these.
2.8 Implications for the Referendum - Agenda-Manipulation
Despite the logical argument against the majority rule, the support of the majority, achieved 
for example in a referendum, for a certain policy option against another remains a strong 
legitimizer of political decisions. Furthermore, the possibility of majority cycles only exists 
in the cases where there are more than two alternatives. In almost all referendums the voters 
have a choice between two mutually exclusive alternatives, more precisely yes or no to the 
proposition put forward in the ballot paper. There are only very few exceptions to this rule 
(Sweden 1957,1980 and Australia 1977). This raises the question whether the argument put 
forward above has any relevance with respect to referendums.
The concept of the outcome set refers to the set of all possible states of affairs, or in Arrow’s 
terms social states, which may follow when a political decision upon a certain issue is 
implemented. The outcome set may be continuous or discrete. The character of the outcome 
set depends on the nature of the issue and the interpretation of the causal effects decisions 
are expected to have (See for example Riker 1982,181-182). In the previous discussion of 
Arrow's paradox, outcomes were assumed to be discrete. However, Arrow's (1963, 17) 
definition for social states, following his economic approach to democracy, is quantitative: 
"...(A) complete description of the amount of each commodity in the hands of each
individual, the amount of labour to be supplied by each individual, the amount of each 
productive resource invested in each type of productive activity, and the amounts of various 
types of collective activity."
At least some political choices are made between innumerable and thus continuous set of 
alternatives. This is the basic assumption for example of the spatial models of party 
competition. When the referendum is held upon quantifiable issues, the set of different 
possible social states following from the decision-making is continuous (for example the 
amount of money spent on defence, the tax rate). Examples of referendums held on this kind 
of issues are Californian referendums on tax limitations. In few cases, however, the nature 
of the outcome may be characterized as ‘naturally binary’. A trivial example of a ‘naturally 
binary issue’ is the left or right-hand traffic of the Swedish referendum in 1958.
The problem of infinity of the policy alternatives may also be prevalent in non-quantifiable 
issues. A referendum may be held on issues in which the outcomes are certain conventional 
facts, such as the ratification of an international treaty or declaring a war. In these cases, the 
outcome set appears to be binary, because injudicial sense there are only two possible states 
of affairs which may follow, ratifying or not ratifying the treaty or declaring or not declaring 
a war. However, at least hypothetically there are also mediating alternatives like ratifying the 
treaty after renegotiation or declaring a war unless an apology is uttered (See Riker 1982, 
181). For example, in the two Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty, a third 
alternative was introduced, a renegotiated treaty. Therefore, the binary character of these
issues is not as clear-cut as it first appears and some of the underlying alternatives have been 
excluded.12
In the Swedish referendum on nuclear power, which will be discussed more extensively in 
Chapter 5, there were three alternatives and the vote was taken following the plurality rule. 
However, the alternatives put forward in the ballot paper clearly did not represent all the 
possible policy choices, and the parties which defined the alternatives also defined the 
choice of the energy policy to a large extent. In those situations in which there are more than 
two possible outcomes, those political actors who define the alternatives which eventually 
are put forward to the voters have a significant influence on the final outcome. In other 
words, the mutually exclusive alternatives x and y  put forward to the voters do not 
necessarily represent the whole outcome set in a certain decision-making situation. There 
may be a third outcome z, which may be preferred to both x and y. The outcome z has simply 
not been put forward as alternative by those, who control the agenda-setting procedures. The 
reintroduction of the third alternative may also cause the emergence of a cyclical majority. 
Let us assume a referendum between two alternatives x andy, and the following preferences:
60% xP  y  
40% yVx .
In this referendum, x is the outcome chosen by the majority (and plurality) of the voters. If 
the third alternative, z, is introduced the preference profile may, for example, turn out to be 
either:
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1) 30% x ? y ? z  
3 0 % z ? x ? y  
40% z V y V x
or: 2) 30% x P y  P z
30%z¥ X? y  
40%y Pz Px .
In the first case, z would be the real majority winner, if all three alternatives were given and 
if a method of pair-wise comparisons was used. In the second example, the majority 
preference ordering is cyclical (x P y  P z P x), and the alternative x was not a genuine 
majority winner. In both of cases the outcome was very much induced by the agenda-setters 
who eliminated the alternative z.
In some cases, when the number of the policy alternatives is difficult to restrict to two, it 
might be recommendable that there should be more than two alternatives given in the ballot 
paper, and such method of preference aggregation method would be used which would take 
into account voters’ all preferences, such as Condorcet’s method of pair-wise comparisons 
or Borda count. These kinds of procedures may, however, be difficult to be introduced. 
Because of their technical sophistication they lack the simplicity of the simple majority rule, 
which may, in fact, be one reason for its legitimacy.
There are only quite few clear examples of how the political elites manipulate the agenda by 
choosing the voting method or introducing alternatives. One example might be the Swedish 
referendum on nuclear power mentioned above. In this referendum it is disputable whether 
one of the three alternatives put forward was actually ‘irrelevant’ and was introduced to split 
the support of the rival alternative. Also the interpretation of the voting result remained
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disputable (See Chapter 5). Another example of a governmental manipulation by choosing 
alternatives and procedures is the case of the referendum in Newfoundland on its status with 
respect to Britain and Canada. Newfoundland used to be under British rule with considerable 
autonomy, but because of economic difficulties it lost its autonomy and was placed under 
‘Commission’ government controlled by London. In 1948 Newfoundland had a referendum 
on an issue concerning its status with respect to Great Britain and Canada. An elected 
convention of Newfoundlanders decided to put forward two alternatives in the ballot: 
continuation of the Commission government for five more years and the return to the 
government under Britain. Because of the strong protests due to the omission of Canadian 
confederation option, British government, however, allowed three alternatives, continuation 
of the Commission government, establishment of ‘Responsible Government’ with local 
autonomy and, reluctantly, joining the Canadian Confederation. The British government 
also decided that the winning alternative should get the absolute majority in the second round 
of the referendum. After the first round the Commission option was eliminated (14% of 
votes), and in the second round six weeks later a small majority of the voters (52%) favoured 
the Confederation option.13 (Rourke & al. 1992,40-41.)
There are also other possible ways of agenda-manipulation than selecting appropriate 
alternatives and procedures. Different wordings of the alternatives may make difference in 
people's preferences. Butler and Kitzinger mention an example on the British referendum on 
the EEC membership in 1975. According to opinion polls, there was a majority of 55% 
supporting staying in when they were asked "Should the United Kingdom come out of the
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Common Market?", whereas the support for staying in raised to 63% when the question was 
put in terms "Should the United Kingdom stay in the Common Market?". In other words, the 
differences in the formulation of the question made a difference of 8 percentage units.
2.9 Conclusions
The definition of democracy as certain forms of preference-aggregation has many 
limitations. For example, it takes the individual preferences as given and fixed and hence it 
does not discuss the dynamics of related to the preference-formation. However, the 
possibility of the majority cycles has some implications to normative theories of democracy. 
As Riker (1982) argues, the results of social choice theory may be taken as an argument 
against the theories of majoritarian democracy. Riker asserts that democracy cannot be about 
the fulfilment of ‘the will of majority’, because there is no such a social choice method 
which would reveal the majority winner in every possible preference profile. This is simply 
because the majority winner does not necessarily exist in singular in situations in which there 
are more than two alternatives and at least three voters. The meaninglessness of the notion 
of ‘the will of majority’ means that decisions made by the majority rule are often arbitrary 
and open to various interpretations. As Arrow’s theorem show, the problems caused by the 
majority cycles are prevalent also in all other decisive preference-aggregation methods. 
Furthermore, the problems of preference-aggregation are not dependent on whether the 
preferences are based on self-interest or, for example, on the perceptions of the common 
good. How seriously these results of social choice theory affect the normative theories of
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democracy?
Despite the results of social choice theory, the voting methods used in nationwide democracy 
do not often seem to be particularly inadequate or unfair. Also, it is very difficult to show 
actual cases in which a voting method actually fails to choose the majority winner or in 
which there is a majority cycle. It may be argued that in democratic systems there should be 
‘a predictable and consistent relationship between expressed preferences and decisions’ 
(Beitz 1989,74). This seems to hold for example in referendums, if the policy supported by 
the majority of the voters in the referendum is implemented. Although there may be a 
predictable relationship between the expressed preferences and the political decisions, 
Arrow’s theorem and Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem imply that the way in which individuals 
express their preferences depends on the issues and the alternatives to be voted upon and the 
procedures used. Different agendas and voting methods produce different results and, 
therefore, outcomes are structure-induced and path-dependent. This means that the results 
of the referendums are not necessarily the majority winners in the strict sense. Furthermore, 
it may be argued that the outcomes of the referendums are, to a large extent, determined by 
those who define the agenda to be voted upon and the procedures used. The agenda-setting 
and procedures used in referendums will be discussed in the Part II.
The problems of preference-aggregation do not only apply to referendums and other macro­
level forms of democracy but to all majoritarian systems, also at micro-level, for example 
in parliaments, committees and voluntary organisations. It may be argued that in social
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choice methods both at micro- and macro-level, the most important element is the overall 
fairness of the systems in the sense that they do not disproportionately favour any individuals 
or groups. According to pluralist theories, the democratic stability is due to dispersed power. 
As Miller (1986) has argued, this means that the decision-making cannot be characterized 
as non-simple games. The stability of democratic system is brought about by the fact that the 
compositions of the winning coalitions are changing, and there are prospects for those at the 
losers’ side to be at the winners’ side in the future decisions. (See Miller 1983.)
Many theorists of democracy are not discussing decision-making procedures as such but 
rather about the external values they enhance. Paradoxically, it may be argued that theories 
of democracy are most concerned about the fact that the pure majority rule should not 
prevail. The procedures are important to the extent in which they enhance certain external 
values, eg. stability due to changing winning coalitions of pluralist theory, limited 
government of liberal theory and popular participation and deliberation of participatory 
theory of democracy. In liberal theory the power of majorities should be controlled and 
checked by institutional and social safeguards. In participatory theory the most crucial 
element of democracy is political participation which makes the opinions more other- 
regarding and reasonable. These theories will be discussed further in the Chapter 3.
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Notes
1 Rae uses the expression, "Ego's value schedule leads him to support a proposal, but it not imposed".
2 What is assumed in Rae's construction is, that each individual would rather see his own values imposed than 
someone else's, and that they are willing to impose their own values on others. In some situations and 
especially with regard of certain kind of issues this may not be the case: there may be individuals taking a 
liberal position, in other words who do not want to impose some of their convictions on anyone else. For 
example, Barry (1995, 177-183) discusses the idea of'epistemological restraint', which was first introduced 
by Thomas Nagel. According to Barry: "The core idea is that it is perfectly consistent to be convinced of the 
truth of some religious or other doctrine while acknowledging as a matter of principle that it would be wrong 
to make it the basis of public policy in a society some of whose members reject it".
3 This problem has been faced for example in such situations in which the constitution requires some more 
complicated decision-making procedure for such issues as joining a giving national powers to international 
organizations or amending the constitution. These questions raised some discussion for example in Finnish 
referendum on EU-membership 1994, because the decision to join EU required 2/3 majority in the Parliament 
and, yet, it was assumed that the outcome of the consultative referendum would be carried out (56.9% for and 
43.1% against). Especially the proponents of the membership emphasized that the status quo should not be 
favoured in this issue because it was not a neutral alternative.
4 Goodin mentions input and output filters as a two main types of mechanisms by which the fairness of the 
outcomes of different decision-making methods can be guaranteed. Output filters work by removing certain 
options from social consideration, while input filters work by refusing to count certain types of preferences 
when aggregating individual utilities. Output filters can be described as barriers at the back end of the social 
decision-making machinery, preventing policies based on perverse preferences from emerging as social 
choices, whereas input filters can be regarded as barriers at the front end of the social decision machinery, 
preventing perverse preferences from even coming into consideration. (Goodin 1983, 78.)
5 Moise Ostrogorski: Democracy and the Organization o f Political Parties (2 Vols., Paris 1902).
6 If the are yes an no marked with Y and N, there are four different possible outcomes in the two-issue vote: 
YY, YN, NY, NN. Of the 24 possible strict preference orderings over the four possible outcomes, eight involve 
strictly independent preferences. (Brams, Steven J.; Kilgour, Marc D.; Zwicker, William S. (1995): How 
Should Voting on Related Propositions Be Conducted?)
7 This has been discussed for example in J-C de Borda (1784): On Ballot Votes. Sommerlad, F. and McLean 
Ian, eds.and trans. (1989): The Political Theory of Condorcet, working paper 1/89, Social Studies Faculty 
Centre, Oxford. The following example, originally given by Charles L. Dodgson, describes a situation (Riker 
1982, pp. 84) in which a Condorcet winner and the positional method introduced by Borda are in contradiction. 
There are eleven voters who have the following preferences over four alternatives (a,b,c,d):
Table 1
Voters 1,2,3 b a c d
Voters 4,5,6 b a d c
Voters 7,8,9 a c d b
Voters 10,11 a d c b
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Now, the majoritarian decision may be calculated on the basis of the following table, which reveals the number 
of voters supporting the row alternative against the column alternative:
Table 2
a b c d
a 5 11 11
6 6 (Condorcet winner)b 6
0
0
c
d
5
5
6
5
Here, the alternative b is the Condorcet winner because the majority prefers it to any other alternative. Let us 
assume that the decision is made on the basis of Borda count so that the most preferred alternative always gets 
3 points, the second most preferred 2 points, the third 1 point, and the least preferred alternative 0 point. The 
result of Borda count in this case is that the alternative a gets ((6 x 2) + (5 x 3)) = 27 points, b gets 18 points, 
c gets 11 po/wts, and d gets 10 points. Therefore, a is the Borda winner which beats the Condorcet winner b 
with a large margin.
8 Ian MacLean (1995), however, points out that some medieval authors, especially the German philosopher 
Cusanus discussed this kind of phenomenon.
9 The difference of the two interpretations is clarified by the following quantifications: the correct 
quantification is (Vx)(Vy)((3 i)(xPjy- xPy)), whereas the wrong interpretation may be quantified as 
follows:(3i)((VxVy)(xPiy-xPy)). (Dowding 1996)
10 The number of different linear orderings (strong preference order) of set of alternatives including m 
members is m!
11 The fact that the 'same issue' is interpreted to have different dimensions in different political cultures can 
be shown for example by looking at the issue of European integration/Maastricht Treaty in some European 
countries. For example in Ireland the issue got a moral dimension when the abortion issue became a part of 
the debate, in Denmark and in Norway the question of popular sovereignty was dominant whereas in Finland 
the security policy was - together with the economic dimension - the most dominant.
12 The law-controlling referendums - analysed more in detail in the Chapter 4 - may be characterized as a 
popular veto on legislation which had already been passed by representative bodies. Therefore, their outcome 
sets may be claimed to be naturally binary, i.e. there are only two possible outcomes, whether or not to accept 
the legislation in question. This means that the nature of the outcome set does not only depend on the issue in 
question but also whether the referendum has been framed as a policy vote or as a veto on the legislation 
already passed by the parliament. This analysis shows that the question of whether a referendum reveals ‘the 
will of the majority’ is related to the problems of initiation of the referendum and agenda-setting.
13 This procedure is similar to ‘plurality runoff elections.
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3. Theories of Democracy
3.1. Families of Theories of Democracy
The analysis of the referendum as a majoritarian instrument gives an important but a very 
limited idea of the institution. Furthermore, as the discussion in the Chapter 2 shows, the 
idea of democracy as the fulfilment of the will of the majority is incoherent and, perhaps, 
misleading. In this chapter, I will discuss different theories of democracy and summarize 
the arguments for and against referendums based upon them. The relationship between 
different theories of democracy will be examined by setting the theories into two 
'families’. The two families of the theories of democracy are put forward in the table 3.1.
Table 3.1: Families of Theories of Democracy 
Nature of Preferences
Self-Interest Common Interest
1. subjective preferences vs objective preferences
2. adversary democracy vs unitary democracy
3. individualism vs republicanism
Nature of Political Influence 
Exit Voice
4. representative democracy vs direct democracy
5. democratic elitism vs classical theory
Value of Democratic System 
Output
6. protective democracy vs
Process
developmental democracy
7. liberal democracy vs populism
8. "thin" democracy vs participatory democracy
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The theories in the Family I  on the left and the Family II on the right side may be 
regarded as mutually rival. In the theories on the left, individuals' political action is 
assumed to be motivated by their self-interest, and the social interaction is perceived in 
terms of the conflicts between the individuals promoting their own interests. The theories 
on the right, n the other hand, emphasize the underlying common interest, and they have 
more trust in individuals' and social groups' motivation and ability to find cooperative or 
at least ‘reasonable’ solutions to political problems. The theories on the left emphasize 
more the outcomes of the decision-making, or the ‘outputs’ of the democratic process, 
whereas the theories on the right pay more attention the social conditions and processes 
of democracy which are necessary for the creation of right kinds of 'inputs' for the 
decision-making. Furthermore, it may be argued that the theories in the left represent the 
ideas typically put forward by the political right and the theories in the right represent the 
ideas of the democratic left.
The relationships between the members of the two families are complex. Different 
members of the families have something in common but there are also differences 
between them. Furthermore, all members of the two families are not necessarily directly 
related with each other, but only through the members between them. In order to clarify 
these differences, I have divided both families into three groups. The first group of 
theories deals mainly with the nature of individual preferences: whether they are based 
on self-interest or perceptions of the common good of the society. The differences 
between the theories in the first group may also be expressed in terms of different 
meanings given to the democratic participation. In the theories on the left democratic
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participation is seen similar to the interaction in the 'market', in which individuals are 
making choices which maximize their private interests. In the theories on the right, 
democratic participation may be characterized as a 'forum', in which politics is about 
discourse on the common good or formation of reasonable public opinion.
The second group of theories has, in addition to the distinction between the nature of 
preferences, also another dimension, the importance given to citizens’ participation in 
politics and the attitudes towards representation. In the theories on the left the 
governments are essentially representative and the effect of citizens’ participation is 
essentially to function as a veto, as an opportunity to get rid of bad governments. 
Furthermore, in the theories on the left citizens’ influence is based on market-type 
choices between alternative representative governments, and the use of the 'exit' option 
with respect to the ones that do not please them. These theories also share a suspicion for 
the mass participation because of the self-interested character of preferences. In the 
theories on the right, on the other hand, democracy is considered to be a system in which 
the citizens have more direct influence on politics. The citizens are assumed to 'voice' 
their political opinions by direct participation in democratic discourse, agenda-setting and 
decision-making.
Finally, the last three pairs of theories deal with, in addition to the aspects discussed 
earlier, the value of the democratic systems. The differences between the last three pairs 
of theories of democracy are largely due to different interpretations of the meanings and 
purposes that are given to democratic process and participation - whether it is seen to 
have some intrinsic value in itself or just as an instrument to enhance other values, such
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as good government or individual liberty. In the last three theories on the left, democratic 
institutions and participation are just regarded as an instrument to achieve individual 
well-being, whereas the theories on the right emphasize the possibilities of the individual 
self-development through political participation. Furthermore, in the theories on the left, 
the relationship between the state and the individual is seen in terms of conflict, and the 
purpose of democratic institutions is to protect the individuals from the interference of 
the state, whereas the last three theories on the right emphasize the importance and value 
of participation in the development of the civic society.
Those theories further down are generally more complex and offer more sophisticated 
institutional solutions for the problems emerging in collective decision-making. In the 
first group of theories, democracy is just discussed in terms of types of preferences and 
formal decision-making methods. The next two pairs of theories deal with the problem 
of representation, especially, the relationship between those who make the decisions and 
the ordinary citizens. The last three pairs of theories provide more complicated solutions 
related to the social conditions and the possible outcomes of democratic system.
It must also be pointed out that some theories represent rather middle-ground ideas, and 
the relationship between theories is not necessarily always adversary in such a clear-cut 
manner as suggested in the table, although some of them are ‘strawman’ theories 
portrayed by their adversaries. In the following sections, the pairs of theories will be 
discussed, approximately in the order put forward above. The purpose of this discussion 
is also to show the historical development of the concept of democracy from the classical 
theories to current ones. Special emphasis will be given to the liberal and participatory
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theories of democracy. Furthermore, the roles of the referendum in these theories of 
democracy will be discussed.
3.2 Rousseau's Theory of Voting
The preference conception of democracy discussed in the Chapter 2 is based on the 
relativist idea that the concepts of 'will of the people' and the 'common good of society' 
are meaningful only in the sense of aggregation of individual preferences. Majority rule 
is one method of fulfilling individual wills or, in Arrowian terms, values and tastes, at 
the collective level, but it is not by any means a unique preference-aggregation method. 
Furthermore, the majority rule may be in contradiction with other preference-aggregation 
methods which have some other valuable properties. This is the position is represented 
for example by most of the current welfare economics and the specific issues related to 
this were discussed in the Chapter 2. The obvious restriction of this approach is the 
individualist fallacy, in other words, it does not take into account the different forms of 
interdependencies between individuals and their preferences. Another problem in the 
preference conception is that it does not really take up any stand over the question about 
the motivations which the individual preferences are based upon, and does not give any 
special value to those preferences which are based on altruistic or public-regarding 
considerations.
In these respects, the preference conception is in contrast with the 'romantist' or 
Rousseauan conception of democracy, according to which the general will (yolonte 
generate) exists objectively, independently of what people think and regardless of
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individual self-interested preferences. This view is sometimes called the 'epistemic' view 
of democracy, according to which democracy is not about aggregating preferences, but 
defining a correct answer to the question "what is the good for the society?". According 
to Rousseau, the majority rule should be used to define the general will, the common 
good of the society, because it gives the best approximation of the general will. 
Rousseau’s view was that the majority is more likely to find correct answers to moral and 
political questions than any other set of individuals, if the right question is asked and 
certain social conditions prevail.
In Rousseau’s theory, citizens regarded as judges on what is the common good of the 
society, but they are not always accurate in their judgements. The majority rule functions 
as a mechanism which balances out the biases in the individual judgments of the 
common good, and therefore produces the general will. Rousseau writes about the 
popular will, which is additive, simply the will of all, something that the 'preference 
conception of democracy' is interested to determine. The general will, on the other hand, 
is indivisible, a result of the majority rule as a procedure which balances out the 
individual biasses of the perception of the common good, and enlightened popular 
judgements on what is the common good for the society. (Barry 1965; Sartori 1987,313.)
In Rousseau’s theory, democratic decision-making is similar to judges' considerations on 
the correct interpretation of a law, and therefore the more recent forms of the theory are 
called jury theorems. Recently, the conception of voting as giving a judgment has been 
adopted by the Civic Republicans (Grofinan 1993,1549). The core of this conception is 
that there is a substantive concept of public interest, which cannot be reduced to an
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outcome of the aggregation of individual preferences.
Rousseau's argument for the majority rule has been formulated mathematically more 
explicitly in Marquis de Condorcet's 'Essay on the Application of Mathematics to the 
Theory of Decision-Making' (1785/1976), and later on in the jury theorems (See for 
example Grofman 1991, Young 1986). Condorcet's starting point was that voters are 
sincere but imperfect judges of the merits of different candidates or the truth of different 
propositions. Condorcet set the following question: which voting procedure brings about 
a candidate or a proposition most likely to be the best or the correct one. If there are 
exactly two alternatives, it is the absolute majority rule, assuming that voters vote 
independently and are correct in their judgments for more than half of the time. This may 
be expressed formally as follows: the probability P that the absolute majority is right in 
a group consisting of n individuals depends on the probability p that each individual is 
right, given that each individual has the same probability p:
(i) if 0.5 < p < 1, and n > 2, then P > p; P increases with n; and when n approaches 
infinity, P converges to 1.
(ii) If 0 < p < 0.5, and n > 2, then P < p; P decreases with the increase of n; and P 
approaches 0 when n approaches infinity.
(iii) If p = 0.5, then P = 0.5, regardless of the value of n. (Nurmi 1994, Miller 1986.)1
The conclusion of this argument is that the opinion supported by the majority is more 
reliable than the opinion of any single individual, if the individuals are more often right 
than wrong in their judgments and the probability of being right is the same for all 
individuals. In fact, as the number of individuals increases, the majority becomes all­
wise. One problem in the argument above is, of course, the assumption that all 
individuals have the same probability of being right. According to the more general jury
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theorem, each individual has the probability ps of being right. Now, if 1/2 < p' < 1 and n 
> 2, then P > p' and P approaches 1 as n approaches infinity. Here p' is the arithmetic 
mean of the individual probabilities of being right. The general juiy theorem implies that 
the majority o f ‘minimally competent’ individuals is more reliable than experts, because 
the probability of an expert being right is rarely 1. (Nurmi 1994.)
A ‘minimally competent’ voter is better in making judgments between the alternatives 
than anyone who makes his judgments at random, because the minimally competent 
voter is able to make right judgements for more than half of the time. This idea may 
generate too much optimism about the virtues of the simple majority rule, because, as 
Condorcet himself pointed out, randomness is not the worst that can be expected from 
the voters: "In effect, when the probability of the truth of a voter's opinion falls below 
1/2, there must be a reason why he decides less well than one would at random. The 
reason can only be found in the prejudices to which this voter is subject." (Condorcet 
1785/1976,62). This implies that those who apply their preconceptions and intuitions in 
political decision-making may do worse than those choosing at random. The worst social 
choices may not be based on randomized or badly informed individual judgments, but 
rather on biassed ones. Therefore the optimistic interpretation of Rousseau’s and 
Condorcet's theory is not the only possible, but also the pessimistic alternative must also 
be taken seriously. According to the pessimistic interpretation, as the size of the 
population of bad judges increases, the probability of the majority being right approaches 
0. (Waldron 1989,1323.)
Rousseau's theory of the general will was very much dependent on his optimistic view
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on the human ability to make judgements. He had also very precise ideas of the 
conditions which promote voters' competence of judgment. Rousseau was particularly 
pessimistic about the individuals' competence of judgement in large societies. First, there 
are more complicated issues and less evident solutions in large societies and, therefore, 
individuals are less able to make right judgements than in small societies. Second, it is 
more difficult for the individuals to identify with the general good in large societies, and 
therefore their judgments are more likely to be biassed by self-interest. Rousseau 
considered the following social conditions to be essential for the working democracy: a 
very small size of the state, where people can easily assemble and easily know each 
other; simplicity of manners and moral; equality in social rank and fortune; and little or 
no luxury because of its corruptive influence. (Rousseau 1763/1976,113.)
Waldron (1989) mentions the following three measures as possible solutions for the 
problem of biassed judgments in large societies. The first measure he suggests is to limit 
the range of issues which are put to a popular vote. For example, Rousseau insisted, that 
it is the task of the administration and not of the people to make decisions about 
particular persons and events. The people as a whole should only deal with questions 
which are universal in character, in other words, affect each citizen similarly, and the 
people should not be consulted on issues which affect only some particular groups of 
people. This idea may, however, be also justified in terms of ‘the preference view of 
democracy’, for the reasons like the asymmetric intensities of preferences.2
The second strategy, put forward by Condorcet, is to submit the matters to the 
representatives (1785/1976,61):
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"But it can be observed that in the majority of matters submitted to the decision of an 
assembly, the same voters whose opinions have such a small probability of being true can 
be enlightened enough - certainly not to pronounce with some probability of truth as to 
which man among a great number has the most merit - but to choose, as the most 
enlightened, one of those whose opinions will have a large enough probability of being 
true. Thus a numerous assembly who are not very enlightened could be usefully 
employed only to choose the members of a less numerous assembly to whom the decision 
on other matters would be then entrusted."
Of course, a question is now, how the less enlightened could be able to elect an assembly 
consisting of more enlightened than they are themselves. The third possible solution 
would be to enhance discussion and public deliberation which precedes the decision­
making and, consequently, to develop citizens' competence of judgement on he common 
good.
The question still remains, what if any relevance Rousseau's theory of voting has in the 
modem societies? The conception does not have any rationale if there is no shared idea 
of the good or, in other words, common values (Barry 1995, 148). This idea does not 
comply with most of most of the modem theories of democracy, in which politics is 
basically seen as resolution between conflicting interests and values. Mill (introduction 
xvii, 1975), for example, argued that the diversity of human nature makes this kind of 
direct democracy impossible and that representative democracy serves best the different 
interests. Barber (1984), on the other hand, argues that there is not any 'independent 
ground' for moral and political judgments and, therefore, and all public decisions need 
arbitration between different conceptions of the good.
Furthermore, Rousseau was probably quite right in his pessimism about people's ability 
to make adequate judgments in large societies. Even if it is assumed that there is a
common good, and thus a right answer to political problems, it may be impossible to 
make sure that people would vote according to their unbiassed perception of it and ignore 
their private interests when they come to the polls, especially with secret ballots which 
prevent any social controls on the voters' behaviour. It is quite plausible that some 
people will vote according to their own interests, or that their judgments will be biassed 
by their own interests. In fact, the worst situation can very well be the one in which some 
people vote according to their honest perception of the common good and the other ones 
according to their own interest, because in this kind of situation the self-interested can 
exploit the fact that the public-interested have given up from their own self-interested 
claims. The unilateral or partial adherence to public good may, probably, bring about 
inferior outcomes compared to those motivated by universal selfishness or altruism. 
(Elster 1983, 115-116.) Biassed judgments may also be due to partial information on the 
basis of which the voters make their decisions. Especially at the times of mass media the 
monetary resources spent on the electoral and referendum campaigns may have crucial 
impacts on citizens’ opinion-formation. The unequal resources and biassed coverage may 
skew the information received by the public.
In sum, the interpretation that the outcome of majoritarian voting is the right answer to 
a political problem, would be quite far-reaching in, for example, national or local 
referendums. When people are making decisions concerning their own lives and interests, 
it cannot be guaranteed that the voting does not deteriorate just to an expression of self- 
interested preferences.3 Condorcet's suggestion of delegating decision-making power to 
representatives does not necessarily solve this problem, because self-interested 
motivations certainly exist among the representatives as well. One character of
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representative democracy is certainly that the representatives sometimes act on the basis 
of their own interests or the interests of the people they are representing, not on the basis 
of their perception of the common good of the society. Rousseau’s theory is probably 
applicable in situations, in which disinterested outsiders make decisions on disputes, like 
injuries. Moreover, it is important to point out a major problem in Rousseau’s theory, 
which is related to the discussion in the Chapter 2, that the majority rule may work 
adequately only in situations in which the choice is naturally binary. If there are more 
than two alternatives, the problem of the majority cycles may emerge.
3.3 Market and Forum
subjective vs objective preferences
adversary democracy vs unitary democracy
individualism vs republicanism
The difference between individualism and republicanism is related to the distinction 
between subjective and objective preferences. This distinction may also be understood 
in terms of two different interpretations of the democratic process: whether it is 
considered to be about aggregating individuals’ self-interested preferences, or making 
collective judgments on what are the right solutions to political problems. Individualism 
is both a methodological approach and a normative theory, and it has its historical roots 
in the writings of such writers as John Locke, David Hume, Adam Smith and Alexis de
Toqcueville. More recently, individualistic social theory has been developed by for
example F.A. Hayek (1949) and by some public choice theorists like Buchanan and 
Tullock (1962). Individualism is based on the assumption that all social entities can only
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be understood through the individuals who compose them. Furthermore, all values are 
derivable from individual subjective valuations.
Hayek (1949, 13-15), for example, argues that a man only knows a small part of the 
society and that he can only care about this part of the public opinion and not for the rest. 
Because the individuals should participate in decision-making only on issues which one 
knows and cares about, the decisions should be made in a decentralized way, like it is the 
case in the market exchange. Because the individualists prefer decentralized decision­
making, they believe that the state activity, which is by nature centralized and collective, 
should be restricted. Only those issue areas which, by nature, are better to be settled 
collectively, such as internal and external security, should belong to the public realm. In 
other words, individualism is critical about all collective forms of decision-making, and 
in this respect it is anti-democratic. However, certain constitutionally restricted forms of 
democratic decision-making may be justified in individualist terms because they 
maximize the welfare of the individuals.
This view is almost opposite to the republican view that individuals should follow the 
guidance of their conscience and apply it in making judgments in public affairs. Sartori 
(1987, 287) points out the distinction between the early forms of democracy and 
republicanism: democracy means power of the people, and for a long time it was only 
used to refer to forms of direct, or as Sartori puts it, 'polis democracy'. Republicanism, 
res publica, refers to a general interest of common good, ideal of government based on 
deliberation and judgment.
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Grofinan (1993) puts forward a modem idea of democracy called Civic Republicanism, 
which is based on the assumption that there is a genuine, substantive concept of the 
public interest which cannot be reduced to individual interests. Like Rousseau, the Civic 
Republicans consider democratic decision-making as making an approximation of the 
common good rather than aggregation of individual interest-based preferences. Grofinan 
argues (1993, 1578): "...civic republican works focus on the virtues of deliberation and 
the possibility of disinterested pursuit of the common good".. By 'disinterested pursuit 
of the common good' Grofinan refers to decision-making by juries and citizens' 
committees (Grofinan 1993, 1578; Grofinan & Feld 1988, 569). There is, however, a 
significant difference between Rousseau's and Civic Republican ideas of deliberation: 
according to Rousseau, democratic deliberation should take place rather within the 
individuals, whereas Civic Republicans emphasize public participation and persuasion. 
Civic Republicanism differs also from participatory democracy discussed later on in this 
chapter. The participatory democrats do not’share the idea of the underlying common 
good, and the reasonableness of the public opinion is held as the ideal by the 
participatory democrats instead of the objectiveness of Civic Republicanism.
The distinction between subjective preferences, those based on purely on self-interest, 
individual pursuit of happiness, and objective preferences, based on the perception on 
what is the good for the whole society, is also related to Jane J. Mansbridge's concepts 
of unitary and adversary democracy (1984, preface, xi). These concepts refer to forms 
of democracy which develop in different social conditions. Mansbridge's concepts are 
rooted on different views of the nature of human interaction: unitary democracy is based 
on the idea of an underlying common interest, whereas adversary democracy is based on
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the assumption of conflicting interests. Both forms of democracy may be characterized 
as egalitarian: in unitary democracy this means equal respect for each member of the 
community, whereas in adversary democracy this means equal protection of interests. 
According to Mansbridge's definition, unitary democracy is characterised by face-to-face 
communication and consensual decision-making. In adversary democracy, on the other 
hand, decisions are made by secret ballots using the majority rule. Mansbridge's concept 
of adversary democracy catches the common sense intuitions of what are the 
characteristics of modem representative democracies. As Mansbridge (1980,3) describes 
this: "The west believes that it invented democracy, and that institutions like Parliament, 
representation, and universal adult suffrage are synonymous with democracy itself."
The idea of unitary democracy is often regarded to be utopian and to be applicable only 
in ancient communities, because they are considered to have been more egalitarian and 
stable. As an example of original forms of unitary democracy Mansbridge (1980, 3,10- 
13) gives the old hunter-gatherer communities, which were egalitarian, both 
economically and politically, face to face and consensual. She argues, however, that 
forms of unitary democracy are possible in some contexts also in modem societies:
"These two conceptions of democracy persist, side by side, in every modem democracy. 
The adversary ideal and the procedures derived from it have dominated Western 
democratic thinking since the seventeenth century. But unitary ideals and procedures 
continue to influence the way legislative committees, elected representatives, major 
institutions like the Supreme Court, and local democracies actually act."
Mansbridge analyses the following cases of modem forms of unitary democracy: town 
hall meetings in New England and a small democratic workplace, an urban crisis centre. 
However, even these were occasionally affected by people's self-interest. However, the
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democratic governments at the nation-state level are typically characterized in terms of 
adversary democracy, because the multiplicity of conflicting interests in large societies 
seems to make Rousseau’s notion of the common good inappropriate.
3.4 Representative and Direct Democracy
Before Bentham (1776)4 and the American Founding Fathers, the concept of democracy 
only referred to forms of direct democracy. Madison, for example, wrote about 
'representative republic1, not about democracy, because the word democracy meant direct 
democracy of antiquity for him (Sartori 1987, 288). Normative theories of direct 
democracy are based on the ideas of i) popular sovereignty, according to which, the 'will 
of the people' and the 'political will' should be identical, ii) 'developmental' democracy, 
in which political participation is seen as a part of individual self-fulfilment and good 
human life. One of the most important supporters of direct democracy was Rousseau, 
who supported democratic government in small and homogenous communities and did 
not consider representative government democratic at all. Rousseau thought that the 
transfer of the sovereignty from the people to the representatives should not take place. 
The sovereignty should stay among the people. He also rejected the distinction between 
the state and the civil society (Held 1986,75). The historical examples of democracies 
Rousseau had in mind were, apart from his home city Geneva, the republics of antiquity.
In the 'polis' democracy of Ancient Greece the participatory citizens were mainly freed 
from the work, and, as Sartori (1987, 281) points out, they were totally absorbed by 
politics. This kind of devotion was probably only possible in a society in which the
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production was based on slavery, which freed the citizens from the economic production. 
In modem times, the participatory theorists of democracy, even when recognizing the 
impossibility of totally direct democracy in large societies, may still see something very 
problematic in representation: "To exercise the franchise is unhappily also to renounce 
it. The representative principle steals from individuals the ultimate responsibility for their 
values, beliefs and actions." (Barber 1984,145.)
The ideas of democratic representation have extended the use of the concept of 
democracy beyond the classical forms. The ideas of representation may be found in the 
social contract theories, in which the governmental power was justified in terms of the 
delegation of powers by the subordinates rather than in terms of its divine origins 
(Sartori 1987,280). The contract theorists (for example Locke and Kant) considered the 
representatives as a link between ‘the will of the people’ and ‘the will of the state’. 
Modem supporters of representative democracy may consider representation just as a 
practical alternative for direct democracy in large-scale societies, but there are also other 
reasons for supporting representative democracy. Schumpeter, for example, opposed 
direct democracy and attacked the 'classical doctrine' of democracy, according to which 
the will of the people should be dictate in politics. Schumpeter (1943/1992,261) showed 
a great misbelief in the abilities of the ordinary citizens to make sound political 
decisions, because they simply lack of interest in most of the political issues:
“The reduced sense of responsibility and the absence of effective volition in turn explain 
the ordinary citizen's ignorance and lack of judgment in matters of domestic and foreign 
policy which are if anything more shocking the case of educated people and of people 
who are successfully active in non-political walks of life than it is with uneducated 
people in humble stations."
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Schumpeter (1943/1992, 250-283) defined democracy in terms of competition for 
political leadership. In this competition, the regular elections are the crucial element 
because they give the citizens an opportunity to veto the worst governments. 
Schumpeter's views have been criticised by the supporters of more participatory forms 
of democracy because of its elitism and disrespect to the ordinary people's will and the 
potentials of judgment.
There are different ideas of the mechanisms of representation, which are called the 
principal-agent and microcosm models (McLean 1991).5 The microcosm conception of 
the representation is built upon the idea that representatives are a portrait of the people:
"Modem democracy is mainly based on the hypothesis that voting in elections of 
representative bodies fulfils the ideal of popular co-determination: the people leave their 
decision-making rights for a certain period of time to an assembly, which in principle, 
ought to be a cross-section of the people and which therefore ought to reflect the opinions 
of the people." (Suksi 1993,1.)
In direct democracy of Ancient Athens, the Court and the Council comprised of citizens 
drawn by a lot. This kind of method produced a statistically representative sample 
because each member of the population had the same probability to be chosen and the 
population (free men) was rather homogenous. This method would, however, produce 
rather strange samples of representatives in heterogenous populations if some subgroups 
of the population may be left completely outside the sample (eg. a sample might consist 
of women only or people living in the same area). Like in statistical social research, in 
which the samples are expected to represent all relevant subgroups of the population, in 
the microcosm conception the representatives are supposed to represent all the
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politically relevant subgroups. Microcosm idea of representation is for example behind 
such claims that the members of some representative body should follow the proportions 
of sexes or linguistic or racial groups. On the other hand, the problem of this reasoning 
is how to decide, which subgroups are politically significant and hence should be taken 
into account. (See McLean 1989,15; 1991,173.)
Furthermore, microcosm representation may not be a sufficient condition for democracy 
because it, as such, does not guarantee the accountability of the representatives to those 
they are representing. Microcosm idea of representation does not presuppose the 
Schumpeterian veto function of the elections. The alternative view of representation, 
principal-agent view, is based on the idea that the representatives are the agents of their 
electors, and they are expected to act on the behalf of the principals. The mechanism by 
which the electors' opinions influence the representative decision-making is based on the 
electoral accountability of the representatives. Accountability means that the principals 
have an opportunity to express their dissatisfaction to their agents by not reelecting them, 
which, on the other hand, creates an incentive to the agents to be more receptive to the 
principals' preferences. During the past decades, the principal-agent view of 
representation has been theoretically developed by public choice theory and game theory. 
The problem of the principal-agent model is that there is typically asymmetry of 
information, in other words, the agents, political representatives, tend have a better 
access to the relevant information than the electors, their principals, and also that the 
principals are dependent on the information given by the agents. This means also that the 
political representatives are able to define the political agenda, in other words, the issues 
and the policy alternatives.
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Sometimes it is assumed that the first-by-the-post system in single-member 
constituencies produces the principal-agent type of representation and the proportional 
representation system generates a microcosm system. It must be pointed out, however, 
that in single-member constituencies the representatives represent the area or the district 
from which they are elected, and therefore, it is expected to produce a body of 
representatives which is the microcosm of the population when it comes to regional 
differences. Furthermore, also in the systems of proportional representation the elections 
make the representatives are accountable to the electors. Also, whether or not the 
representatives are the microcosm of the whole electorate depends largely on how 
precisely the party-system reflects the socioeconomic, regional and other politically 
divisive cleavages of the society.6
Schumpeter argued that there is an absence of effective volition. This means that the 
citizens do not necessarily have rational opinions or preferences on most of the political 
issues. From this follows that the role of the representatives must be something else than 
simply that of reflecting the opinions of the electorate or interests of their supporters 
(Grofinan 1993). For example Thomas Cronin (1989) makes a distinction between 
delegate and trustee/independence models of representation. The delegate view 
resembles the microcosm and also the principal/agent view of representation: "The 
delegate view requires the representative to mirror the views of the district's or state's 
voters." Edmund Burke is often referred to as 'the intellectual godfather' of the 
trustee/independence model of representation. Cronin describes this model as follows: 
"Representatives must be free to exercise their own best judgment and accountable to 
constituents only at certain intervals"; and also: "’representatives' first loyalty was to the
long-term interests of the country, especially when such interests differed from parochial 
moods of the moment."
In the trustee/independence model, as in Schumpeter's theory, the political decisions 
made by representatives are expected to be based on better informed judgements which 
do not necessarily coincide with the opinions of the electorate. It is a debatable whether 
the fact that the representatives are better informed is inevitable or a result of self- 
interested action by the representatives aiming to stay in office and selectively informing 
about the political issues and their own actions. However, an argument for representation 
discussed in the Chapter 2 is based on the preference conception of democracy according 
to which representation enhances communication and bargaining between the decision­
makers, and thus allows the intensities of preferences and the interdependencies between 
the alternatives to be taken into account.
The views on the referendum are related to the ideas of representation. If one believes in 
the delegate view of representation, the referendum may be seen as an instrument which 
gives a more accurate picture of the will of the majority without the distortions caused 
by representation. In terms of the principal-agent-model, the referendum may be a 
corrective institution when the agents fail to represent their principals’ views on some 
issues. However, in some forms of referendums, the agenda-setting power of the 
representatives may counteract these positive effects. According to the trustee model of 
representation, on the other hand, the popular will may not be considered to be a superior 
guide over political disputes, compared to the judgments of the representatives. 
Furthermore, as Schumpeter did in his defence for representative democracy, it is
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possible to question whether the people actually have 'will' in most political issues.. 
However, the possibility of participation for example in referendums may also be seen 
necessary for the formation of ‘the popular will*.
3.5 Classical Theory and Democratic Elitism
The development of political science as an empirical discipline has increased the demand 
for more realistic definitions of democracy. It is common to require that the theories of 
democracy should articulate a form of government which is feasible in the modem states, 
and that the definitions of democracy should be possible to be operationalized in 
empirical research. Democratic elitism has been an influential theory especially after the 
World War II. Held (1987,143-145) points out that according to writers like Weber and 
Schumpeter, the elitist character of the state is the prize necessary to be paid for living 
in modem, industrial societies, which are characterized by extensive state activity and 
large bureaucracy. In modem societies, democracy can only mean the opportunity of 
'choosing decision-makers and curbing their excesses' (Riker 1982).7
Schumpeter and other elitists are critical towards extensive political participation. This 
can be explained by historical events like the raise of Nazism and communism, which 
were based on mass political activity and mobilization. Because of these examples, 
political participation, mass movements and totalitarianism were often associated. 
Furthermore, some post-war studies showed that especially lower ranks of societies are 
authoritarian and non-democratic, which gave gravity to the argument that mass 
participation should be kept at the minimal level and that the elites are more committed
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to democratic values (Lipset 1960; Komhauser 1960). Moreover, totalitarian coups over 
democratic governments have encouraged research which emphasize the stability of the 
government. The stability has become the ultimate measure of the success of democratic 
governments, rather than the level of participation (Pateman 1970,2-3). The significance 
of the participation for the working democracy has also been questioned for the reason 
that political participation, measured by electoral turnouts, has been rather low in such 
stable democracies as the US and Switzerland.
For example Bachrach (1967) has contrasted democratic elitism, with classical theory 
o f democracy. According to Schumpeter's version of democratic elitism, the central 
characteristics of democracy is the competition between power elites.8 According to 
Schumpeter's (1943/1992,242) definition:
"Democracy is a political method, that is to say, a certain type of institutional 
arrangement for arriving at political - legislative or administrative - decisions and hence 
incapable of being an end in itself, irrespective of what decisions it will produce under 
given historical conditions. And this must be the starting point of any attempt at defining 
it."
What Schumpeter thought was important in the state-level democracy was the 
institutionalized competition between power elites in frequent elections. The elections 
give the citizens a peaceful means to get rid of those elites which do not work 
satisfactorily. As for who are included in the democratic decision-making, Schumpeter 
argues that every government excludes some groups of people (eg. people under some 
age limit) and that there are no objective standards to judge who should be included and 
who should not. The societies which exclude certain groups from decision-making, for 
example according to property, religion, sex or race, may be condemned, but there is no
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reason for calling them undemocratic.9 (Schumpeter 1992,244-245.)
From the democratic elitists’ point of view, citizens' interests in political process may be 
identified with the outcomes it bring about. Democratic system is working well as long 
as it fulfils the crucial property of providing the citizens a peaceful means to repeal 
unpopular rulers. Furthermore, political participation is regarded as costly, and therefore 
it is not in the interests of ordinary citizens to participate. There is, however, another 
group of people, political entrepreneurs, who have career incentives for political 
participation. Political process is seen in terms of competition between political elites 
divided to parties which offer different policy 'packages'. The citizens’ participation 
means the choice between parties in the elections, and the successful party is the one 
which manages to appeal to the largest numbers. Schumpeter's theory of democracy 
inspired Anthony Downs (1957) to develop the economic theory o f democracy, which 
is still an influential theory of the democratic competition. According to this model, 
democracy means competition between the parties, and intra-party democracy based on 
rank-and-file participation is not considered to be crucial for democracy. (Assarsson 
1996.)
Bachrach (1969, 93-94) criticised this 'general theory of democracy', which was based 
on Schumpeter's views and which has been dominant in the American political science 
in the 1950s and 1960s, for being ideological although it was claimed to be value-free:
"This general theory purports to be above ideology but is in reality deeply rooted in an 
ideology, an ideology which is grounded upon a profound distrust of the majority of 
ordinary men and women, and a reliance upon the established elites to maintain the 
values of civility and the 'rules of the game' of democracy... While embracing liberalism
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it rejects, in effect, the major tenet of classical democratic theory - belief and confidence 
in the people.”
Bachrach argues that in Schumpeter's model citizens' interest in politics is seen as one­
dimensional, which means that citizens are assumed to be interested only in the outcomes 
of the political process. Bachrach, as a supporter of what he calls self-developmental 
theory o f democracy, believes that citizens have two-dimensional interests in politics. 
The citizens have interests also in “the opportunity of development which accrues from 
participation in meaningful political decisions”. Democracy does not mean just an 
opportunity to choose between different rulers, but a system in which the citizens actually 
participate in decision-making and apply their judgments in political problems. Political 
participation is an essential element of individual moral dignity and development. 
Bachrach admits that classical theory “falls short of being a viable political theory for 
modem society”, which can be characterized by mass-elite structure, but he argues that 
democratic elitism does not share any of the essential normative ends of democracy as 
they were put forward for example by Rousseau and J.S. Mill.
The term ‘classical democracy’ has also been used by the proponents of the radical, 
populist, participatory or, even developmental democratic theorists. Bachrach criticises 
Schumpeter's definition of the classical theory of democracy. Schumpeter argues that the 
classical doctrine of democracy originates from the late 18th century. Quite misleadingly, 
he couples Rousseau and the utilitarians together as the ‘intellectual founders’ of the 
classical democracy, although the utilitarians, starting from individualist premises, 
definitely do not subscribe Rousseau's idea of the common good. As Birch argues (1993, 
52): "In writing as he did, Schumpeter, an economist by profession, displayed an
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ignorance of the history of political ideas that would disgrace an undergraduate."
3.6 Liberal and Participatory Theories of Democracy
protective democracy
liberalism
"thin" democracy vs
vs
vs developmental democracy 
populism
participatory democracy
The pair of concepts developmental and protective democracy has been used by Held 
(1987, 70). The central idea of protective democracy is that individuals need to be 
protected from the interference by other individuals as well as from the governmental 
intervention. Held mentions Machiavelli and Hobbes as intellectual predecessors of 
protective democracy, although neither of them was a liberal nor a democrat. However, 
both of them considered individuals as some kinds of maximisers of their own interests, 
and described the interaction between the individuals in terms of conflicts. In protective 
democracy, the government is expected to pursue policies which protect people’s private 
interests, most importantly, the security of the body, but at the same time the government 
must be limited so that it will not interfere individuals' lives to much. Moreover, the state 
and the civil society are regarded as separate spheres, and the function of governmental 
action is to guarantee the individuals' pursuit of private goals. The principles of the 
institutional forms of protective democracy have been put forward by, for example, 
Montesqieu, Locke, Madison and Bentham, including the principles of the accountability 
of representatives, civil rights and the division of powers.
According to Held, the most radical forms of developmental theory have been expressed
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by Rousseau in his moral definition of freedom and in the idea of popular sovereignty, 
whereas J.S. Mill represents the most liberal extreme of developmental democracy. Held 
(1987, 78) puts forward the following principle of justification for the radical forms of 
developmental democracy: "Citizens must enjoy political and economic equality in order 
that nobody can be master of another and all can enjoy equal freedom and dependence 
in the process of collective development." According to Held’s definition, radical 
developmental democracy requires legislation by direct assemblies and election of public 
officials, which creates “informed, committed and developing citizenry” (Held 1987, 
102). In general, both the radical and the liberal versions of developmental democracy 
are based on the idea that the political participation has an intrinsic value of being part 
of the development of citizens - not just the instrumental value of influencing the 
governmental policies. The ideas of developmental democracy will be discussed further 
in conjunction with participatory theory.
In his book Liberalism against Populism (1982) William Riker defines liberal democracy 
as a political system in which individual freedom is best protected10. Under liberal 
government, the individual freedom is guaranteed by such institutional arrangements as 
representative government with frequent elections, which create the representatives an 
incentive to be reflective to the interests of the electorate and, also, constitutional checks 
and balances, which limit the powers of representative and popular majorities. 
Especially, these latter institutions can be seen as a prevention of the tyranny of 
majorities which create a threat to individual liberties. Referring to the results of the 
social choice theory, Riker criticises the so-called populist theories of democracy. By 
populism Riker means theories in which democracy simply means the fulfilment of the
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will of the majority. According to Riker’s interpretation of the results of social choice 
theory, the notion of the majority will does not have any normative significance, and 
therefore it cannot be argued that democratic decisions would be particularly fair or just. 
Therefore, democratic institutions may only be justified on the basis of their the long-run 
consequence, the protection of individual freedom.
The distinction between participatory or strong democracy and liberal or thin democracy 
has been used by Barber (1984). As a supporter of participatory democracy he criticises 
liberal democracy, as it has been put forward by the classics of liberal thinking (Hobbes, 
Locke, the American Founding Fathers), for being too ‘thin’, giving too much emphasis 
on the limitations of the power of the government, and underrating the importance of 
citizens' participation. As an alternative, he offers a more participatory model of 
democracy which is based on the philosophies of Rousseau and J.S. Mill. Barber’s model 
of strong democracy provides more possibilities for political participation than the 
nationwide elections, for example, local democracy, the referendum and the initiative. 
These measures should be combined with classical liberal institutions which restrict the 
powesr of the government, and they are expected to create certain sentiments of 
communality and citizenship, which make citizens' political judgments more reasonable.
Riker's concept of populism and Barber’s thin democracy are, probably, strawman 
theories used by those who represent the adversary ideas of democracy. Riker does not 
pay attention to the fact that those populists, who identify democracy with the use of the 
majority rule, for example Rousseau, also set some strict restrictions on what kind of 
opinions people should have and on what kind of participation and deliberation is
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required before the definition of the will of the majority. In other words, Riker fails to 
take into account the ‘input’ side of different radical theories of democracy: he does not 
give an adequate account on the considerations on how the objectiveness or 
reasonableness of citizens' preferences can be achieved, or on the developmental 
elements of the participatory models of democracy. Barber’s ‘thin democracy’, on the 
other hand, is a brutal version of liberalism, in which the essence of democracy is the 
institutionalized form of competition for power that can be characterized in Riker’s 
(1982) words as 'counting heads instead of cutting them'.
The difference between liberal and participatory, protective and developmental theory, 
or thin and strong democracy may also be put in terms of the distinction between 
negative and positive liberty used by Sir Isaiah Berlin (1969). Negative liberty is 
essentially individual freedom from outside coercion. Full negative freedom would mean 
total absence of coercion. Negative freedom does not necessarily require democratic form 
of government: any form of government which does not coerce the citizens guarantees 
it. Liberal democracy may, however, be the only government which fulfils this 
requirement de facto. Positive liberty, on the other hand, requires citizens' participation 
in government, because individuals cannot be free if they are not allowed to take part in 
the decision-making on the issues concerning their own lives, and therefore political 
participation is also seen as a part of individual self-fulfilment and growth. Positive 
freedom requires some kind of participatory democracy in which people directly 
participate in decision-making and thus also take the responsibility for political decisions.
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3.7 Historical and Philosophical Background of Liberal Theory
In the following sections, liberal and participatory theories of democracy will be 
discussed more closely. Both of these theories are concerned about democracy in large 
and fractionalized societies. The core of liberal political thought may probably become 
understandable only in its historical background: it was a reaction against absolutist 
forms of government. This explains why liberal theory emphasizes the conflict between 
the state and the individual. The roots of political liberalism were in the fights against 
different forms of absolutism: religious oppression, servile status and censorship of the 
press. Later on, liberal defence of individual freedom has got more distinguished forms, 
and also the institutional arrangements to protect this freedom against the interference 
of the state have become more elaborate. As Barry (1991,24) describes the origins of the 
liberal ideas of toleration, freedom and equality:
"Modem liberal institutions may be seen as extensions of each of these elements in the 
historic core. Thus, the principle of religious toleration has been generalized to the 'harm 
principle': the principle that people should be free to act as they wish provided they don't 
harm others. Freedom of the press has been generalized to cover freedom of expression 
of all kinds. And the principle that there should be no servile status has been generalized 
to a concept of equal citizenship rights due to everyone without regard to social class, 
race, or gender."
Liberal theory has been discussed from different philosophical perspectives. I will 
concentrate the English-speaking version of the liberal theory as a contrast to those 
theories of democracy which emphasize the importance of political participation. In the 
Anglo-Saxon version of liberal democracy, the liberal democratic form of government 
is justified in terms of self-interest, most fundamentally the preservation of the life, and 
the political liberalism has an instrumental value of enhancing the private aims of the
individuals. This characterization, which is quite close to how Barber (1984) represents 
liberal democracy, does not necessarily make justice to such English-speaking liberals 
who emphasized toleration and participation such as J.S. Mill.
Another philosophical approach to liberal democracy is based on the Hegelian 
philosophy of history. From this point of view, liberal democracy with its emphasis on 
equality and freedom, is an end in itself, because it satisfies the intrinsic human need for 
the recognition of dignity. Liberal government is based on universal and reciprocal 
recognition between human beings, institutionalized by such institutions as equal 
citizens' rights and the universal suffrage, and therefore it is a contradiction-free form of 
government. Under liberal government nobody needs to fight for the recognition because 
it is inherent in the political system. This was the basis of the Hegel's argument on liberal 
democracy and the end of history, and recently it has been resurrected by Francis 
Fukuyama in his book ‘The End of History and the Last Man’. (Fukuyama 1992, 
introduction.)
In his book ‘Strong Democracy’ Barber (1984) gives a critical account on the English- 
speaking version of liberal democracy. Barber argues that the structure of this version 
of liberal theory is ‘cartesian’, because it is based on certain assumptions of human 
nature. Liberal theory has an independent ground, from which the concepts, values, 
standards and ends of political life are derived. The model of reasoning of liberal theory 
resembles that of Hobbes' theory of social contract. The formula of the theory is the 
deductive which means theoretical truths are logically inferred from analytical premises. 
A criticism against liberal epistemology is that it is reductionist in its perceptions of
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human beings. The liberal conception of a human being is atomistic, individuals are 
perceived as separate and indivisible physical beings, whose actions can be explained in 
terms of certain self-interested motives (needs, wants, desires, impulses, instincts etc.). 
Human action can be described as a ‘vector sum’ of these motives, and similar laws 
apply interpersonally in calculating these sums. Human interaction is reduced to atomist 
forms, and all social and communal aspects of life are excluded. Furthermore, social 
interaction is defined in terms of conflicts between self-interested individuals, rather than 
a necessary condition for individual development and socialization. (Barber 1984,33.)
Liberal view of the state is instrumentalist, in other words, the governmental organisation 
and the state action should be aimed at increasing individuals' well-being. Governmental 
action should serve the homo economicus, the seeker of material happiness and security 
of the body. Locke expresses the central idea of instrumentalism: "power hath no other 
end but preservation of life, liberty and estate". In liberal theory politics is about 
fulfilment of private ends in the public arena. From this principle it follows that every 
intervention by the state must be justified, in other words, it must be proved that it serves 
the well-being of individuals. In liberal theory the purpose of political institutions is the 
peaceful resolution of the conflicts between individuals, protection of individuals from 
oppression by other individuals, and finding such solutions to political problems which 
would be, as far as possible, in accordance with the wishes of the individuals.
In liberal theory, the philosophical basis for politics is the logic of the consequences of 
the individual actions on the other individuals, or, in economic terms, externalities. 
Individual actions may have some consequences on other human beings, which makes
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them intersubjective and, in a sense, public. The state of nature is a situation in which 
these consequences are not publicly concerned because there is no political sphere. 
Barber depicts two different kinds of liberal 'states of nature', which may result when 
human beings interact. The first is what he calls liberal anarchist state of nature in which 
the interaction between individuals is harmonious, because the nature has provided 
sufficient room for each individual. The problems of extematilities do not come up. In 
the liberal realist state of nature, on the other hand, there is a finite space with density and 
scarcity, and at worst, the interaction between individuals may be characterized as a 
Hobbesian 'war of all against all'. (Barber 1984, 73).
The state activity is based on the extension of realist premises of the anarchy into the 
political realm. In liberal tradition politics is essentially seen as resolution of conflicts 
caused by the extematilities. In the realist state of nature there is not a possibility of 
cooperation, i.e. spontaneous settlement of interest conflicts, because among individuals 
driven by self-interest the credibility of all contracts depends on an exterior power which 
puts them in force. In Hobbes' Leviathan, this is stated as follows:
"For the Lawes of Nature (as Justice, Equity, Modesty, Mercy, and (in summe) doing to 
others, as wee would be done To,) of themselves, without the terrour of some Power, to 
cause them to be observed, are contrary to our naturall Passions, that carry us to 
Partiality, Pride, Revenge, and the like. And Covenants, without the Sword, are but 
Words, and of no strength to secure a man at all." (Hobbes 1651/1924, 87.)
The justification for the state activity arises from the hypothetical social contract. The 
basis of the civil society is the fear of sanction, which creates an incentive for the citizens 
to obey the rules11. As Locke has put it, "polecats and foxes" must be "caged by laws, 
prodded by penalties, deterred by threats". Barber (1984, 83-84) criticises the basis of the
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civil society in liberal theory that in liberal theory "men are made to obey but not to 
change or grow".
A liberal democrat does not, however, glorify power, because the core of liberal thought 
is that freedom and power are opposites. Liberal thought is based on the idea of negative 
freedom; the idea that individuals should have a private sphere, which is protected 
against the interference of the state. From this follows the ‘liberal dilemma’: in the state 
of nature individual man's potential freedom is endangered, while the state endangers his 
actual freedom. The step from anarchy to civil society can be justified on the basis of 
individual freedom and well-being, but the problem then is, how governmental tyranny 
can be prevented after the step from the state of nature to the civil society has been 
taken.12 The solution to this problem is the limited state, minimalism: "liberal state 
manipulates men by first implanting terror in them and then, in return for their socially 
acceptable behaviour and their prudential fealty, protecting them from it". It must be 
emphasized that minimalism in itself does not necessarily imply democracy but any form 
of limited government, although constitutional democracy may be the only mechanism 
by which the governments may be limited in practise. (Barber 1984,15,21.)
3.8. Liberal Institutions
3.8.1 Elections and Democratic Rights
Much of the current controversy on liberal democracy is more about the philosophical 
foundations of the theory, and whether or not the theory is universally applicable.
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Furthermore, within the Anglo-Saxon liberal theory there is controversy on how the 
individuals' freedoms and private sphere should be justified, or what should be public 
and what should be private. There is probably lesser controversy on the institutional 
arrangements of the liberal government. As a form of government, liberal democracy is 
essentially about certain institutional safety mechanisms. These mechanisms constrain 
the individual wills, on which the political decisions are based upon, and prevent any 
single one of them from becoming tyrannical. As Sartori (1987,271) describes this, in 
liberal democracies the people “stand for a long process of both innumerable adjustments 
and innumerable checks”, and that the people “actually resolve themselves in a multi­
actor, multi-step and multi-filtered decision-making process”.
One of the central features of modem liberal democracies are the frequent elections of 
the representatives. Riker, for example, suggests that electoral voting in liberal 
democracies survives the critique of majoritarianism of social choice theory. According 
to the liberal interpretation, the purpose of voting is not to give a reliable account on the 
hypothetical will of the majority, but to serve as an opportunity to dismiss the unpopular 
officials. The negative character of liberal theory does not require that the outcomes of 
social choice methods are accurate reflections of the popular will, and therefore it is not 
about popular rule. Instead, as Riker (1982,244) argues:
"The kind of democracy that thus survives is not, however, popular rule, but rather an 
intermittent, sometimes random, even perverse, popular veto. Social choice theory forces 
us to recognize that the people cannot mle as a corporate body in the way that populists 
suppose. Instead, officials rule, and they do not represent some indefinable popular will. 
Hence they can easily be tyrants, either in their names or in the name of some putative 
imaginary majority. Liberal democracy is simply the veto by which it is sometimes 
possible to restrain official tyranny".
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Despite the defects of electoral institutions, ie. manipulation, cycles and so on, they still 
fulfil their main function, which is to allow the electorate a regular veto on the policies 
pursued by elected officials. Riker's idea of democratic method resembles Schumpeter's 
'democratic elitism'. According to Riker's and Schumpeter's definition, the concept of 
democracy simply refers to this particular type of system of alternate the ruling elites 
without much reference to the social conditions in which they work or the outcomes they 
bring about. Democratic decisions do not need to be particularly just or fair, although the 
electoral method is expected to provide some kind of check on the actions of the 
officials. Schumpeter even insisted that democracy which bums witches or heretics at the 
stake is still democracy. Riker, on the other hand, believes that the electoral veto tends 
to generate freedom, because it curbs the power of the government and thus eliminates 
oppression. (Riker 1982,246.)
Riker's and Schumpeter's definition of democracy is very minimalistic, and the other 
theorists of liberal democracy have set more substantial conditions for the democratic 
system. This is because the minimal definition is not sufficient to guarantee the 
sustainability of the democratic system. Democratic systems are vulnerable because 
democratic decisions may violate the necessary conditions for even the minimal form of 
democracy, understood as electoral competition. Dahl (1989, 163-175) considers the 
social preconditions of democracy and the democratic outcomes as interlinked:
"But the democratic process isn't completely open-ended. If a majority were to deprive 
a minority, or even itself, of any of its primary political rights, then in the very act of 
doing so it would violate the democratic process. If the decision of the majority wasn't 
simply a mistake on their part, then it would necessarily be true that they weren't fully 
committed to the democratic process itself." (Dahl 1989,171.)
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According to Dahl, a political system may cease to be democratic if the majority decides 
to deny the right to participate for example from the opposition, because this act would 
essentially put an end to the political competition. A similar argument has been put 
forward by for example Bachrach (1967,4), and it can be summarized that i) there are 
some necessary social conditions for democracy, and ii) the substantial outcomes of 
democratic systems may violate the necessary social conditions of democracy. The social 
preconditions necessary for democratic process means certain primary political rights, 
like equal right to vote, the freedom of speech and association. Freedom of speech is 
necessary for the public discussion which makes the electors aware of different political 
alternatives and their consequences, the acts of the government and the characteristics 
of the political candidates. Freedom of association also gives the citizens formal 
opportunities to organise themselves to political activity, promote their political interests, 
and nominate candidates in elections.
In sum, liberal democracy cannot be defined purely in terms of such methods as the 
electoral competition, because democratically made decisions or democratically elected 
representatives may violate the necessary prerequisites for a fair competition, the political 
rights. Without institutionalization of the rights and universal adherence to them there 
is no guarantee of the sustainability of the system. However, liberal rights of participation 
fundamentally serve the instrumental goal of counteracting the possible oppression by 
the governments, and the political participation is not seen as a value in itself. 
Furthermore, liberal political rights are negative in character, they mean just a formal 
opportunity to participate and express opinions. It is one matter of dispute between the
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liberal and participatory theorists of democracy whether the equality of possibilities of 
participation and expression should be made more substantial, whether there should 
active be policies for abolishing the inequalities in the resources of participation to make 
the societies more ‘democratic’.
3.8.2 Division of Powers and Constitutional Checks and Balances
In the early liberal thought the emphasis was in the opposition against the tyranny of the 
absolute monarchy. Later on, the possibility of the tyranny o f the majority has become 
an important issue in liberal thought. Many of the principles of the liberal government 
were expressed for example in Madison's ‘The Federalist Papers 47-51' (Hamilton, 
Madison & Jay 1788/1961, 300-325). The most important institutional arrangement 
suggested by Madison is the division of powers. The US Constitution follows the 
principle according to which the legislative, the executive and judiciary powers are in the 
hands of separate institutions. This principle of separation of powers was stated by 
Madison as follows: "The accumulation of all powers, legislative, executive, and 
judiciary, in the same hands, whether of one, a few, or many, and whether hereditary, 
self-appointed, or elective, may just be pronounced the very definition of tyranny." 
(Hamilton, Madison & Jay 1788/1961, 301.) In most liberal democracies, there is also 
constitutional division between the realms of national and regional or local governments. 
American-style liberalism also emphasizes the importance of an independent judiciary 
which may block decision-making. (Riker 1982,250.)
According to Madison, there should be certain control and veto rights between the
99
different branches of government. As Madison puts it in The Federalist Paper No. 48: 
"After discriminating, therefore, in theory, the several classes of power, as they may in 
their nature be legislative, executive, or judiciary, the next and most difficult task is to 
provide some practical security for each, against the invasion of the others." (Hamilton, 
Madison & Jay 1788/1961, 308.) A central element in American constitutionalism is 
multicameral legislature with mutual veto powers.
According to Madison and Hamilton, constitutional checks and balances were needed in 
order to assure that only 'cool and deliberate' opinion of the people prevails. The aim of 
checks is to filter out the most transient wills of the people, because persistent wills are 
more reasonable than transitory ones. This was explained by the psychological 
assumption that the passions are cooled down as the time passes by. In other words, the 
delaying devices prevent the occasional whims from determining the political outcomes. 
(Manin 1994,61.)
Riker (1982), for example, is somewhat ambivalent about the importance of these other 
institutional arrangements in the liberal government. Riker admits that in practise, 
however, liberal government requires also other checks than simply the electoral threat 
on the ruling officials:
"Perhaps, in the abstract, liberal methods do not need to be supplemented with these 
restraints because liberalism has only one stipulated sanction on rulers - namely, the 
threat of the next election. Nevertheless, in practice, liberal democracy probably does not 
work without the additional restraints always heretofore associated with it - multicameral 
legislatures, decentralized parties, and so on." (Riker 1982,248.)
The powers of majorities may also be limited by the requirement for a parliamentary
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supermajority. This means that more than the absolute majority, a qualified majority, is 
required for passing certain parts of legislation in the legislature. The requirement for 
qualified majorities may be seen as appropriate in those issues, in which the preservation 
of the legislative status quo is of special importance. Qualified majorities may be, for 
example, be required in issues concerning the infringement of constitutional rights, 
because the constitutional rights protect the fundamental democratic values. The 
requirements for supermajorities are based on the idea of the social contract: the 
fundamental rules of democratic decision-making must be accepted by all citizens or, in 
practice, at least by the vast majority of them. Supermajority requirements may be 
criticised on the grounds that they protect the status quo when it is unfair in some 
respect. Furthermore, as mentioned in the Chapter 2, the supermajority requirements 
block the decision-making also in those cases in which there would be a clear-cut and fair 
majority winner, and may make the decision-making procedures ineffective, because the 
bargaining costs tend to rise as the size of the required majority rises.
Referendums and other forms of direct democracy do not fit very well to Riker's and 
Schumpeter's definition of democracy. The results of referendums are typically justified 
by the notions of the will of the majority and the popular sovereignty. Especially those 
referendums which are initiated by the governments may become a tool in the hands of 
political elites improving their own or their party's position in the political competition. 
On the other hand, the constitutionally required referendums and other forms of ‘law- 
controlling’ referendums have often been justified in Madisonian terms as being checks 
on the power of the parliamentary majorities. Because these form of referendums also 
force the representatives to take the public opinion into account, they are expected to be
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especially anti-elitist controls of power.
3.8. Participatory Democracy - Man as a Social Being
Barber's (1984,32) criticism against the liberal theory is largely a criticism against the 
premises and the structure of the theory in its most economic forms. First, he criticises 
the deductive structure of the reasoning in liberal theory. Barber states his criticism as 
follows: "the appropriate metaphor for political reasoning is not concatenation but 
weaving - the interlacing strands in a cable rather than forging of links in the chain." 
Barber criticises liberal theory for being sceptical and dogmatically certain about the 
human nature at the same time. He regards this as two sides of the same error of 
considering the principles of organization of a society to be derivable from abstract 
reasoning, and justifiable by epistemological ‘truths’ concerning the human nature. (See 
also pp. 128-129,164-165).
Second, Barber criticises liberal theory for its individualism, in other words, the view that 
individuals are essentially separate. Liberal ideas of ‘man alone’ and negative freedom 
are not sufficient grounds for what he calls positive freedom. For example, defining 
freedom in barely physical terms misconstrues it, and also produces a conception of 
political liberty as passive. Barber (1984,91) quotes Carl Saunders Peirce: "individual 
man since his separate existence is manifested only by ignorance and error, so far as he 
is anything apart from his fellows, and from what he and they are to be, is only a 
negation".13
Liberal theory, based on atomistic view of individuals, cannot be expected to give an 
adequate account of human interdependency, mutualism, cooperation and fellowship, 
and therefore is not sufficient for describing the actual character of social relations. In 
participatory theory, political actors interact socially in ways which cannot be described 
in terms of metaphysics or moral absolutes. Individuals are not treated as egoistic 
interest-maximisers, whose cooperation is based merely on the possible beneficial 
outcomes. In participatory theory, the starting point is the civic ideal that human beings 
are inherently social. For example Rousseau resolved the problem of individual freedom 
under government ‘by redefining the concept of natural freedom as civic and moral 
freedom and by using obedience to self. Marx, on the other hand, expresses the 
psychological assumptions which typically characterize communitarian theories of 
democracy: "man is not merely gregarious animal, but an animal that can individuate 
itself only in the midst of society". (Barber 1984,10,214.)
Liberal, minimalist politics may fit better to the world of uncertainty, because it treats 
‘men and women with lessened expectations’. Those who are sceptical about human 
nature may consider liberal democracy as a system which works in favour of minimal 
individual freedom in every social contingency, even among the worst egoists. Most of 
the theories in the other Family require something which is not necessarily true, for 
example in participatory theory ‘reasonable citizens’. Barber, however, criticises this 
kind of minimalism and scepticism for being ‘an excuse for political passivity’ (Barber 
1984,158,258).
Barber accuses liberalism of being a non-visionary form of democracy and criticises of
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the effects of liberal thought and liberal institutions in societies. He claims that liberal 
institutions have paralysing effects on political participation. He means by this that the 
scepticism towards human nature in liberal theory has turned into an excuse for political 
passivity and a hindrance for political community-building (Barber 1984, 11). Like 
Bachrach, Barber argues that the arguments on the dangers of the popular participation, 
and the assumption that citizens are incompetent for democratic participation 
fundamentally represent an elitist ideology. In liberal thinking individuals are arranged 
into two categories: they may be either political entrepreneurs or disinterested 
‘consumers’ of politics. Barber argues that in liberal thought the powerlessness of masses 
is explained by their apathy. He argues the contrary: people are apathetic because they 
are powerless.
Barber admits the problem of large societies that the plurality of individual roles and 
interests weakens grounds of mutuality and participatory citizenship. The mere existence 
of majorities and minorities is an expression of disintegration. Political theories have 
different ideas on how this social disintegration should be lessened: in liberal or pluralist 
theory overlapping disintegration is assumed to lessen disintegration as whole; in 
participatory democracy political participation is expected to enforce mutualism within 
fragmented societies. In this respect, participatory theory has ambitious goals: politics 
should be an arena in which citizens learn ‘public thinking*. This means that citizens' 
opinions would not eventually be based on purely self-interested calculations, but also 
the interests of the other people or the 'common good' should play part in citizens' 
opinion-formation. In participatory democracy the actual decision-making is preceded 
by a deliberation process in which more reasonable opinions are conceived.14
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In participatory theory, democracy is seen as a way of solving moral and political 
problems by citizens' participation and public discussion: "Politics is not the application 
of truth to the problem of human relations but the application of human relations to the 
problem of truth." Barber's theory, however, differs from Rousseau's theory because it 
does not assume the existence of the objective common good. Participatory democracy 
is rooted on the epistemological theory of fallibilism. Politics is concerned with problems 
in which ‘truth is not - or is not yet -known.’ Democracy may exist entirely without 
moral foundations: in, fact, it may be a political answer to the question of moral 
uncertainty. Conditional and tentative truths in moral and political issues imply certain 
kind of politics, politics of toleration in Mill's sense (Barber 1984, 61-66).
Barber argues that also liberalism acknowledges the absence of an independent ground 
as a condition of politics. The solutions offered, however, are different in these two 
theories. Unlike liberal democracy, participatory democracy is not based on any 
metaphysical assumptions on the individual motivations, rather: "Politics is what men 
do when metaphysics fails; it is not metaphysics as a constitution" (Barber 1984,131, 
151). Barber's solution for the absence of independent ground is strong democracy: 
"...strong democracy in the participatory mode resolves conflict in the absence of an 
independent ground through participatory process of ongoing, proximate self-legislation 
and the creation of political community capable of transforming dependant private 
individuals into free citizens and partial and private interests into public goods.”
The idea of strong democracy is based on civic attitudes and institutions which encourage 
participation, rather than the idea of mutual interests of liberal contractualism. First,
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politics is defined in terms of participation: "politics remains something we do, not 
something (such as power, for example) that we possess or use or watch or think about" 
(Barber 1984, 119, 162). In strong democracy political and moral uncertainty is 
transferred into group action; conflicts are tried to use as means for achieve cooperation. 
Second, participation ought to have transformative effect on individual opinions: it is 
expected to create reasonableness in political opinions. Reasonableness is a 
commonsensical notion, and Barber characterizes it as practical rather than metaphysical: 
"To be reasonable is therefore not to deny self, but to place Self in the context of Other 
and to inform it with a sense of its dependence on the civic polity." Increased mutuality 
in citizens' attitudes has the effects that right and wrong cease to be vital terms of 
judgment and political truths no longer exist (Barber 1984, 127,187-199).
According to Barber, communication is at the heart of strong democracy, and he 
criticises the most economic forms of liberal theory for ignoring the importance of it. 
Communication is a ‘manifestation of our common humanity’. The ‘strong democratic 
talk’ has, among others, the following functions: articulation of interest; bargaining and 
exchange; persuasion; agenda-setting, which in strong democracy is open and public; 
exploring mutuality; affiliation and affection; reformulation and reconceptualization of 
social concepts; community-building. Strong democracy should entail both the intimacy 
of local participation and the power and response of regional and national participation. 
The institutional arrangements required in theories of participatory democracy can be 
seen as an attempt to reestablish the communitarian spirit which has been lost in large 
societies. (Barber 1984, 74.).15
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Barber's programme for strong democracy is based on different mediating institutions in 
which all citizens can participate. Strong democracy is, however, more a complementary 
idea than a radical alternative to liberal democracy, because the strong democratic 
institutions should be established while maintaining the liberal limitations on power. 
Barber (1984, 270, 305) mentions for example the following methods of 
institutionalizing 'strong democratic talk': Neighbourhood assemblies which are expected 
to increase the accountability of the local government and deliberation on local issues; 
Television town meetings and civic communications cooperative which enhance civic 
interaction via television and the use of interactive television for multi-choice voting 
systems; Civic education and equal access to information.
As institutions for strong democratic decision-making, Barber suggests electronic 
balloting and elections by lot, and national initiative and referendum. The initiative and 
the referendum should be also used on laws passed by the parliament, in other words, 
they would also be used for checking the decisions. Barber supports the use of multi­
choice format, which he claims to create more public orientation, because the nature of 
the voting becomes more giving a judgment than making a choice. He also suggests two 
readings, because this prevents plebiscitary wilfulness and forces people to consider.
Barber (1984,305) also suggests some measures for 'strong democratic action', in other 
words, citizens' active participation in defence, public works and voluntary 
neighbourhood action, and also democracy at the workplace. The institutional methods 
put forward by Barber form an integrated agenda; strong democracy is not based on be 
piecemeal engineering, because the potentials of suggested measures depend on mutual
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reenforcement. The purpose of civic participation and deliberation is not only to filter 
citizens' preferences and prevent unreasonable outcomes, but they must be seen as a 
value in themselves, because they are necessary for the creation of the responsible 
citizenship which is the precondition of participatory democracy.
3.10 Public Debate and Reasonableness - Criticism
Participatory theory emphasizes such elements as public discussion and persuasion. Ideas 
resembling Barber's public discussion and 'reasonableness' have been put forward by 
Habermas in his theory of communicative action. Habermas' theory is based on the 
premise that purely self-interested arguments cannot be put forward in the public 
discussion, because the argument that a certain option would be the most beneficial for 
the speaker oneself is not convincing enough. In public discourse, one needs to give 
grounds for one's positions which are rational and other-regarding. This is the feature 
which distinguishes public debate from political bargaining, and also the difference 
between the 'forum' and the 'market' types of political interaction discussed earlier. It may 
also be argued that when people expose themselves to the reason in the rational 
discussion, the reason overcomes their own prejudices and selfishness, and the outcome 
of the debate will be a more rational opinion. In Habermas' theory, the unanimous 
consent is assumed to be the outcome of the rational discussion, and he obviously 
believes, like Rousseau and unlike Barber, that there is the common good, not a plurality 
of ultimate values. (Elster 1986,112-113.).
According to Elster (1986), the need for certain kinds of arguments in public discussion
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is not a sufficient condition for achieving truly rational and other-regarding opinions, 
because this 'argument only shows that in public debate one has to pay some lip-service 
of the common good.' Elster also gives other reasons for criticising Habermasian view, 
and I will consider a few of them, especially those which have relevance for Barber's 
theory as well. The first major problem is, whether it is possible to guarantee that only 
those who are well-informed and other-regarding participate. Furthermore, it is 
appropriate to ask whether it would be right to exclude the disinterested or the purely 
self-interested from the political process. Counting only well-reflected opinions in 
decision-making would lead to a certain kind of elitism, or to the situation described in 
conjunction with Rousseau's theory, in which only some but not all the people align 
themselves to the public-regarding standpoints. (Elster 1986,114-115.)
Second, Barber, as well as other participatory theorists, may be accused to be rather naive 
in their trust that the public discussion will increase the 'objectiveness' or 'reasonableness' 
of the opinions. As Elster (1983,116-117) points out, sometimes interaction may, in fact, 
reinforce the biases in individual opinions, especially in the presence of demagogues. 
This was considered as a problem already in early assembly democracies, and was 
probably the reason why Rousseau stressed the fact that political deliberation should 
happen without much communication. Increased interaction can also undermine 
autonomy and morality, the claim which can be supported by the evidence of certain 
political mass movements. The opinions based on interaction may be affected by 
conformism or 'group-thinking', which means that people blindly follow the opinions 
held by certain opinion-leaders or by the majority.16 As Elster concludes:"The random 
errors of selfish and private preferences may to some extent cancel each other out and
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thus be less to be feared that the massive and coordinate errors that may arise through 
group-think...I am not arguing against the need for public discussion, only for the need 
to take the question of institutional and constitutional design very seriously."
3.11 Conclusions
The modem conceptions of democracy differ considerably from the classical forms and 
theories of democracy. This may be explained by the fact that the modem conceptions 
of democracy deal with large political entities, such as the nation-state. The ideas of 
political liberalism have been merged together with the concept of democracy which has 
resulted the dominant doctrine of liberal democracy, and in increasingly many countries 
the political life according has been arranged according to these principles. In the earlier 
conceptions popular self-government and direct participation were the central elements 
of democracy, whereas according to most of the modem theories democracy is 
considered to mean certain type of representative government.
The elements of liberalism have become more important in democratic theory. 
Furthermore, the significance of democratic participation has decreased at the same time 
as new groups were enfranchised. Nowadays democracy almost exclusively means 
representative democracy, and the elitist character of it is considered to be a necessity. 
The classical forms of democracy are considered to have only few applications in 
modem, large and adversary societies, and Rousseau's interpretation of the correctness 
of majoritarian decisions hardly has any applicability for example in nationwide 
referendums.
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Some theorists, however, would like to develop more participatory forms of government. 
Barber's account on liberal theory, perhaps, overemphasizes the materialist and over­
individualist parts of liberal tradition, and does not do justice to the theorists representing 
the ‘middle-ground’ between liberal and participatory theories. Liberal theory is not 
probably a theory of the best possible government, but it may be a theory about a best 
feasible government. Liberal government, however 'thin' or 'non-visionary' form of 
government it may be, however, is a big improvement compared to some authoritarian 
forms of government when it comes to such questions as civil rights and toleration of 
dissidents. Also, Barber's ideas of participatory democracy include many liberal checks 
and balances, the fact which reveals that he does not fully trust 'reasonableness' as a 
check on public opinion. The existence civil liberties of liberal theory may be a 
prerequisite for any other form of democracy.
The idea that the moral and political truths may only be defined in intersubjective 
processes is a powerful argument supporting epistemic and participatory conceptions of 
democracy. The ambitious goals of participatory theory are not possible to achieve just 
by setting up some institutions. What is needed are citizens who are willing to use these 
opportunities. The development of participatory politics may be seen as an evolutionary 
process. The lack of participatory culture may be used as excuse for not giving any 
institutional opportunities for participation although it may as well be argued that the 
lack of opportunities is the reason for the backward participatory culture. The 
development of participatory culture and institutions are therefore interdependent. There 
are, however, some external factors, which may explain the success of participatory 
democracy, for example the size of the political entity, which makes the effects of
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participation more visible and also may increase the feelings of community. Also, as it 
has been assumed in some earlier theories of developmental democracy, the ideals of 
participatory theory may only be achieved in relatively equal societies.
Given the complexities of modem society and the liberal form of democracy, what kinds 
of purposes, the occasional referendums in Western democracies serve? As shown in the 
Chapter 2, the referendum is not even a particularly reliable measure of the will of the 
majority. It also seems to be quite justified to argue that in sometimes there is an absence 
of'effective political volition'. These conclusions raise the question, to what extent the 
referendum is in accordance with the normative principles of democratic government, 
those put forward either in theories in the right or left. These questions, I will argue, can 
be answered more satisfactorily if the institutional differences of the referendums are 
taken into account.
The theories and the empirical practices of democracy should not necessarily be studied 
separately, but that there are many ways in which these two are related. Theories of 
democracy have more or less explicit views on people’s motivations, on their level of 
understanding on politics, on their political behaviour, and also on how political 
institutions shape their behaviour. It is possible to study these views empirically. Also 
the normative arguments for and against different forms of democracy are not conceived 
in vacuum, but affected by the experience on different democratic institutions. Finally, 
normative arguments are used in the political debate on the adoption and the use of 
democratic institutions and hence they influence the empirical reality. In the Part II of 
my thesis I will analyse some historical experiences of the referendum in Western
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democracies. In the Chapter 4 the institutional frameworks of referendums are analysed, 
and in the case studies the referendum is analysed as a part of political process with real 
political actors. The purpose is to illustrate the link between the normative and 
ideological argumentation on the referendum, and the motivations and interests of the 
participants of the political process.
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Notes
IThis has been proved mathematically by Miller 1986.
2 This is the reason why the legislation on minority rights would not be considered to be appropriate for 
being decided in referendum. Also the existence of the minority rights may be considered to be so 
fundamental for the democratic system that majoritarian procedures cannot be appropriate for settling 
them. (Magleby 1984,76).
3 In game-theoretical terms, this situation may be described as a n-player Prisoners' Dilemma-game, in 
which those people voting in 'Rousseauan' manner are acting cooperatively and those who vote according 
to their own interests are acting non-cooperatively. However, the whole act of voting and participating 
in politics cannot be based on people's self-interest, because the cost of voting is likely to exceed the 
expected utility of the act. This would imply that mostly those who have public concerns, or rather have 
public- than self-regarding stands, would participate anyway. As Goodin (1983, 89) argues, this can be 
considered as a mechanism of'laundering preferences' internal to democratic systems.
4 Bentham, Jeremy: A Fragment o f Government (1776).
5 In addition to these, representation may thought to be based on the metaphysical link between the rulers 
and the ruled. In metaphysical representation the power is concentrated in the hands of a 'Hobbesian' 
sovereign, who may formally act on behalf of the citizens. However, in metaphysical representation there 
does not exist any concrete mechanisms by which the activities of the sovereign would be controlled. 
(Pitkin 1969, 8-9.)
6 McLean (1991, 188-189), for example, argues that the use of statistical sampling methods would 
produce better forms of microcosm representation than any of those electoral system expected to bring 
about proportional representation. However, the proportional electoral systems make the representatives 
accountable unlike the statistical methods.
7 Elitist theories of democracy may be contrasted also with pluralist theories (Dahl 1976; Miller 1983).
In elitist theories of democracy the people are clearly divided to ‘elites’ and ‘masses’. The only way in 
which the elites are related to the masses is the electoral accountability. According to pluralist theories, 
on the other hand, the political decision-making takes place between different groups representing 
conflicting cleavages in the society. The social pluralism meaning cross-cutting cleavages, and political 
pluralism meaning changing majority coalitions between different groups. Both of these prevent any 
social group from becoming too dominant in the political process which enhances the long-run stability 
of the democratic system.
8 Even Rousseau, who distinguished between three forms of government, democracy, aristocracy and 
monarchy, argues that elective aristocracy is the best form of government (1762/1968,114-116.)
9 "Communities which most of us would readily recognize as democracies have burned heretics at the 
stake - the republic of Geneva did in Calvin's time - or otherwise persecuted them in a manner repulsive 
to our moral standards - colonial Massachusetts may serve as an example." (Schumpeter 1992,240-241.)
10 The individual freedom means here negative freedom, i.e. freedom form external coercion. The idea 
of freedom underlying populist and participatory conceptions of democracy is the individual self- 
determination.
11 The Hobbesian problem of social order can be described as a n-person Prisoner's dilemma game, in 
which non-cooperation is the dominant strategy. The introduction of sanctions changes the payoffs and 
therefore also the structure of the game in such a way, that cooperation becomes the dominant strategy. 
There is, however, a problem inherent in this solution: the establishment of the controlling and sanctioning 
authority can also be described as a n-person Prisoner's dilemma.
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12 The historical foundations of liberal theory of democracy are in the combat of the Europeans and 
Americans against absolute monarchy in the 17th and 18th century. In its way, this historical background 
explains, why the idea of the conflict between the state and the individual is so characteristic to liberal 
philosophy. The tension between anarchist and realist variations of liberal theory engenders what Barber 
calls American paradox: "repudiated the cynicism of Europe and called for a political order based on the 
most elevated view of man's capacities, and then designed a constitution based on the very lowest 
expectations". (Barber 1984,81.)
13 Benjamin Barber (1974,135) describes the process of individualization in Western societies: 
"Individuation, atomization, and alienation were characteristics processes through which men combatted 
and ultimately overcame feudalism. The subsequent history of European political institutions has taken 
the form of permanent contest between liberated, atomized man and the vestigial imperial state, given 
a new lease on life by nationalism, bureaucracy and technological progress. No history of the West (...) 
has missed the centrality of this dualism to the Western political tradition. Representative government, 
natural rights, the theory of social contract and consent, freedom as the absence of external impediments 
on movement, power as a necessary evil, private rights as the final objective of public law - each of these 
characteristic foundations of our political thought and institutions finds its seeds in the birth of modem 
European man out of the feudal womb."
14 Participatory theory differs from Rousseauan theory in two respects. First, as mentioned above, 
participatory theory is designed for large and pluralistic societies whereas Rousseau's theory is only 
applicable in small and homogenous societies, and, second, in participatory theories there does not exist 
any objective common good which is found out in individual deliberation, but certain institutional 
arrangements are needed for the development of right kind of public thinking.
15 The participatory theory has a significantly different view on the social fragmentation and polarisation 
than the pluralist theory. According to the pluralist theory, the fragmentation of the society is creates more 
checks on the social groups tying to access the power. Polarization may maintain the stability of the 
democratic system: "To overstate the point, every ally is sometimes an enemy and every enemy is 
sometimes an ally. Consequently, polarization o f politics along ideological lines is held in check...." (Dahl 
1976, 347.)
16 The most radical participatory theorist would actually prefer open ballots, because they assume that 
open ballots would make individuals more responsible for their voting decisions. This may be criticised 
for the reason that open ballots could be lead for conformism and oppression of dissidents.
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PART II: ANALYSIS OF AGENDA-SETTING
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PART R: ANALYSIS OF AGENDA-SETTING
4. Referendum as a Part of Democratic Decision-Making
4.1 Classification of Issues
Gordon Smith (1976,3) argues that the classification of referendums along the subject- 
matter of the issues may only be descriptive, not analytical. Smith puts forward a 
threefold division: decisions on constitutional matters and others concerning the basic 
nature of the state; the determination of important lines in public policy; and the 
resolution of moral issues which have rather social than political salience. In the 
following table the main categories are divided into subcategories and an example of 
each type of issues is given (See also Mockli 1994,153):
Table 4.1 Classification of Issues
IS S U E  T Y P E  E X A M P L E
R U L E S  O F  P O L IT IC A L  O R G A N IZ A T IO N
1. New Constitution
2. Civil rights
3. Local autonomy
4. International 
agreements
5. Transfer of sovereignty to 
supranational organisations
6. Territorial 
issues and secession
7. Organisation competence
8. Voting age
9. Church and state
P U B L IC  P O L IC Y
1. Taxation and budget policy
2. Energy, environment, traffic
Italy 1993
Australia 1967: aboriginal rights 
Scotland 1979: devolution 
Switzerland 1992: EEA-agreement
Denmark 1992: Maastricht Treaty
Denmark 1916: sale of Danish West 
Indies
Italy 1993: abolition of tourist, public enterprise and 
agriculture ministries 
Denmark 1953,1961,1969,1971,1978 
Ireland 1972: lifting the special position of 
the Roman Catholic church
California 1990: funding for railway 
Sweden 1980: nuclear power
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3. Consumer protection, prices, land use
4. Defence
5. Social policy
6. Agriculture
7. Education and culture
8. Coordination
9. Work and employment
Denmark 1963: land reform bills 
Switzerland 1989: abolition of army 
Sweden 1957: supplementary pension plans 
Switzerland 1992: farmers* inheritance regulation 
Switzerland 1978: University and Research Act 
Sweden 1955: right or left-hand traffic 
Switzerland 1988:40-hour work week
M O R A L  IS S U E S
1. Alcohol, tobacco, drugs
2. Gender issues, abortion
3. Lifestyles
Italy 1993: decriminalise personal use of soft drugs
Ireland 1993: abortion
Switzerland 1993: legalising casinos
Italy 1995: repeal compulsory residence for mafia
suspects_________________________________
4. Crime and punishment
Mockli (1993, 153) distinguishes between those referendums which are about policy 
issues and those which are more about votes of confidence of the political leaders. When 
the referendum has the character of being a vote of confidence, there are two types of 
referendums, noncompetitive and competitive referendums. The noncompetitive 
referendums are only an acclamation of the leader’s power and there are no real 
alternatives for giving the support to the leader (for example, Germany in the 1930s). In 
competitive votes of confidence the support for the leader is really put to a test. As an 
example of this kind of referendums Mockli mentions the referendum in Belgium in 
1950 on the return of King Leopold II.
Sometimes referendums turn out to be votes of confidence for the political leaders even 
when they are formally held upon some policy issue. This was the case in the French 
referendum in 1969 on the senate power and regional devolution, which President de 
Gaulle made a referendum on his own popularity. Therefore, in addition to the question 
put forward in the ballot paper, the referendum question had another dimension, the 
personal position of the president. After the narrow defeat in the referendum, de Gaulle 
felt obliged to resign. (Morel 1996.) Furthermore, it may be argued that many
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referendums turn out to be votes on the popularity of the political leaders who promote 
the proposals to be voted upon. Especially referendums on low-salience issues may 
become votes on the popularity of the government (see Franklin & al.1994).
Many referendums do not fit to any of the categories put forward in the table 4.1. very 
well, because, apart from the possibility of being votes of confidence of political leaders, 
referendums may be held upon issues which have many different dimensions. For 
example, in the Swiss referendums on traffic restriction, the issue is very much about 
environmental policy but also that of public economy. Of course, there is no a priori way 
of classifying the issues according to whether there are one or more issue dimensions. 
The character of an issue submitted to the referendum is determined by the attributes by 
which the voters assess the issue in question. This, in turn, depends on the historical and 
social circumstances in which the referendum takes place. A proper reconstruction of 
issue dimensions would require knowledge on these contingent factors, and therefore the 
classification of issues as such does not seem to be a very fruitful exercise.
4.2 Classification of Institutions
There is a considerable variation between different institutional provisions for 
referendums, and therefore the analysis of the role of the referendum in political systems 
must be based on an appropriate classification of institutions. There are several 
institutional classifications of referendums applying different criteria, put forward for 
example by Smith (1976), Suksi (1993) and Uleri and Gallagher (1996). Moreover, there
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does not seem to be a general consensus on the criteria the classification should be based 
upon. To certain extent, the way in which the institutions are classified depends on the 
purpose of the classification. Especially those who look at referendums mainly from the 
perspective of constitutional law and those who focus more on political interaction tend 
to different approaches.
The aim of this work is to analyse how the referendum works as a part of democratic 
process, and, especially, what kinds of effects the referendum has on the political agenda, 
and, therefore, I will focus on the criteria relevant for these purposes. There is a rather 
limited amount of comparative literature on how different types of the referendum work 
in democratic systems. The problem of creating a satisfactory classification is that there 
is such a large variation between the practices in different countries that it is difficult to 
define a limited number of criteria that would explain most of this variation. Sometimes 
minor constitutional differences may change the functions of the institution dramatically. 
Furthermore, extra-constitutional factors may even be more important for understanding 
the use or non-use of referendums as the constitutional rules. Therefore, the 
constitutional differences as such are not sufficient for understanding the functional 
differences between the referendums, but it is important to look at the actual practices 
as well. For example, the Californian and Swiss popular initiatives differ considerably 
from each other, and it is possible to question to what extent they represent the ‘same’ 
institution even though they have been classified under the same category of institutions.
The countries to be studied here are 22 western democracies, more precisely West
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European and Anglo-Saxon democracies. The purpose is not to look at the referendums 
of all democratic countries, let alone all countries of the world. This kind of global 
analysis has been made by Suksi (1993). The purpose in this thesis is to create a 
taxonomy of referendums which is based on the distinctions between the roles of 
different political actors at the initiation and the agenda-setting stages of the referendum. 
This is the reason why it somewhat differs from for example Suksi*s classification in 
which more emphasis has been given on the constitutional regulation of the institution.
In the classification of the institutions, the criterion introduced by Smith in his article 
‘The Functional Properties of the Referendum’ (1976) will be followed. Smith judges the 
quality of the referendum as a political institution, and argues that a comparative analysis 
of the referendum depends on the adequacy of the primary classification. He argues that 
the most relevant classification between institutions is made according to how the 
referendum is initiated. Smith’s argument is that the political actor who initiates the 
referendum should be taken as a basis of the classification.
According to the way how referendums are initiated, they may be classified as either 
mandatory or non-mandatory (facultative). Mandatory referendums are constitutionally 
required upon certain issues. Non-mandatory (facultative) referendums are triggered only 
at certain political actors' request. Furthermore, using Suksi’s (1993) terminology, non- 
mandatory referendums may be classified either as passive, when they are initiated by 
certain actors in the representative government, or as active, when they are initiated by 
a certain number of citizens.
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However, in order to get a comprehensive picture of the institutional variation, a second 
factor needs to be taken as a basis for classification. In addition to the initiator of the 
referendum, the source o f the legislative proposal on which the referendum is held needs 
to be taken into account. Uleri (1996,10-11) puts forward a distinction between those 
referendums which are law-promoting and those which are law-controlling. In law- 
promoting referendums the author of the proposed law and the promoter of the 
referendum is the same political actor, whereas in the law-controlling referendums the 
referendum is not initiated by the author of the law proposal. Mandatory referendums are 
always law-controlling, whereas non-mandatory referendums may either be law- 
controlling or law-promoting.1 The following table summarizes the classification of the 
referendums according to how they are initiated and who has formulated the law 
proposal to be voted upon:
Table 4.2 Categories of Referendums
Initiator of the Referendum Law-Controlling Law-Promoting
Constitutionally Required mandatory -
Passive abrogative and suspensive ad Aoc/optional referendum
Active abrogative and suspensive popular initiative
If the referendum is mandatory, the constitution specifies the issues on which the 
referendum is required. Mandatory referendums are typically required on such issues as 
the constitutional amendments or the delegation of national sovereignty in international 
agreements. Mandatory referendums are necessarily constitutionally regulated. 
Sometimes, instead of ‘mandatory referendums’, the concept of 'constitutionally
required referendums' is used. Because the referendum is based on a constitutional 
requirement, mandatory referendums are law-controlling, and they function as a check 
on legislation passed in the parliament.
There are different types of law-controlling non-mandatory (facultative) referendums, 
all of which may be called rejective referendums. Like mandatory referendums, these 
referendums function as a retrospective check on legislation. The initiation procedures 
of rejective referendums are constitutionally regulated. The non-mandatory law- 
controlling referendum may be initiated by a certain number of citizens when, using 
Suksi’s terminology, the referendum is active. The referendum may also be initiated by 
some actors in the representative government (the head of the state, the prime minister, 
the president or the king, parliamentary minority), or local or regional governments, 
when the referendum may be characterized as passive.
Furthermore, in functional terms, there is a rather important difference between 
suspensive and abrogative referendums. The suspensive referendums are held upon 
legislative proposals which have already been accepted by the parliamentary majority but 
which have not yet been enacted as a law. The abrogative referendums are held on laws 
which are already in force. Abrogative and suspensive referendums are often initiated by 
the parliamentary minority. In the countries in which the abrogative referendum is used 
most often, Italy and in Switzerland, the referendum may be initiated by a certain number 
of voters. In Italy the abrogative referendum may also be initiated by five regional 
councils and in Switzerland by eight cantons. Furthermore, the Italian abrogative
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referendum differs considerably from other rejective referendums, because there is no 
limit on the length of the time period between the implementation of the law to be voted 
upon and the referendum. This will be discussed in the section 4.6 of this chapter.
In general, law-controlling referendums function as a retrospective check on 
parliamentary decision-making, which means that the law proposal submitted to the 
referendum has already been supported by the parliamentary majority. Law-controlling 
referendums are pro-status-quo institutions, because they complicate the procedures to 
change the legislation. Their impact on the political agenda is also indirect: they force 
the parliamentary majorities to take into account the public opinion, or the opinions of 
the intensive parliamentary or public minorities.
The terms ad hoc or optional referendums are used to refer to institutions of passive law- 
promoting non-mandatory referendums, which are initiated by the representatives and 
held on law proposals put forward in the normal parliamentary way. The ad hoc and 
optional referendums are usually held before the final decision in the parliament. 
Therefore, ad hoc and optional referendums are typically consultative, not binding, 
which means that the parliament has the ultimate decision-making power. These are the 
most widespread practises of referendums in the 22 sample countries. Ad hoc and 
optional referendums are sometimes called ‘facultative’ or, even, ‘extraordinary’ 
referendums. It must be also pointed out that the term ‘optional referendum’ is 
sometimes used to refer to all forms of non-mandatory (facultative) referendums, also 
to those which are law-controlling (rejective referendums).2
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Furthermore, Gallagher and Uleri (1996) make the distinction between the ad hoc and 
optional referendums. The ad hoc referendums are not constitutionally regulated unlike 
the optional referendums. Gallagher and Uleri admit, this distinction does not have much 
practical relevance when the parliamentary majority makes the decision to have a 
referendum, because in both cases the referendum is used at the discretion of the 
parliamentary majority. It may be argued that in most of these cases, the power to initiate 
the referendum is effectively in the hands of the government. In many constitutions the 
possibility of a referendum initiated by the parliamentary majority is just briefly stated 
without much regulation on how the referendum should be conducted. I will, however, 
follow Gallagher’s and Uleri’s suggestion to use the term ad hoc referendum for 
referendums not regulated in the constitution, and the term optional referendum for 
referendums which are regulated in the constitution.3 There are also a few cases in which 
optional referendums are initiated by some other actor of the representative government 
than the MPs, for example France where the power to initiate a referendum is effectively 
in the hands of the president although constitutionally he shares this power with the 
parliament.
The popular initiative refers to law-promoting non-mandatory referendums initiated by 
a certain number of citizens. Using Suksi’s terminology, popular initiatives are active. 
The popular initiative for a referendum also includes a draft for a law proposal to be 
voted upon. In other words, the popular initiative allows the citizens to raise issues on 
political agenda. The citizens demand the referendum by signing a petition supporting 
a law proposal which is drafted by citizens' committee. This kind of initiation procedure
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is constitutionally regulated, and also the decision made in the popular vote typically has 
immediate legal consequences.4 The popular initiative is used at the national level only 
in Switzerland.
According to the agenda-setting procedures, the referendums may be classified as 
follows: 1. mandatory referendum; constitutionally required on some legislative 
proposals put forward by the government and approved by a parliamentary majority; 2.1. 
rejective referendums: 2.1.1. suspensive referendum; initiated by a certain political actor 
on a legislative proposal passed by the parliament but not enacted as a law; 2.1.2. 
abrogative referendum: initiated by a certain political actor on a legislative proposal 
passed by the parliament and enacted as a law; 2.1. ad hoc and optional referendum; 
initiated by the parliamentary majority, or some other actor in the representative 
government on a legislative proposal put forward but not yet approved in a parliamentary 
way; 2.3. popular initiative; initiated by a certain number of citizens on a law proposal 
put forward by a citizens’ committee. The referendum may be seen as a part of political 
process which starts from the law proposal, and ends at the final political decision.5 The 
following diagrams describe these processes in each type of the referendum: -
a) Law-Controlling
1.Mandatory (law-controlling, decisive) 
govemment(p) -  (constitution)* -  referendum(d)
2. Non-mandatory
2.1 rejective
2.1.1 suspensive (law-controlling, decisive)
passive'. govemment(p) -  pari, majority -  pari. minority*/head of the state*/other* -  
referendum(d) (decisive)
active: govemment(p) -  pari, majority -  citizens* -  referendum(d)
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2.1.2. abrogative (law-controlling, decisive)
passive: govemment(p) -  pari, majority(d) -  pari, minority* /head of the state*/other* -  
referendum(d)
active: govemment(p) -  pari, majority(d) -  citizens* -  referendum(d)
b) Law-Promoting
2.2 ad hoc or optional (law-promoting, advisory, in some cases decisive)
govemment(p) -  parliamentary majority*/president* -  referendum -  parliamentary majority(d)
2.3. popular initiative (law-promoting, active, decisive) 
citizens (p)* -  (government) -  referendum(d)
* stands for the actor who initiates the referendum 
p refers to the actor who makes the legislative proposal 
d refers to the actor who makes the final decision
As pointed out above, referendums may be either binding or consultative, according to 
their effects on the final decision-making. This refers to the judicial status of the 
referendum. Those referendums which are binding de jure have immediate normative 
consequences, because in this case the referendum may be the final or otherwise decisive 
stage of the decision-making procedure in the issue in question. After the referendum has 
been held, the parliament should have no discretion with respect to the political decision: 
either the result of the referendum has immediate normative consequences or the 
parliament is constitutionally obliged to follow the outcome of the referendum, like it is 
the case in some initiative-based and abrogative referendums.6 Mandatory and popular 
initiative-based referendums are typically legally binding, as well as suspensive and 
abrogative referendums.7 Ad hoc referendums initiated by the parliamentary majority are 
not constitutionally binding, whereas some of the optional referendums may be binding 
if that is mentioned in the constitution.
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The procedures for optional and ad hoc referendums are regulated in the constitutions 
and/or have been used after the World War II in 15 of the 22 western democracies in the 
sample.8 If all those countries which have ever held a referendum had been included, this 
would undoubtedly be the largest category. Mandatory referendums are in use in 7 
countries in the sample. Popular initiative -based referendums exist only in Switzerland, 
but it is also widely used in California and other American states. Suspensive 
referendums have been actively used only in Denmark and Switzerland, but also 
countries like Austria, Ireland, Italy, Spain and Sweden have constitutional provisions 
for a suspensive referendum although they never have put to practise. Abrogative 
referendums are widely used in Italy and in Switzerland. In the Table 4.1 the countries 
in the sample are classified under certain categories according to what kinds of 
institutions of the referendum they have. The cases of binding referendums are printed 
in bold (compare with Gallagher 1996,226-229):
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\Table 4.3 Classification of Institutions:
Legislation Constitution or 
International agreements
Law-Controlling
1. M andatory (constitutionally required) Australia
Austria
Denmark
Iceland1
Ireland
Spain
Switzerland
2. Non-Mandatory 
2.1. Rejective
2.1.1 Suspensive
2.1.1.1 Popular petition (active) Switzerland Italy
2.1.1.2 Parliamentary 
minority (passive)
Denmark Austria
Denmark2
Italy
Spain
Sweden
2.1.1.3 Other (passive) : president, prime 
minister, regional or local gvt
Ireland
Switzerland
Greece
Italy
2.1.2 Abrogative
2.1.2.1 Popular petition Italy
Switzerland
2.1.2.2 Other (passive): president, prime 
minister, regional or local gvt
Iceland
Italy
Switzerland
Law-Promoting
2.2 Ad hoc or Optional
2.2.1 Parliamentary Majority Australia
Austria
Belgium
Canada
Denmark
Finland
Greece
United Kingdom 
New Zealand 
Norway 
Sweden
-
2.2.2 Other France
Greece
Portugal
Spain
2.3 Popular Initiative Switzerland
1 required on the position of the state church
2 alternative for 5/6 parliamentary majority on transfers of national powers to international organizations
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\The table contains those countries where the referendum is not constitutionally regulated 
but where there have been ad hoc referendums initiated by the parliamentary majority 
after the World War II, such as Belgium, Norway and the UK. The table does not 
contain such democracies in which there are no constitutional clauses on the referendum 
and which have not experienced any referendums at the national level since the World 
War II, such as Germany, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and the US, although in these 
countries there may be referendums at the sub-state level. Furthermore, those cases of 
ad hoc and optional referendums in which the constitution does not specify the nature 
of the issues to be submitted to a referendum are classified under the category 
’legislation’, although it may be more common that these kinds of ad hoc referendums 
are held upon constitutional issues'. The table shows clearly that different kinds of 
institutions coexist in some countries (Switzerland, Denmark, Australia, Ireland, Italy, 
Sweden). There are also some democracies which have not applied any of these 
procedures. For the more detailed description of the institutions see Appendix I.
The frequencies of referendums illustrate the importance of the referendums in the 
countries in the sample. The following table has the number of referendums held 
between 1945 and 1996 in the sample countries. For all referendums in these countries 
see Appendixes Hand III (See also Gallagher 1996; Butler & Ranney 1994):
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Table 4.4 Number of Referendums 22 Democracies 1945-1996
Country 1945-9 1950-9 1960-9 1970-9 1980-9 1990-96 Total
Australia 4 1 2 11 6 24
Austria - - - 1 1 2
Belgium - 1 - - 1
Canada - - - - 1 1
Denmark - 2 6 3 1 14
Finland - - - - 1 1
France 4 1 4 1 1 1 12
Germany - - - - 0
Greece 1 - 1 2 4*
Iceland - - - 0
Ireland - 1 2 5 6 18
Italy 1 - - 3 12 24 40
Luxembourg - - - - 0
Netherlands - - - - 0
New Zealand 3 - 2 4 9
Norway - - - 1 1 2
Portugal - - - - 0
Spain 1 - 1 2 1 - 5*
Sweden - 2 - - 1 1 4
Switzerland 12 45 26 86 62 73 304
United Kingdom - - - 1 - - 1
United States - - - - - - 0
Total excl. 
Switzerland
14 8 18 29 27 42 138
* 2 of Greek and 3 of Spanish referendums have been held under the democratic Constitutions or during 
the transition to democracy.
In addition to nationwide referendums, in many countries referendums are used at the 
sub-national level. Referendums have been widely applied on issues concerning territorial 
disputes. For example, in 1920s several territorial disputes, those between the losers of 
the World War I, Austria and Germany, and their neighbouring states, were solved by 
referendums held under the control of the League of Nations. Ever since, several 
referendums have been held upon territorial issues or secession. Germany has not had any 
nation-wide referendums ever since, but it has a constitutional provision for territorial 
referendums. According to the German Constitution, territorial changes between the
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states (Lander) are subject to a referendum. Canada has had only one national referendum 
(on Charlottetown Accord in 1992) but has used regional and territorial referendums quite 
frequently. Newfoundland had in 1948 a referendum on its status with respect to Britain 
and Canada (discussed in the Chapter 3), and more recently, there have been referendums 
(1980 and 1995) on the independence of Quebec. Apart from territorial referendums, 
many countries have provisions for referendums at sub-state level (the US states and 
Swiss cantons) or local level (eg. communal referendums in Finland, the Netherlands and 
Switzerland).
4.3 Towards Normative Analysis of the Referendum
4.3.1 Governmental Control over Referendums
Before a more detailed institutional analysis, I will shortly review some of the earlier 
normative discussions on the referendum and introduce more concepts for analysis of the 
institutions. Ian Budge (1993) distinguishes between two institutional forms of direct 
democracy: unmediatedpopular voting and party-based direct democracy. Budge defines 
unmediated popular vote in the following terms: law proposals are made in the form of 
popular initiatives after the public debate, and most political decisions are made in 
referendums. In reality, unmediated popular voting is not in use in any country. There are, 
however, political systems in which the citizens at least in principle can actively 
participate in the agenda-setting by making popular initiatives. Budge describes the 
defects of this kind of system of perpetual initiatives and referendums:
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"Referenda often stimulate a temporary influx of ill-informed and normally apathetic 
electors whose participation adds further unpredictability to the result and introduces 
greater inconsistency and incoherence to the process of decision-making. An additional 
fear is that popular majorities would not limit themselves, so that minorities would be 
disregarded and even suppressed before they had the opportunity if transforming 
themselves into future majorities." (Budge 1993,138.)
As a counterargument against Budge's criticism one can point out that the use of measures 
of popular self-government (like popular initiative) may be combined with institutional 
safeguards which limit the powers of majorities. This was the case, for example, in 
Barber's model of strong democracy.
The other form of direct democracy put forward by Budge, party-based direct democracy, 
means that the referendum is used alongside with representative decision-making, and 
that the power to submit an issue to a referendum is in the hands of the parliamentary 
majority, which may choose to put some important legislative bills to popular votes. In 
this respect, party-based direct democracy would most resemble ad hoc and optional 
referendums of the classification put forward earlier. Budge (1993,141) does not see any 
reasons why parties should not adopt the same role in organizing popular referendums as 
they do for legislative voting. The motivation behind party-based direct democracy is 
pragmatic: to make the decisions more reflective to the public opinion. In other words, 
Budge considers the party-based direct democracy to be a realistic, and in some cases a 
preferable alternative for parliamentary decision-making. He does not seem to take very 
seriously the problems of agenda-manipulation which may arise when the governments 
control the referendum.9
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Gordon Smith (1976) makes a distinction between those referendums which are initiated 
effectively by the governments and the others which are outside their control. Controlled 
referendums are initiated by the ruling party or coalition. The ruling party/coalition 
determines the issues on which it holds a referendum, and it also decides on the 
alternative to be voted upon, and the timing of the referendum. Ad hoc and optional 
referendums, especially, may be classified under this category. According to Smith, 
mandatory referendums are semi-controlled, because they are held only on issues 
supported by the parliamentary majority. Mandatory referendums also sometimes allow 
the government to control the timing of the referendum. Furthermore, the government 
may anticipate the issues on which the referendum will be held and thus adjust its policies 
to the public opinion. The initiation of uncontrolled referendums is outside of the control 
of the ruling party or the coalition, and therefore, the popular initiative-based referendums 
are uncontrolled. In popular initiatives the citizens act as agenda-setters, although, as it 
will be pointed out later, there are many ways in which the ruling coalition may anticipate 
and intervene into even these kinds of referendums.10
The difference between controlled and uncontrolled referendums is not a categorical one, 
but referendums may be seen on a continuum, in which the fully controlled and 
uncontrolled referendums represent the extremes. Applying Smith's terms to the other 
categories of the classification, one can argue that suspensive referendums - especially 
those initiated by the voters - are at least in theory more uncontrolled than mandatory 
referendums, because in these referendums the government cannot fully anticipate which 
parts of the legislation will be submitted to the referendum. On the other hand, the
134
petition for a suspensive referendum is costly, and, therefore, not equally possible to all 
groups of citizens. The same basically applies to the abrogative referendums. However, 
the Italian institution of abrogative referendum is more uncontrolled than other forms of 
rejective referendums, because there are not very strict limits what parts of legislation 
may be abrogated. This shows that the classification put forward above does not fully 
explain the extent of the governmental control on the referendums, because some minor 
differences in the procedures may have considerable functional effects.
There are several examples of the attempts by the governments to control the referendum 
and to manufacture the support of the popular majority for their policies. There are more 
and less sophisticated ways of doing this. One extreme is the forgery and oppression 
exercised by the most authoritarian governments. Formulation of the question and 
formatting the ballot slip in a suggestive way are other strategies used by the 
governments.11 Also democratically elected governments may try influence the outcomes 
of referendums by using their agenda-setting power, by the timing of the referendum, by 
formulating and framing one alternative in a favourable way, or by otherwise advocating 
a certain alternative in the referendum campaign. It must be pointed out that this kind of 
control is not only possible in the case of ad hoc referendums, although, as Smith argues, 
the variation of measures of control may be the largest in this type.
The Nordic referendums on the EU-membership in 1994 provide a good example of an 
attempt by the governments to control the referendum result. All three referendums were 
linked together with the so-called domino-strategy, which meant that the three pro-EU
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Nordic governments agreed on the timing of the referendums. The most safely pro-EU 
Finland voted first, then Sweden, and finally the most anti-EU Norway. The result of the 
Finnish vote was expected to encourage the voters in Sweden to vote ‘yes’, and the 
Finnish and Swedish yes-votes were expected to convert some of the reluctant Norwegian 
voters to vote ‘yes’ to the EU. The strategy was expected to work because a certain 
proportion of the voters in these countries were supposed to make their voting decisions 
conditionally on what happens in the other Nordic countries. The domino-strategy was 
backed by active pro-membership campaigns by the political establishment and rather 
weak opposition, especially in Finland and Sweden. The strategy worked out only 
partially, because a sufficient majority was found both in Finland and in Sweden but not 
in Norway. Of course, it is rather difficult to assess what the impact of the strategy was, 
but it is possible to speculate that at least the opposite order would have brought about 
different outcomes. The domino-strategy may also be used as an example of how the 
information provided by the opinion polls may be used to manipulate the procedures. 
(Jahn & Storsved 1995.)
Apart from the controlled and uncontrolled referendums, Smith makes also another 
distinction: between pro-hegemonic and anti-hegemonic referendums. This distinction 
refers to the final outcome of the referendum, whether it is in the line of governmental 
policies or not, i.e. whether it supports or undermines the position of the political elites. 
The results of pro-hegemonic referendums may be characterized as pro-elitist and anti- 
hegemonic referendums as anti-elitist. Basically, controlled referendums may be expected 
to be pro-hegemonic, because the government may decide to hold a referendum only in
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situations and only in a way which is advantageous for it. There are, however, cases in 
which controlled referendums have turned out to be anti-hegemonic. Good examples are 
the two Norwegian referendums on European integration in 1972 and in 1994. Most of 
the political establishment supported the membership in both occasions, but the electorate 
rejected the EEC-membership in 1972 and the EU-membership in 1994. More 
uncontrolled popular initiative-based referendums are prone to be anti-hegemonic, 
because they give citizens an opportunity to raise issues which the government tries to 
avoid. It must be pointed out, however, that there are certain ways in which the 
governments may try to affect the results of the more uncontrolled referendums and to 
water down popular petitions and initiatives. These will be discussed further in 
conjunction of the Swiss initiative-based referendums in the Chapter 7.
Smith's and Budge's conceptions of the advantages and disadvantages of different kinds
of institutions differ considerably. Budge criticises the popular initiative-based
referendums (in Smith's account, uncontrolled referendums) for increasing the power of
the irresponsible and easily manipulable electorate, whereas Smith has a negative view
on controlled referendums (in Budge's account, party-based), because they can be
manipulated by the government and the ruling coalition. Budge considers the party-based
direct democracy as a means of enhancing discussion on the values between the public
and the political elites, whereas Smith emphasizes the possibilities of manipulative abuses
of controlled referendums and innovativeness of the popular initiative:
"...it can be assumed that strong control will only be associated with referenda that have 
foreseeable results in favour of the governing authority. The reverse applies for an 
uncontrolled referendum: the whole point of a popular initiative is to bring about changes 
which for one reason or another are resisted by the government." (Smith 1976, 6.)
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43.2 Referendum, Majoritarian and Consensual Democracy
In his study of comparative politics, Arend Lipjhart (1984,59) discusses the status of the 
referendum in the context of representative democracies. He puts forward two 
conceptions of representative democracy, consensual democracy and majoritarian or 
Westminster democracy. Consensual democracy may be characterized by executive 
power-sharing in grand coalitions, separation of powers, a bicameral legislature with 
minority representation, a multiparty system, multiple dimensions of party competition, 
proportional representation, federalism, and a written constitution providing for minority 
vetoes. The majoritarian model, on the other hand, is marked by the following features: 
the concentration of executive power in a one-party cabinet, executive dominance of the 
parliament, unicameralism, a two-party system, a single dimension of party competition, 
a plurality electoral system, unitary government and parliamentary sovereignty.
Lijphart's opinion is that the referendum as a form of direct democracy does not fit to his 
classification: it cannot be regarded as part of either majoritarian or consensual 
democracy because it is the antithesis of representative democracy. His view is that the 
referendum basically does not fit to the Westminster model of democracy which is based 
on the principle of parliamentary sovereignty:
“Implicit in the systems of direct democracy is the presumption that sovereignty lies with 
the people of the nation. Therefore, the referendum is theoretically incompatible with the 
notion of parliamentary sovereignty, central to the Westminster model of democracy. The 
concentration of all political authority in the national representative chamber allows no 
room for a competing authority resident in the citizenry. In other words, a parliament is 
not sovereign if any of its laws can be overruled by the voters.” (Lipjhart 1984, 58.)
138
The discussion in this chapter shows, like Lipjhart argues, that although referendums are 
in contradiction with the principle of parliamentary sovereignty, various forms of 
referendums have different status with respect to the parliament. Mandatory, suspensive 
and abrogative referendums function as a check on the parliament, popular initiatives as 
a competitive source of legislative proposals, and ad hoc and optional referendums as a 
means of legitimizing decisions, resolving parliamentary deadlocks and settling issues 
which the parliament fails to settle.
The referendum appears to be a majoritarian institution: they offer two solutions and tend 
to close the door to further considerations. Therefore, they may be considered to be 
unsuitable also to consensual forms of democracy. However, Lipjhart (1984,31-32, 80) 
comes to the same conclusion as many others that some forms of referendums may 
function as a check on parliamentary majorities, especially the mandatory, suspensive and 
abrogative referendums. The case of Switzerland proves that the referendums reinforce 
the consensual character of the government: the threat of the referendums used as a 
retrospective check forces the government to find a wide support for the legislative 
proposals. Furthermore, the popular initiative gives the groups not represented in the 
consensual government an opportunity to raise issues on political agenda, and therefore 
the institution has counterbalanced the arrangement which has kept the composition of 
the coalition government constant over time.
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4.4. Ad Hoc and Optional Referendums
4.4.1 Reasons for Ad Hoc and Optional Referendums
The aim of the discussion in this chapter and in the case studies is to illustrate what kinds 
of roles different political actors have at the initiation and the agenda-setting stages of 
referendums. I will start the discussion from the most ‘controlled’ referendums, ad hoc 
and optional referendums, then analyse the ‘semi-controlled’ law-controlling 
referendums, and finish with the most ‘uncontrolled’ forms of referendums, popular 
initiatives. Of the countries in the sample, the following ones have held ad hoc or optional 
referendums after 1945: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, 
Greece, Iceland, Italy, New Zealand, Norway, Spain, Sweden, the United Kingdom.
Ad hoc and optional referendums are not usually legally binding, which means that they 
cannot be considered to be an integral part of decision-making procedure. This means that 
they are not direct legislation. Ad hoc and optional referendums are usually framed as a 
rejection or an acceptance of a legislative change proposed by the government, the yes- 
vote expressing the support for the change, and a no-vote the support for the status quo. 
Sometimes ad hoc and optional referendums, which are not binding de jure, are 
interpreted to be binding de facto. This means that the parliament or other representative 
body which initiates the referendum also makes a (pre)commitment to respect its result. 
It is quite difficult for the representatives to overcome the result of this kind of the 
referendum even though it would not be legally binding. It may be said that the
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referendums turn out to be politically binding. It must be pointed out that even though the 
results of judicially consultative referendums may be interpreted to oblige the members 
of the parliament 'morally and politically', it is by no means clear how these results should 
bind any single MP. For example, the MPs may feel more responsible for the opinion of 
the majority of their own constituency than the majority of the whole population of the 
country. (Lagerspetz 1995, 52.) In fact, the obscurity of a role of the MPs in these 
situations may be the reason why the referendum is often accused to undermine the 
responsibility of the representatives.
If the result of the referendum is not respected, the status of the referendum is nothing 
more than that of an 'official opinion poll'. This kind of conduct may appear extremely 
elitist for those who support direct democracy or citizens' sovereignty, because it quite 
obviously reveals that the representatives consider themselves to have better capacities 
for the decision-making than the citizens. This kind of action may be justified, however, 
by such arguments that the circumstances change radically between the referendum and 
the parliamentary decision-making or that some new information comes up. This may be 
used as an explanation why the Swedish government in 1967 decided on the change to 
right-hand traffic despite the result of the referendum 12 years earlier, when only 15.2 % 
of the voters supported it (the turnout was just 53.2 %).
Ad hoc and optional referendums are often justified in terms of the popular sovereignty: 
it is considered to be important that in certain issues the political decisions reflect the will 
of the majority of the people, and thus it is necessary to consult the opinions of the people
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in order to achieve a legitimate outcome. Referendums are used for legitimation when a 
political issue is very important in terms of the existing political order and a legitimate 
decision is needed, or when an issue is very contentious and such a decision is needed 
which would remove the issue from the political agenda. Decisions on such issues as 
constitutional changes, territorial changes and transfers of national powers to 
supranational organisations are often considered to need legitimation by the popular 
majority even if the referendum would not be required in the constitution. This, to certain 
extent, explains the recent referendums in Eastern European countries during their 
transition to democracy and the referendums on European integration in West Europe.
Sometimes the referendum is used to achieve symbolic legitimation for the governmental 
policies. This is very often the case in the manipulated referendums held in authoritarian 
states. Also democratic governments have used the referendum to achieve symbolic 
legitimation, although this may only be possible in low-salience issues which are not too 
contentious. For example Italy had an ad hoc referendum in 1989 in conjunction with the 
European Parliamentary election about whether or not the Italian members of the 
European Parliament should be given the authority to draft the text for a Treaty of 
European Union {Maastricht Treaty). In this referendum, 88% of the voters supported 
the proposal. (Bogdanor 1994,62.)
If the issue is divisive and the support for the governmental policies is not self-evident, 
the referendum may be interpreted as a vote of confidence for the government. The 
government may be seen to be obliged to resign if the opposite side wins in the
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referendum. Holding a referendum can be seen as a risky strategy because the failure of 
the governmental policy to win in the referendum may lead to resignation of the 
government. This happened, for example, in the Norwegian referendum on the 
membership in the EEC in 1972, when the Labour government resigned after the majority 
of the voters rejected the membership. The referendum, however, was not purely 
motivated by legitimation purposes, but also by the internal division of the Labour party. 
Furthermore, framing the issue as a vote of confidence was used as a strategy to bring 
pressure to the party supporters to follow the line of the party’s leadership in the 
referendum. (Wyller 1996.)
The Norwegian example shows that legitimation is not the only reason why parties and 
other political actors promote ad hoc and optional referendums: the referendum may serve 
some latent functions in addition to the manifest function of consulting people’s opinions 
in an important issue. If the democratic process is considered in Schumpeter’s terms as 
competition between power elites, especially between the political parties, the referendum 
may be perceived as an instrument in this competition. Political actors may promote 
referendums for strategic reasons, which may be divided to policy outcome maximizing 
and power-maximizing motivations. Furthermore, power-maximization means both the 
maximization of the electoral support and the maximization of the office in the 
government (Compare with Strom 1990.) The referendum used for policy outcome and 
power maximizing reasons may be seen as instances of political manipulation, in other 
words, as ways to make the political agenda and the decision-making procedures more 
beneficial for a certain political actor.
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When an ad hoc or an optional referendum is initiated by the parliamentary majority, the 
reasons for referendums may be found in the situation within the parliamentary parties 
and coalitions. If the executive initiates the referendum, it may be used to consolidate his 
or her position. The strategic reasons for initiating optional and ad hoc referendums may 
be characterized as follows: i) policy-outcome maximizing: the sufficient majority is not 
reached in the parliament when the governmental party/coalition is divided on the issue 
or when there is a minority government; or a party (in opposition) promotes a referendum 
in order to achieve a certain policy outcome by a referendum when it is not possible in 
the parliamentary way; ii) power-maximizing reasons: the governmental coalition/party 
is divided on the issue and the referendum is used to avoid a split of the coalition/party; 
the referendum is promoted in order to remove a difficult issue from the electoral agenda, 
and thus to prevent the party from being identified with a divisive policy platform; or the 
referendum initiated by the executive may be used to consolidate his or her power.
Sometimes the relevant political actors may have many different reasons to promote a 
referendum, and it may be quite difficult to distinguish between various motivations and 
intentions. Because the total number of ad hoc and optional referendums is relatively 
small, it may be impossible to make far-reaching generalisations on the motivations 
behind them, although it is necessary to look at all situations when the referendum option 
has been raised by some political actor, not just the actual referendums.
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4.4.2 Examples
It may be argued that the representatives are willing to resort to the referendum option 
when the parliamentary decision-making system is not working adequately for their 
purposes. Ad hoc and optional referendums are used for legitimising political decisions, 
seeking for support for the party’s policies, escaping parliamentary deadlocks, defusing 
political issues, separating issues from electoral agendas, and consolidating the powers 
of the executive. I will now give some examples of ad hoc referendums motivated by 
strategic considerations:
ii) a party may promote a referendum to seek support for its policies when it is not 
possible for it to achieve the support o f the parliamentary majority; this is typically the 
case when the party is in the opposition or when there is a minority government and a 
sufficient majority cannot be reached in the parliament
A party in the parliamentary minority may promote a referendum especially if there 
seems to be a possibility of achieving a popular majority when the opinions in the 
parliament do not accurately reflect the public opinion. This was a reason why the 
Swedish Communist party promoted the referendum on the nuclear power issue in 1975. 
The anti-nuclear power position was in the minority in the Riksdag, which did not fully 
reflect the public opinion. The reasoning behind was that what was not possible to be 
achieved in the parliament would probably be achieved in the referendum.
In the Danish referendum on the Single European Act (SEA) in 1986, the referendum 
option was also used as a means to achieve a certain policy outcome despite the fact that
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the parliamentary majority was against it. For several times the bourgeois minority 
government formed in 1982 and lead by Poul Schliiter was confronted by an 'alternative 
majority', consisting of the opposition parties, the Socialist People’s Party, the Social 
Democrats and Radical Liberals. The alternative majority was also behind the fact that 
the SEA, the agreement achieved in intergovernmental negotiations, was rejected in the 
Folketing. Instead of calling for new elections and achieving the parliamentary support 
in this way, the government called an advisory referendum. The majority of the voters 
supported the governmental position of ratifying the SEA, and after the referendum SEA 
was passed in the Folketing}2 (Svensson 1996,42.)
Hi) the governmental party/coalition is divided on the issue and the referendum is used 
to avoid split o f  the party/coalition
Ad hoc referendums are also held in order to avoid deadlocks within the governmental 
party/coalition. When this is the case, the referendum may be seen an external arbitrator 
which may guarantee the continuation of governmental cooperation despite the division. 
This requires, naturally, that contending parties or factions have a common ground for 
accepting the referendum as a method of solving the dispute. In other words, the 
continuity of the coalition or the unity of the party is preferred so much that all the parties 
or factions are ready to put the issue to voters and take the risk of the loss in the 
referendum.
This was the motivation behind the British referendum on staying in the EEC in 1975. 
The Labour Party was divided in the issue, and the idea of the referendum was first put
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forward by Tony Benn in 1970. This was commented James Callaghan: Tony has 
launched a rubber life-raft into which the whole party may one day have to climb'. The 
Labour Party did not commit itself to the referendum option right away, but only two 
years later in 1972. In the same year, Britain became a member of the EEC under the 
Conservative government. Two years later, in 1974, the Labour got into power, and the 
terms of the EEC membership were renegotiated by the new government. The party 
remained divided in the membership issue: for example the Prime Minister Harold 
Wilson supported the continuation of the membership with the renegotiated terms, but the 
left-wing of the party, Tony Benn as a leading figure, still opposed it. The Labour MPs 
mostly committed themselves to respect the outcome of the referendum in the 
parliamentary vote, which prevented the split of the party and also ensured the 
continuation of the Labour government. (Balsom 1996; Bogdanor 1981,90-93.)
Furthermore, referendums initiated by the head of the state may in some situations be 
used in solving disputes between legislative chambers. The Australian constitution allows 
the referendum to be used as an instrument in solving conflicts between the two houses 
of the Australian legislature (Senate and House of Representatives). The Governor- 
General may submit a proposal concerning a constitutional change to the electorate if 
either the houses rejects a constitutional change, but the other approves it for a second 
time. When the referendum is used to maintain the unity of a coalition or a party or to 
seek an escape from a parliamentary deadlock, the purpose of the referendum is power- 
maximizing, in other words, the referendum is not used in order to achieve any particular 
decision, but any decision in a way which would not cause permanent division within the
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party or the breakdown of a coalition. Sometimes the internal division of the party goes 
between the party leadership and the voters, when the following reason for the 
referendum may come up.
r
iv) the issue threatens the electoral success o f a party and the referendum is used to 
remove the issue from the electoral agenda
The reason why the governmental parties are sometimes unwilling to take the 
responsibility for a decision may be the fear that the decision will have damaging effect 
on their electoral success. This is typically the case when there is a division in the 
opinions of the party leadership and its supporters, which has been the case for example 
in the European integration issue and the Danish Social Democratic Party in 1972, which 
will be discussed in the Chapter 6.
Also the Swedish referendum on the European Union membership in November 1994 
shows how the referendum is used by parties as a vote-maximizing strategy. For the 
Social Democratic Party it was important not to have the referendum simultaneously with 
the parliamentary election in September 1994, but rather two months later in November. 
The supporters of the party were not as united in their support for the membership as its 
leaders, and the party leadership was afraid that this fact would lead to electoral defeat 
if the electoral campaign and the referendum campaign were led simultaneously. (Gilljam 
1996,19.) This implies that the referendum was used as a means to separate issues from 
the electoral agenda and thus used as a vote-maximizing strategy.
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v) the referendum is used to consolidate the powers o f the executive and to promote the 
policies favoured by him or her
In some countries the president or the prime minister may have the power to initiate the 
referendum, although typically the decision is dependent on the opinion of the parliament. 
In those cases in which the president, the prime minister or the king has some role in 
initiating procedure, the referendum may become an important instrument of the struggle 
for power between these institutions. This was the case for example in some referendums 
recently held in Russia (April 1994)13, and the referendums initiated by president De 
Gaulle at the early stages of the French Fifth Republic. In the Constitution of the French 
Fifth Republic, accepted in the referendum of 1958, the powers of the president were 
somewhat ambiguously defined. However, according to the Constitution (Article 11), the 
president had the right to resort to an optional referendum. President De Gaulle used this 
right for three times in the early 1960s in order to establish a presidential government and 
strengthening his authority in relation to the parliament and the parties.
First two of the referendums initiated by the president were about Algeria: in January 
1961 the French voted on Algerian self-determination and in April 1962 on Algerian 
independence. The third referendum initiated by president De Gaulle, held in October 
1962, was the most controversial one: it was about reinforcing the status of the president 
by electing him directly. The way in which this referendum was initiated was, in fact, 
unconstitutional, because in the Article 89 of the Constitution it is stated that amendments 
to the Constitution must be approved by the parliament first. As a consequence of the 
presidential manoeuvring the government resigned and, later, the president dissolved the
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parliament. All the traditional parties campaigned for the defeat of the referendum 
proposal. The common line among the opposition was the defence of parliamentary 
democracy - whereas de Gaulle put the dispute in terms of the choice between himself 
and the instability of the times of the Fourth Republic. His threat of resignation after the 
possible defeat unleashed accusations of Bonapartism. The result was a victory but not 
a triumph for De Gaulle (61.7 % of voters voted ‘yes’ and the turnout was 77.2%). The 
referendum of October 1962 lead to the formation of the new party system and 
politicisation of the presidency. It did not lead to the consolidation of the presidency 
above parties, which was the original purpose of the referendums. (Cole & Campbell 
1989, 94-95; Frears 1991,9-20,209-215.)
4.4.3. Consequences of Referendums
There is not a single explanation for the fact that certain issues are submitted to ad hoc 
or optional referendums and others not. One should not underestimate the importance of 
the political culture, national experiences or international examples in explaining the 
demand for referendums. These explanations apply, for example, to the referendums on 
European integration. Also, ad hoc and optional referendums are sometimes used on 
issues in which the decision is expected to be particularly legitimate, for example 
constitutional changes or transfers of national powers to supranational organisations. 
Furthermore, parties and individual politicians may have long-lasting ideological 
preferences over the role of referendums in the political system. However, the fact that 
certain issues are actually submitted to a referendum may often be explained by strategic
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considerations.
The examples show that referendums are often promoted and actually used in issues in 
which the parties’ issue positions do not follow the traditional political dimensions and 
party alignments. In other words, the divisions within a party or a coalition formed along 
the dominant dimension are likely to raise demands for the referendum. In these kinds of 
situations, referendums are used to promote governmental stability by removing the issue 
from the governmental agenda. The referendum is an external arbitrator which provides 
a legitimate outcome when it is difficult to determine a stable outcome, or when the 
decision would cause the breakdown of the divided party or coalition. The European 
integration issue has divided the political right and left in for example Denmark and 
Norway. In Denmark as well as in Norway there has been a division also between the 
opinions of the political elites and the voters.
Sometimes the parties are under a pressure to make such compromises, either within the 
governmental coalition or in intergovernmental negotiations, that are not in accordance 
with its supporters’ preferences. In this kind of situation, the party may use the 
referendum as a means of avoiding the identification with the policy platform not 
acceptable to the voters in order to avoid the decrease of the electoral support. In other 
words, the referendum option is used by the parties as a means to balance between the 
pressures created by its coalition/negotiation partners and its voters.
The ad hoc and optional referendums affect the inter-party-competition by shaping the
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electoral agendas. In general, they tend to stabilize the existing party system. If used 
frequently on the same issue, referendums may prevent the 'correct' representation of 
certain issue dimension in electoral politics. The frequent referendums on the European 
integration issue are a reason why the anti-integration sentiments of the Danish electorate 
have not been channelled to larger electoral support for the anti-integration parties. 
According to Gallagher (1996, 103), there is a similar situation in Ireland, where the 
moral dimension has not emerged in electoral politics, because moral issues have been 
settled by referendums. The main reason for referendums in these countries has been the 
constitutional requirement, but this applies also to ad hoc and optional referendums when 
they are frequently used.
The use of ad hoc and optional referendums as an instrument in the competition between 
the elites may raise the questions whether they can be justified, or whether they are just 
about deluding the people. However, because the referendums are often used in the 
situation when the governmental parties or coalitions are internally divided, none of the 
parties can dominate the agenda-setting procedures either, for example on the issues like 
the question-setting and the timing of the referendum. The division within the political 
elites may also prevent any of the sides from becoming too dominant in the campaign. 
In fact, the governmental control may be more extensive in those referendums which are 
principally used for legitimizing purposes, and even then the fairness of the campaign is 
an important element of the legitimacy of the outcome. From a normative point view, 
more important than the reasons and motivations for submitting an issue to a referendum 
may be the way in which the referendum campaign and the ballot are carried out. Despite
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the strategic element, the ad hoc referendums give an opportunity for the citizens to 
influence the policies more directly, which may also improve citizens’ level of 
information and interest in politics.
4.5 Mandatory Referendums
Some countries have constitutional clauses which require that certain issues, typically 
amendments to the constitution, must be submitted to the popular vote after having been 
passed in the parliament by a sufficient majority. The mandatory referendum on 
constitutional amendments is required in Australia, Denmark, Ireland and Switzerland. In 
Austria the mandatory referendum is required on amendments which would change the 
four fundamental principles of the Constitution. This was the reason for the 1994 
referendum on the membership in the European Union. In Spain, similarly, the mandatory 
referendum is required on total revisions and revisions which effect the basic principles of 
the Constitution. In Iceland the referendum is required on changing the position of the 
state church. In principle, mandatory referendums are triggered ‘automatically’ by the 
constitutional requirement. In practice, the interpretation of the constitution and the 
necessity of mandatory referendums may become a matter of a political dispute, 
especially when there is no independent constitutional coiurt which would interpret the 
constitution, like it is the case in Denmark.
The rationale behind the mandatory or constitutionally required referendums is that
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it is considered to be important that those political decisions dealing with the fundamental 
rules of the political system, such as constitutional issues, transfers of powers to 
supranational organisations and territorial issues, will not be against the will of the 
majority, and therefore the opportunity to reject the proposals on these issues is given to 
the electorate. In this respect, constitutionally required referendums make the citizens an 
integral part of the legislative process - at least in the most important constitutional issues.
The referendums on transfer of national powers to supranational organisations (used in 
Denmark, France, Switzerland) may be justified in terms of popular sovereignty or liberal 
constitutionalism, according to which the political power is delegated by the citizens to 
representatives who are accountable for the will of the people. When it comes to 
transferring the power to some organization which is beyond the control of the citizens, 
the opinion of the people must be consulted first. For example, John Locke claimed: "The 
Legislative cannot transfer the power of making laws to any other hands. For it being but 
a delegated power from the People, they who have it cannot pass it to others." (Locke, 
Second Treatise para 41, see Bogdanor 1994,47.) Similar ideas have been used to justify 
the referendums on territorial changes. The idea that territorial changes should not be 
carried out without the consent by the people living in the territory has been put forward 
already by the 17th century natural law theorists, for example by Grotius. (Suksi 1993, 
238.)
Mandatory referendums make it more difficult to change the legislation and, therefore, 
they tend to maintain the legislative status quo. This provides a grounds for criticism
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against them: they may maintain the status quo in such situations in which it is 
discriminative against some group of citizens. This happened for example in Switzerland, 
where the constitutional amendment concerning women's suffrage was rejected in a 
mandatory referendum in 1959, and was not approved in a referendum until 1971 
(Kobach 1993). Furthermore, in Australia numerous constitutional reforms have been 
rejected in the mandatory constitutional referendums because of the double majority 
requirement. The double majority means more than 50% of all votes and the majority of 
the votes in the majority of the states, ie. in four out of six states. The rejections of the 
constitutional reforms have also been a result of the obligatory voting, which have 
brought to polls disinterested voters who tend to vote in favour of the status quo. (Hughes 
1994, 154-173.)
A British constitutional historian Dicey put forward a conservative argument for the 
mandatory referendum. His view was that constitutional referendum can function as a 
check for legislative (usually constitutional) changes accepted by the parliamentary. In 
this respect, the functions of the referendum much resemble those of multicameral 
legislation because it limits the powers of the parliamentary majority. Just like 
multicameral legislation, the purpose of the constitutionally required referendum is to be 
an extra procedural hurdle in decision-making. According to Bogdanor, however, the 
referendum is a particularly democratic check, because the electorate is directly consulted 
in it, and because it also limits the dominance of parties. (Bogdanor 1981,14-19.)
Although mandatory referendums are used retrospectively, they also have effects on the
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preparation stages of laws. According to Bogdanor (1981,14) mandatory referendums 
are expected to have an anticipatory effect on representative decision-making: 
"knowledge that electorate would have the right to pronounce upon a bill might 
encourage MPs to seek improvement in legislation so that it becomes more acceptable to 
the electorate". Furthermore, the knowledge of a coming referendum makes the 
representatives more reflective to the opinions of the majority of the electorate. A similar 
kind of argument also applies to the suspensive and abrogative referendums, although in 
these cases the referendum is used only if some intensively feeling parliamentary or 
electoral group so demand, which, in a way, makes it more uncontrollable are more 
difficult to anticipate.
It must be noticed that this liberal democratic veto-argument is entirely different from the 
radical argument promoting the referendum and they are supported by rather opposite 
political forces. For example in Denmark and in Sweden the referendum was originally 
supported by the political left, but later on the constitutional referendum was promoted 
by the Conservatives. In Denmark the constitutional referendum was adopted in 1953 - 
at the same time when the upper chamber of the parliament was abolished - to have a 
restraint on parliamentary majorities at least on constitutional issues (Miller 1982). 
Similar reasons for the adoption of mandatory (or suspensive) constitutional referendum 
have been put forward also in New Zealand. The mandatory and other law-controlling 
referendums in Denmark will be discussed in the Chapter 6.
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4.6 Suspensive and Abrogative Referendums
The provisions for suspensive referendums in the sample countries have been rarely put 
to practice. For example, the following constitutional provisions have never been 
implemented. The Austrian Constitution provides for a suspensive referendum, initiated 
by 1/3 of the members of the parliament, on partial constitutional amendments. In Greece 
certain bills may be submitted to a suspensive referendum by the demand of the President 
and the agreement of 3/5 of the MPs. In Spain the partial revisions of the Constitution 
may be submitted to a suspensive referendum after they are passed by the parliament, if 
1/10 of the members of either Chamber of the parliament so demand. In Sweden the 
Constitutional Amendment from the year 1979 provides for a suspensive referendum for 
constitutional amendments between the readings in two subsequent parliaments if 
required by certain minority of the parliament.
The Irish Free State Constitution (1922), which was influenced by the other republican 
constitutions, had a provision for a suspensive referendum which could either be initiated 
by 3/5 of the members of the Senate or by a popular petition signed by at least 1/20 of 
the electorate. This provision was never used and it was deleted from the Constitution 
of Irish Republic in 1982. (Chubb 1983.)14 Also the current Irish Constitution provides 
for a suspensive legislative referendum: a bill (not a constitutional amendment) which 
has passed through both houses of the parliament, Oireachtas, can be put to referendum 
before it has been signed into law by the president if it is challenged by a petition of a 
majority of the members of the Senate and at least 1/3 of the members of the Dail. This
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joint petition is addressed to the president who may submit the bill to a referendum 
which is held in a period of eighteen months. The law is vetoed if the majority of the 
voters are against it and if the total number of the voters against it are at least a third of 
the votes on the register. This provision has never been implemented either.
It must be pointed out that the suspensive referendums may also have indirect influence. 
This means that the mere possibility of the referendum changes the nature of the political 
process. In fact, the instances of political actors raising the option of suspensive 
referendum in political debates are more common than actual referendums, which is the 
case for example in Denmark (Rasmussen 1993). Denmark is also one of the few 
countries which has actually experienced suspensive referendums. According to the 
Danish Constitution, a suspensive legislative referendum may be initiated by 1/3 of the 
MPs. If the bill is submitted to a referendum, it is rejected if the majority of the voters 
and 30% of the electorate vote against it. The referendums on four laws on the land use 
in June 1963 were held under this provision. These referendums, which will be further 
discussed in the Chapter 6, show that the suspensive referendum can protect the interests 
represented by parliamentary minorities. (Svensson 1996,44.) In Switzerland laws and 
decrees - except for those which are declared urgent - and international treaties are liable 
to a referendum if 50.000 citizens sign a petition demanding it or at least eight cantons 
demand it within ninety days of the publication of the law while the law is suspended. 
The Swiss suspensive referendums will be dealt more in detail in the Chapter 7.
Sometimes the suspensive referendum is an alternative to a large supermajority: for
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example in Denmark the transfer of national powers to international authorities the 
majority of 5/6 is required in the Folketing or an ordinary majority and the submission 
of the bill to the voters. In Italy there is a possibility to submit a constitutional 
amendment to a referendum if it has not been supported by a sufficient majority: there 
may be a suspensive referendum if the constitutional amendment fails to get 2/3 majority 
in the second reading in both houses of the Parliament. The referendum must be initiated 
by 5 regional councils, 1/5 of the members of the Chamber or Senate, or 500.000 electors 
within three months after the constitutional amendment has been passed in the 
parliament. (Uleri 1996,108-9.) Furthermore, in France a constitutional referendum is 
an alternative to a procedure in which the law is passed by the 3/5 majority of the Senate 
and the National Assembly meeting together as Congress, and the president has a right 
to decide on the procedure. So far, there have not been any referendums under this 
provision. (Morel 1996,66-86.)
Although both the suspensive and mandatory referendums are retrospective checks on 
the legislation, there is a crucial difference between them: the suspensive referendum is 
avoidable if the demands of the potential initiators of the referendums are satisfied. 
Therefore, suspensive referendums are rather consensual than majoritarian in character, 
because they make the government to seek a consensus with the parties in the minority 
or with other potential initiators of the referendum. Suspensive referendums may also 
promote the interests of the minorities: they function as an incentive for the ruling 
coalition to make such legislative proposals which do not create active opposition among 
those who may initiate the referendum. This may be the case even if the opposition
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would not have a clear support by the majority of the voters, because the costs and delays 
caused by the referendum may encourage the government to seek a consensus.
The difference between abrogative and suspensive referendums is that abrogative 
referendums are used on laws which are already in force whereas suspensive referendums 
are used after the parliamentary majority has passed the law but before it is enacted. The 
abrogative referendum is provided in the Italian, Swiss and Icelandic Constitutions. In 
Iceland the President can initiate a referendum if she or he refuses to approve a law 
within two weeks after the parliament, Althing, has passed the bill. The law will be 
enacted, but it must, as soon as circumstances permit, be submitted to a referendum and 
it will become invalid if it is rejected in the referendum. This provision has never been 
put to practise.
In Switzerland abrogative referendums are used instead of suspensive referendums on 
the laws which have been declared as urgent. The same number of signatures, 50.000, 
is needed for the petition for both abrogative and suspensive referendums. Moreover, 
those abrogative and suspensive referendums which are initiated by citizens, are actually 
often promoted by ‘political insiders’ rather than by grass-root movements, perhaps 
because the procedural hurdles for initiating the referendum are quite high. In Italy the 
provision for the abrogative referendum (referendum abrogativo) has recently been 
extensively used. The provision for abrogative referendum was adopted in the 
Constitution of 1953. This provision was not, however, activated until in 1970 when the 
law on the implementation of the provision was passed.
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\The Italian abrogative referendum may be initiated by the signatures o f500.000 citizens. 
Some abrogative referendums have been initiated by regional councils, which is also 
provided by the Constitution (referendums in 1993 on the abolition of Agriculture and 
Tourist Ministry). Certain types of issues, for example tax and budget laws and acts on 
ratification of international treaties cannot be submitted to the abrogative referendum. 
After the submission of the petition, the Constitutional Court makes the decision on the 
admissibility of the referendum. If the referendum is admissible, the government decides 
the date of the vote. The ballot question is formulated: "Do you desire the repeal of the 
law...?", which means that a yes-vote is a vote against the law. The law is repealed if the 
majority of the total electorate participates in the referendum and the majority of the 
voters votes against the law. If the law is repealed in the referendum, it remains in force 
for two months. After this, the Parliament may pass a new law if it is in harmony with 
the result of the referendum. The dissolution of the Parliament may be used as a 
mechanism to suspend a referendum, and this has happened for three times. (Uleri 1996, 
106-110.)
Apart from two, all Italian referendums have been abrogative. The implementation of the 
constitutional provision for the abrogative referendum was a matter of dispute during the 
1960s. The reason for its implementation in 1970 was that the centre-left-coalition 
government was divided on the issue of divorce. The Christian Democrat Party agreed 
to approve the divorce law only if a law on the implementation of the abrogative 
referendum is adopted. The first abrogative referendum was, consequently, on the repeal 
of the law on divorce. The referendum was held after numerous postponements in 1974,
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and the repeal of the law was rejected (40.7% yes, turnout 87.7%). This was a landmark 
in Italian political history because it meant a defeat to the position supported by the 
Catholic Church (Furlong 1994,157-158).
There have also been some other abrogative referendums initiated by the Catholic 
groups. By the 1980s, there were a variety of political forces, especially in the political 
left, promoting abrogative referendums. A few referendums have been initiated by 
environmental groups. The main promoter of the abrogative referendums, however, has 
been the Radical Party (PR) which has tried by the petitions to raise new issues on the 
political agenda and thus changing the existing party alignments and coalition patterns.
The number of popular initiatives for abrogative referendums has increased considerably: 
in 1974-80 there have been three abrogative referendums, in 1981-90,14, and in 1991-5, 
21 referendums. In June 1995 the Italians voted upon 12 petitions. The increasing 
number of abrogative referendums has created pressures to complicate the procedures for 
making a petition. Until 1987, all abrogative referendums had resulted in no-votes, the 
petitions for repealing the law were rejected. Since 1987 there have been yes-votes on 
many important issues, such as on political reforms in 1993, which brought about the 
electoral reform and the abolition of certain ministries. In this occasion the abrogative 
referendum was an important factor in solving the political crisis. For the list of 
abrogative referendums see the Appendix II. (Uleri 1996,110-117.)
As Uleri (1996,110-117) summarizes it: "Italian referendum experience seems indeed
162
largely an unexpected, unforeseen and above all undesired consequence of choices and 
necessities internal to the parties and coalitions that first founded and then governed the 
republican democracy." The Italian experience on abrogative referendums shows that the 
institution may be used by ‘political outsiders’, small parties, popular movements and 
interest groups to change the political agenda. It has also proven to be considerably 
radical measure encouraging the activity of new social movements, populist political 
parties and entrepreneurs.
4.7. Popular Initiative
4.7.1 Institutions of Popular Initiative
The referendum may also be initiated by popular initiative, in other words, by the request 
for a referendum and a law proposal made by a certain number of citizens. Law- 
promoting popular initiatives must be distinguished from the popular petitions for 
abrogative and suspensive referendums (Butler and Ranney 1978,23-24). The popular 
initiative offers the citizens an opportunity to participate directly in political agenda- 
setting by demanding a referendum on a certain issue, and therefore the initiative at least 
in principle makes the political agenda-setting process less elitist. The popular initiative 
combined with the referendum may be claimed to be a measure of direct legislation, 
because it gives the citizens an opportunity to raise issues on the political agenda and 
also to make decisions upon them (see Magleby 1984). Initiative-based referendums may 
be seen as an element of "the government by the people", which exist side by side with
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representative decision-making. Initiative-based referendums are used in national level 
only in Switzerland and in 23 states of the United States, most notably in California.
Initiative-based referendums have been supported by radical democrats and theorists of 
participatory democracy. Barber (1984), for example, supports popular initiative-based 
referendums, which provide citizens a possibility to participate in the public agenda- 
setting and in the decision-making upon single issues:
"A people that does not set its own agenda, by means of talks and direct political 
exchange, not only relinquishes a vital power of government but also exposes its 
remaining powers of deliberation and decision to ongoing subversion. What counts as 
an "issue" or a "problem" and how such issues or problems are formulated may to a large 
extent predetermine what decisions are reached.” (Barber 1984,181.)
Barber (1984, 198-208) prefers multi-choice format to yes/no-format in referendums, 
because it gives the referendum more the nature of giving a judgment than making a 
choice and hence creates more ‘public orientation’. He suggests two readings in 
referendums as a check for inconsistencies. Barber also argues that some of the problems 
of social choice can be circumvented in the more participatory forms of democracy. First, 
the problem of agenda-manipulation is not as serious in direct as in representative 
democracy, because in direct democracy public agenda is more open to citizens' interests. 
Second, Barber argues that intransitivity of social preference orderings is due to 
outcomes being scaled on multidimensional policy space. This is typical to representative 
democracy, in which voters have to choose between parties and candidates who represent 
positions over many separate issues. The separation of issues and issue-by-issue voting 
is characteristics of direct democracy, and thus it is probable that the outcomes of
referendums more closely reflect the preferences of the majority than the outcomes of 
elections. This is the case especially when such preference aggregation methods which 
take into account fuller information on voters' preferences are used.
The view that the popular initiative makes the agenda-setting more democratic is often 
questioned by the criticism that some well-organised interest groups may control the 
agenda-setting process in the systems of popular initiative. It may also be argued, that 
where the electorate is prone to extremism, the initiative may become tyrannical 
(Bogdanor 1981, 88). As mentioned before, Barber considers the initiative and the 
referendum only as a part of the larger agenda for strong democracy: "referendum and 
initiative processes divorced from innovative programs for public talk and deliberation 
fall easy victims to plebiscitary abuses and to the manipulation by money and elites of 
popular prejudice." (Barber 1984,262-264.)
4.7.2 Normative Theory and Existing Practices
The Swiss direct-democratic institutions will be studied in the Chapter 7, and therefore 
I will now concentrate on the American experience of'direct legislation'. The historical 
background of the American direct democracy is the European political philosophy, 
especially the religious ideals of the Pilgrims (Mockli 1994, 65). The first forms of 
American direct democracy were the Pilgrims' town meetings in New England in the 
early 17th century. Magleby (1984,20-27) distinguishes two periods of the expansion 
of the modem forms of citizens’ participation in American politics. The first expansion
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was the result of the activity of the Populist Party and the Progressivist movement of the 
late 19th and early 20th century. Progressivism represented urban well-educated and self- 
employed middle-class, and it was a reaction against the rising power of business 
corporations and labour unions. The progressivists promoted the initiative-based 
referendum together with such measures as the recall, direct primaries and women's 
suffrage. As ideals of direct democracy, the progressivists held the New England town 
meetings and direct legislation in Switzerland. During the Progressive Era both the 
referendum and the initiative were adopted in fifteen states (Luthardt 1994, 56).
Since the Progressive Era, the states have become more cautious about the adoption of 
provisions of direct democracy. Most of the states which have some kinds of direct- 
democratic institutions adopted them during this time, and only eight states have adopted 
both the initiative and the referendum after 1915. Extension of citizens' participation was, 
however, promoted by some democratic movements in the 1960s and 1970. These 
movements considered citizens’ participation especially as a cure for political corruption. 
As a result of these movements, since the mid-1970s, more than twenty states have 
considered adopting the initiative. However, only Wyoming and Florida have actually 
done so in 1968, and Illinois in 1970. Popular initiatives, like other institutions of direct 
democracy, have been much more widely adopted in the West of the United States: only 
six states east of Mississippi allow popular initiative. This may be explained by the facts 
that the West was a stronghold of the Progressive movement, and that the Western states 
were at a more developmental stage during the Progressive Era. (Magleby 1994, 222- 
223; Mockli 1994,112.)
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The constitutional regulation of the popular initiative varies from state to state. The most 
important institutional differences are those between direct and indirect initiatives and 
constitutional and statutory initiatives (Mockli 1994,110-111,219). In a direct initiative 
the law proposal is submitted to referendums without any considerations in the 
legislature, whereas an indirect initiative is considered and possibly passed in the 
legislature. If the legislature rejects the initiative, the promoters of the initiative need to 
collect some extra number of signatures in order to put the issue to a referendum. Indirect 
initiative has been adopted in 10 US states and it has become more popular since the 
Progressive Era. Apart from statutory initiatives, some states have provisions for 
constitutional initiatives. The promoters of the initiative usually aim at making 
constitutional initiatives rather than statutory ones, because the initiatives passed as a 
constitutional law may only be changed in another popular vote.
Also, the number of required signatures required for the initiative varies between the 
states. Sometimes there are requirements also for the geographical distribution of the 
signatures, which have often turned out to be a significant hurdle. The circulation time 
of popular initiatives is limited, varying from 50 to 360 days - the average is 120 days. 
Because the initiatives are normally voted together in conjunction with the general 
elections, the ballot papers may end up being quite lengthy, which may cause confusion 
and fatigue among voters. If the proposal has been accepted by the majority in the 
referendum, it is subjected to the judicial review. Quite a few proposals approved in the 
ballots are declared partly or entirely invalid by the courts either because they are 
unconstitutional or because the rules on making the initiative have been violated. The
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judicial review is also the mechanism by which the minority rights are protected from 
the discriminative outcomes of the initiative ballots.
The total number of initiatives on ballots in the US States decreased considerably during 
the 1940s and 1950s and was at lowest in the 1960s. Since then the number has increased 
again, and during the 1990s more initiatives than ever before are expected to be voted. 
This cannot only be explained by the raise of grass-root political activism, but also by 
the emergence of a new kind of'initiative industry' which will be discussed later on. The 
most frequent users of initiatives between 1898 and 1992 have been California and 
Oregon. (Magleby 1994,229-232,235-41.)
The reality of popular initiatives may, in some respects, resemble rather the negative 
visions of plebiscitary politics than the ideals of participatory democracy. Nowadays the 
initiative campaigns in the American states are largely carried out by professional 
political consultants, and the initiative has become a large-scale political business, or 
'industry', as Magleby puts it. Also Rourke & al. (1992) argue that the referendum has 
ceased to be a radical measure in the US politics. One landmark in this was the Federal 
Supreme Court decision in 1978 in the case between First National Bank of Boston and 
the Attorney General of Massachusetts. In this case, the Bank argued that its 
constitutional right of freedom of speech had been limited by the Massachusetts Supreme 
Court decision to uphold a state law which forbade the bank’s contribution to a 
referendum campaign against a proposal on the state income tax. The Federal Supreme
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Court, however, reversed this decision. The implication of this decision was that the 
participants of referendums were now exempted of campaign financing and disclosure 
laws. (Rourke & al. 1992, 156-158.) Another milestone in the development of the 
'initiative industry' to its current range was the Federal Supreme Court declaration in 
1988, in which the rules on paid signature collection were declared unconstitutional. This 
meant that, for example, Colorado needed to allow professional signature collection. 
Today political consultancy firms collect the signatures by mail and, often 
simultaneously, request campaign contributions. Also, it has become common to 
circulate several petitions simultaneously.15 (Magleby 1994,228.)
The fact that popular initiative is often used by the well-organized or the wealthy may 
be proven by looking at the issues raised by initiatives. As Magleby writes about 
California:
"In the 1978 and 1980 elections alone, voters decided initiatives on such diverse subjects 
as casino gambling, a state lottery, tax and spending limitations, the drinking age, branch 
banking, right to work, obscenity, beverage container deposits, apportionment, land-use 
planning, the death penalty, school busing, the hunting of mourning doves, milk prices 
and abortion. Absent from this list are issues that would arise from groups lacking the 
financial resources or organizational skills necessary to meet the signature requirements. 
In recent years there have been few initiatives to increase welfare expenditures, provide 
mass transit, or require building access for the handicapped." (Magleby 1984,74.)
The voters’ volatility increases the importance of the campaign spending, especially the 
spending against the propositions seems to pay off well. Magleby (1994,242-244) offers 
some statistics about the sources of the campaign funding between 1952 and 1990: 66% 
of it came from the business, 12% as individual contributions, 9% from officeholders,
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7% from political groups, 5% from issue groups, and only 1% from labour. Sometimes 
the campaign spending gets large proportions, especially when business interests are 
involved. In 1988 101 million dollars were spent in California on the campaign on five 
initiatives on insurances. This was more than three times more than what was spent on 
governor's election two years later.
4.7.3 Initiative, Referendum and Median Voter Preferences
Some American scholars (Ingerberman 1985; Gerber 1996) have analysed the impact of 
popular initiatives and referendums to the extent of which the policy outcomes reflect the 
median voter preferences. Although also the governmental initiative-based referendums 
are often justified on the grounds that they increase the likelihood that the policies reflect 
the preferences of the majority (median voter preference) on some issue, the agenda- 
setting power of the government limits this positive effect. Gerber (1996, 101-102) 
argues that the existence of a provision for a popular initiative-based referendum makes 
it more probable that the laws will reflect the median voter preference, because the 
’legislators may want to anticipate the behaviour of the potential initiative proposers and 
draft laws to preempt their initiatives’.
Gerber (1996) argues that the existence of the institution of popular initiative increases 
citizens' influence over the political process in two ways: directly by enabling them to 
raise political issues on the political agenda and indirectly by effecting the policy choices 
of the representatives. Gerber characterizes the indirect effects of the initiatives by a
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dynamic, spatial game between the Legislature, the Proposer of the initiative, and the 
median voter. Among others, the model is based on the following assumptions: one­
dimensional issue space, unitary legislation, and actors that are fully informed of each 
other's preferences. One-dimensional issue space may be justified on the basis that the 
initiatives normally deal with one issue. The assumption on unitary Legislature simply 
excludes all the interaction between the legislators from the model. It is also assumed 
that the ‘Legislatures* preference’ is the one emerging in the legislative preference- 
aggregation process. In the spatial analysis, Legislatures’ preference is referred as 
Legislature’s ideal point. Gerber admits that the assumption on the perfect information 
is often violated in reality, and that the asymmetries of the information may change the 
situation considerably. As a test case of her model Gerber puts forward the issue of 
parental consent of teenage abortions, in which she compares the legislation in the states 
with and without initiatives.
Gerber considers the popular initiative as a non-electoral constraint on Legislatures’ 
behaviour. She compares the unconstrained situation to the situation in which the 
constraint of the popular initiative exists. In the unconstrained situation the Legislature 
always chooses its own ideal point. In the analysis of the constrained situation with 
popular initiatives it is assumed that the voters always vote for the alternative which 
maximizes his or her utility. The potential Proposer of the initiative needs to consider 
whether the costs of making the initiative exceed the benefits of the successful initiative. 
Because the Proposer is fully informed on voters’ preferences, it will only propose 
winning initiatives. Furthermore, it is assumed that legislation is costless to the
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legislators. In this situation, the extent of the constraint created by the initiative on the 
Legislature depends on the relative preferences of the players and costs caused of making 
a proposal for the Proposer. The anticipatory effect of the initiatives on the Legislature 
may be explained as follows: when there is a possibility of an initiative on a certain issue, 
the Legislature prefers to pass a law in order to avoid an initiative which may be further 
away from the Legislature’s ideal point. In the constrained situation the policy outcomes 
are more likely to be closer to the median voter preference, because the aim of the 
Legislature is thus to provide a law which the median voter prefers to the Proposer’s best 
response. As Gerber (1996) puts this: “In other words, the Legislature averts the initiative 
proposal by buying off the Voter, not the Proposer. By doing so, the Voter is again made 
better off.”
Gerber’s model has two conclusions: First, the interest groups may affect the policies 
even in the cases when no initiatives are made. Second, the existence of the popular 
initiative encourages the legislature to pass laws closer to the median voter preference. 
In Gerber’s model it is actually assumed that popular initiative has similar anticipatory 
effects as the suspensive, abrogative and mandatory referendums, which also should 
bring the legislation closer to the median voter preference. In mandatory referendums 
this anticipatory effect is more 'automatic' and not dependant on the activity of interest 
groups. Therefore, in the game-model describing the mandatory referendums there are 
just two players, the Legislature and the median voter, and the Legislature is expected 
to legislate such laws which is acceptable to the median voter but yet closer to the 
Legislature’s ideal point than the status quo.
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There are, however, several limitations for Gerber’s model. First, the legislature has 
many other constraints than popular initiatives, and moving towards the median voter 
preferences may be very costly indeed to some members of the legislature because of the 
electoral constraints. Second, in the case of Swiss popular initiatives Gerber’s model 
should be adjusted: because the referendums do not automatically follow the initiatives 
there are more ways for the legislature (the Federal Council) to react to the initiatives. 
The reactions are not in a similar way ‘anticipatory’ as in Gerber’s model, because after 
the initiative has been submitted the promoters of the initiative and the Federal Council 
may bargain over the withdrawal of the initiative. In the Swiss system, the governmental 
counterproposals made after the submission of the initiatives are the legislature’s main 
responses to initiatives. (See Chapter 7.)
Third, the popular initiative brings the policy outcomes closer to the median voter 
preference only on issues in which there are interest groups which may them. There are 
good reasons to believe that certain interest groups are more able to make initiatives than 
the others: the resources for making the initiative are not equally distributed in the 
society. This is related to Magleby’s (1994, 240) point that the initiatives very rarely 
reflect the issues which the largest numbers of voters consider to be the most relevant, 
such as the state economy or unemployment, because there are no organisations 
promoting initiatives on these issues. Fourth, in Gerber's model is the assumption that 
the preferences are fixed and remain stable over the time. Because of this assumption, 
the model fails to take into account the importance related to campaigning and
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preference-formation. Magleby (1994,249-250) concludes that voters tend to be more 
volatile in initiative issues than for example in candidate elections, and that up to 70% 
of voters may change their opinions during the campaigns. This implies that campaigning 
has a big importance on voters’ decision-making, and that it may be possible to 
‘purchase’ initiatives. Finally, it may be asked whether the median voter preferences 
should determine the policy outcomes. As Gerber (1996, 125) herself points out, the 
members of minority groups represented in the legislature but far from the median voter 
preferences may be better off without popular initiatives.
4.8 Conclusions
In this chapter, the role of different forms of referendums in political systems has been 
characterized both in terms of normative argumentation and empirical experience. The 
purpose has been to establish a link between the normative theories of democracy and 
different institutional forms of democracy, and to analyse how the reality matches with 
the theoretical discussion in the Part /. It may be argued that all types of referendums 
increase the possibilities of popular participation. Only the most manipulative practices 
of the referendum in dictatorial countries do not really have any function of expression 
of political opinions. They are more about the symbolic confirmation and legitimation 
of the existing government. Referendums are also potentially educative devices if they 
encourage people to discuss and deliberate about political issues. On the other hand, the 
most typical criticism raised against all types of referendum is that citizens do not have 
a sufficient ability to make sound political judgments and that, because of the expansion
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of the state activity, political issues in modem societies are too complicated and often too 
remote to be understood by laypeople. Furthermore, referendums are often considered 
to lead to inconsistencies in policies because they tend to separate issues.
I have argued that there are also many differences between what kind of role different 
forms of the referendum play in political systems. Also different forms of referendums 
have been justified and criticised from different theoretical points of view. In fact, the 
variation of the use and the functions of the referendum is so wide, that it is almost 
inevitable to agree with Gordon Smith (1975) that there hardly ever will be 'a general 
theory of referendum'. The referendum serves very different political purposes depending 
not only on the institutional regulation of the referendum discussed in the earlier section 
but also on the kind of representative democracy, electoral system, party system, state 
structure (federal-unitary), political culture and so on. It may be argued, however, that 
a great deal of the functional variation can be explained by the classification put forward 
in this chapter.
The differences between various forms of referendums may also be expressed in terms 
of their impact on the political agenda. In the case of ad hoc referendums, the political 
representatives fully control the agenda. The mandatory referendums function as a 
popular check on legislation, and they are triggered ‘automatically’ by the constitutional 
demand, but those who are authorized to interpret the constitution may influence the use 
of the referendums. In the case of suspensive and abrogative referendums, the opposition 
groups, either parliamentary or popular, may choose the issues in which they want to
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exercise their veto. The popular initiatives and the Italian abrogative referendum allow 
the citizens also define new policy issues to be raised on the decision-making agenda.
The following table summarizes the functional differences and normative justifications 
and criticism of the five different types of referendums. The table is based on the earlier 
normative discussions on the referendum and the arguments put forward for and against 
different forms of referendums:
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Table 4.5 Properties of Referendums 
Type of the Referendum:
Justifications
Objections
Procedu­
ral features 
studied
Ad Hoc and 
Optional
Popular Initiative Mandatory Abrogative 
and Suspensive
increasing popular self-government, participation and deliberation; 
civic education
legitimizing 
important 
decisions 
by consulting 
popular will
popular
self-government
check on legislature; 
correcting mis­
representations of 
majority will;
a check 
on legislature
anti-elitist
agenda-setting
limit the power 
of parliamentary 
majorities
protect the interests 
of minorities
citizens’ inability to solve political problems tyranny of majority, 
inconsistencies of policies, problems in the representative system
manipulation 
by the ruling 
coalition
undermining 
the responsibility 
of representative 
decision-makers
over-representation 
well-organised 
interest groups
favouring the status 
quo
decreasing the 
efficiency of 
decision-making; 
pro-status quo
strategic 
considerations 
of political 
parties
collective action 
problems of making 
initiative
representatives’ 
reactions to 
initiatives
anticipatory effect 
on parliamentary 
decision-making
collective action 
problems
representatives’ 
reactions to the threat 
of the referendum
The table shows the relationship between different institutional forms of referendums and 
various notions of democracy. The ad hoc and optional referendums have probably the 
weakest normative grounds. As Gallagher (1996,250) describes the problem of these 
kinds of referendums: “When parties and parliaments have the power to decide when
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and whether referendums should be held, philosophical arguments in favour of more 
referendums may not count for much.” The law-controlling referendums, on the other 
hand, may be understood in terms of liberal theory of democracy with its emphasis on 
limited power of government with institutional checks and balances. Law-controlling 
referendums have been promoted by those in favour of constitutional status quo, liberals 
and conservatives. Popular initiative and active suspensive and abrogative referendums 
more clearly enhance and rely on citizens’ activism. Especially the agenda-setting 
function of popular initiatives is supposed to increase popular self-government and 
public deliberation and participation. The popular initiative has often been promoted by 
radical and participatory democrats.
The discussion in this chapter and the case studies in the following chapter clearly shows, 
however, that the reality does not always match with the theoretical hypotheses on the 
functions and dysfunctions of referendums put forward, and that the functional 
differences between the institutions cannot be understood fully without reference to the 
other characteristics of the political system. Moreover, there is considerable variation 
within the main categories which can only be understood by looking at how referendums 
actually function in certain political systems, which is the purpose of the case studies.
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Notes
1 Furthermore, some researchers emphasize the judicial distinction between those referendums which 
are constitutionally regulated and those which are not. This distinction is only relevant with respect to 
those referendums which are initiated by the parliamentary majority, because all other forms of 
referendums are constitutionally regulated.
2 The use of terminology varies in the discussion: for example Swiss researchers Trechsel and Sciarini 
(1996) use the term optional referendum to refer to popular initiative-based referendums in 
Switzerland. Trechsel, Alexandre; Sciarini, Pascal (1996): Direct Democracy in Switzerland: Do Elites 
Matter? Paper presented at the ECPR Conference in Oslo, March 1996.
3 Simon Hug (1995) puts forward a classification of referendums in Western democracies based on 
three dichotomies: 1) mandatory and facultative referendums, 2) active and passive referendums 
(according to whether or not the voters have an active role in calling a referendum), 3) referendums 
where the policy on the ballot stems from the government and where it stems from some other group. 
Furthermore, he claims that mandatory referendums always concern policies adopted by the 
government and citizens never have an active role in initiating them and that facultative referendums 
with passive citizens never concern policies proposed by outside groups. This leaves four referendum 
types which differ according to the strategic interaction between the government and the opposition, 
i.e. 1) mandatory/passive (I refer to this category with the concept of mandatory referendums); 2) 
facultative/active vote on governmental policies (popular initiative-based abrogative and suspensive 
referendums); 3) facultative/active vote on opposition policy (popular initiative); 4) facultative/passive 
(optional referendums). In my opinion Hug fails to distinguish the fifth category, which I have referred 
to as 'representative initiative-based abrogative/suspensive referendum'. In Hug's classification this 
should be facultative/passive/govemmental policy.
4 Linder (1994) distinguishes between 'constitutional' or 'obligatory' referendum, and 'legislative' or 
'optional referendum in Switzerland. Obligatory referendums cover all the forms of referendums on 
constitutional issues and international treaties, whereas the 'optional' referendums are those held on 
normal laws. This classification does not, however take into account the source of the laws proposal in 
the case of constitutional referendums, because some of them are based on popular initiative. The 
classification makes sense in the case of Switzerland where the referendum does not automatically 
follow from the constitutional initiative but there is a long-lasting parliamentary negotiation stage 
between the initiative and the referendum.
5 It must be pointed out that especially with the abrogative referendums the expression of'final legal 
decision1 is ambiguous, because the parliamentary decision as such is sufficient to pass the law, and the 
referendal check is used only retrospectively. Especially in Italy the laws may have been in force for a 
considerable period of time before they are submitted to an abrogative referendum.
6 In the US states also the judicial review can void the results of the referendum.
7 The result of a legally binding referendum can only be overcome by a parallel procedure, which was 
the case for example in the Danish referendums on Maastricht Treaty (and Edinburgh Agreement) in 
1992 and 1993.
8 The countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, Finland, France, Germany, 
Greece, Iceland, Ireland, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, 
Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States.
9 It may be argued that the electorate may be more vulnerable to the agenda-manipulation than the 
representatives, because they lack the information and capacities required for counteracting 
governmental manoeuvring.
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10 This argument may better apply to those American states in which the wording of the alternatives 
is directly decided by those who initiate the referendum, whereas in Switzerland the representative 
institutions can much more control the initiative process, for example by using delaying power (see 
the section 6.3.)
11 For example, when Austrians in 1938 voted on the Anschluss, there were actually two separate 
issues, first agreeing with the joining to the German 'Reich' and secondly expressing the support for 
National Socialists in the German Reichstag. In a democratic environment, the expression of the 
support for Hitler's list in the Reichstag would have been considered to be legitimate only if the 
majority had already agreed with the Anschluss. The questions were, however, voted inseparably and 
there were just two alternatives given in the ballot paper, yes and no, meaning that yes-vote would 
mean agreement and, respectively, no-vote disagreement with both proposals. Also the circle to be 
crossed for the support of yes-alternative was twice as big than the one for no-altemative. The result of 
the referendum was more than 99% support for the Anschluss and the National Socialists and in the 
turnout was in average 99%. (MOckli 1994,78-9.)
12 The referendum may also be a means to fulfil a requirement for a parliamentary supermajority. The 
MPs often consider themselves to be obliged to follow the result of the referendum. Therefore, the 
result of the referendum tends to ’amplify’ in the parliament. For example, in Norway and in Finland a 
2/3 majority was required for the approval of the EU-membership in the parliament, and in Norway 
especially the parliamentary opposition was strong enough to block the decision. Therefore, the 
referendum could have been the only possibility to achieve a positive outcome, although this did not 
happen in Norway. The reasons why the EU-membership issue was submitted to the referendum were, 
however, manifold in both countries, so it is hard to argue whether or not these kinds of calculations 
were behind these referendums.
13 The Russian President Boris Yeltsin tried to break the stalemate between himself and the legislature 
by the referendum in April 1993. This referendum was expected to give him the mandate for his 
political program and economic reforms. With the December 1993 referendum he seeked approval for 
the new Constitution which would give more powers to the president and establish a new Federal 
Assembly as a substitute to the Supreme Soviet and the Congress of People's Deputies. (See Hill & 
White 1995.)
14 Articles 48 and 50 of the Constitution of Irish Free State provide for an abrogative referendums 
based on popular initiative on laws and constitutional amendments.
15 For more details on the practices of making the initiative, see Magleby 1994.
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Introduction to the Case Studies
In the following three chapters, referendums in three West European democracies, 
Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland, will be examined. These three countries were 
selected among the 22 countries in the sample, because their referendums differ from 
each other with respect to the agenda-setting and initiation procedures. The aim of the 
case studies is to analyse how different referendums work as a part of the political 
system, and how referendums are used by different political actors.
Sweden, Denmark and Switzerland are different from each other with respect to the 
frequency referendums: in Sweden there have been 4 national referendums between 1945 
and 1996, less than 1 per decade. Denmark has experienced 10 referendums since 1945, 
2 per decade. In Switzerland different forms of referendums are an integral part of 
legislative processes, and between 1945 and 1996 there have been 306 federal 
referendums, nearly 60 per decade (Gallagher & Uleri 1996). In addition to the numbers 
of referendums, the countries are different with respect to the variety of the institutional 
provisions for referendums. Sweden has only had consultative referendums based on the 
decision made by the parliamentary majority. The 1979 Constitution also provided for 
a referendum on constitutional laws initiated by a parliamentary minority, but so far no 
referendums have been held under this provision. Denmark has a much larger 
institutional variation, with four different constitutional provisions for referendums and 
the ad hoc referendum initiated by the parliamentary majority. Finally, according to
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some scholars in Switzerland there are 11 different provisions for referendums at the 
federal level alone (Gallagher & Uleri 1996). In addition to the direct-democratic 
institutions at the federal level, there are various provisions for referendums at local and 
cantonal level.
The frequency of the referendums and the number of constitutional provisions indicate 
the overall significance of the referendums in political systems. The Swiss political 
decision-making system is thoroughly affected by different kinds of direct-democratic 
institutions which have a profound impact on Swiss democracy. In Denmark 
referendums have been more frequent and they have had many effects on the 
parliamentary decision-making, whereas in Sweden the referendum is something which 
is only resorted to when the political parties have failed to find any other solutions.
The political systems in these countries are also quite different from each other. Sweden 
and Denmark are unitary states with parliamentary forms of government, whereas 
Switzerland is a federal state, consisting of linguistically and religiously different parts. 
Furthermore, the Swiss federal government is consensual rather than parliamentarian, 
in the sense that its party composition has remained stable since 1959 and it represents 
the most important cleavages of the society. This will be further discussed in the Chapter 
7. The Swiss federalism and consociationalism may raise some questions about the 
comparability of the three countries. The approach in this section is not, however, 
systematic comparisons of institutions, because I emphasize the differences between the 
three cases. However, it is appropriate to ask to what extent the Swiss experience is
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applicable to more parliamentary systems.
Suksi(1993), for example, has solved the problem of making meaningful comparisons 
between different practices of referendums by using so-called matched-pair method: he 
compares countries with similar institutional provisions with each other. First he 
compares the countries with mandatory referendums, Denmark and Ireland, and then the 
occasional users of ad hoc referendums, Finland and Sweden. (See Suksi 1993,181-182.) 
Suksi's emphasis was in the constitutional history and the regulation of referendums, and 
the normative argumentation for and against referendums, whereas the emphasis in this 
thesis is more on the interaction between different political actors within certain 
constitutional rules regulating the use of referendums.
The aim of the case studies is to test the arguments for and against different forms of 
referendums put forward in the Chapter 4, ie. those regarding the ad hoc referendum as 
a strategic option for political parties; the mandatory referendums as a check on the 
legislature; and the popular-initiative-based referendums increasing popular influence on 
popular agenda; and all forms of referendums enhancing citizens’ deliberation and 
participation in politics. Because the purpose is to test and adjust theoretical hypotheses, 
the case studies are, using the terminology put forward by Lipjhart (1971), 'theory 
confirming' or 'theory infuming'. Some elements in each case are apparently deviant from 
the theoretical propositions put forward earlier, which is used to modify the theories.
The first case to be examined is the referendum on the nuclear power in Sweden in 1980.
183
All Swedish referendums, the nuclear power referendum included, have been 
consultative and initiated ad hoc by the parliamentary majority. Second, I will analyse 
the Danish referendums on European integration, especially the two referendums on 
Maastricht Treaty in 1992 and in 1993. Most of the integration referendums in Denmark 
have been law-controlling and held under the constitutional provision which requires a 
binding referendum on the issues concerning transfer of powers from national to 
supranational organizations. Depending on the interpretation, these referendums have 
been either mandatory or suspensive. Finally, I will analyse the popular initiative-based 
referendums in Switzerland since 1945.
In each case, I will consider three aspects. First, the discussion in each case will begin 
with a characterization of the constitutional provisions for referendums and their 
historical background. I will discuss different political actors’ motivations and the 
normative arguments used in the constitutional debates on referendums. Second, I will 
analyse the actual practices of the referendums. I will consider the whole referendum 
process from the initiation of the referendum to the final outcome of the vote, and, 
moreover, its implications to the policies implemented. I will focus on the question 
which are the reasons why a certain issue are submitted to the referendum, who are the 
crucial actors promoting the referendum, and what are their motivations. I will also 
consider which were the groups with especially high interest in the issue and in which 
ways these groups (interest groups/political establishment) participated in the referendum 
campaigns. In each case, I am also going to consider such questions as to what extent the 
referendum increased the citizens’ interest in politics and their level of information; how
184
balanced the campaigns are in terms of the media coverage, and, especially in the case 
of popular initiative, the influence of economic interests and ideological groups. Third, 
I will make a broader analysis of the impact of the use of the referendum on the political 
decision-making in each country. I will discuss the role of referendums in the political 
systems and the consequences of the referendums on representative decision-making.
The difference in the frequencies of referendums has certain implications to the ways in 
which referendums will be analysed: in the Swedish and Danish case the style is more 
descriptive whereas the extensive use of referendums in Switzerland allows more 
systematic and also quantitative analysis. In the Swedish case, the referendum is 
analysed as an instrument used by the parties in the struggle over the political agenda. 
In the Danish case, I consider the ideological background of the referendum, liberal 
constitutionalism and the idea of restricted power of parliamentary majorities, and 
contrast it with the real-world practices in which the constitutional requirements may be 
a matter of interpretation. In the Swiss case, I will first discuss the constitutional history 
of direct democracy, and then concentrate on the impact of the popular initiative on the 
political agenda. Furthermore, in the Swiss case I will not focus that much on one 
particular case, but on the influence of the popular initiative on the political agenda- 
formation in the Swiss consociational political system.
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5. Party Politics and Referendum - Swedish Nuclear Power Referendum
5.1 Constitutional and Historical Background
During its history, Sweden has experienced altogether five referendums. The first 
referendum was held in 1922 on issue of the prohibition of alcoholic beverages. The 
proposal for the prohibition was rejected by the voters: 49% of the voters voted for and 
51% against. The turnout was relatively low, only 55.1%. The second referendum was 
held in 1955 on the issue of driving on the left or right side of the road. In this 
referendum, the majority of the voters were in favour of staying on the left-hand side. 
However, twelve years later the government decided to change to right-side traffic 
following the trends in the Continental Europe. It was argued that because of the low 
turnout (53.2%), the outcome of the referendum was not representative.
The referendum held in 1957 on a politically more disputable issue, the supplementary 
pension plans. The referendum was held in order to resolve the deadlock in the Riksdag. 
The Centre - Social Democrat Coalition government was divided on this issue, and in the 
parliamentary vote none of the proposals achieved an overall majority. In the referendum 
three alternatives were voted upon, each of them were formulated and promoted by some 
of the major parties. Unfortunately, none of these alternatives could achieve an overall 
majority in the referendum, and the deadlock in the parliament was not by any means 
solved until a Liberal MP took the Social Democrat position. This ill-conceived 
referendum devalued the referendum institution in many people’s eyes and it was one
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reason why the referendum was not used for two decades. The nuclear power referendum 
was held in 1980 and, finally, in 1994 the Swedes voted upon the EU-membership. (For 
the results of the referendums, see Appendix II.)
In Sweden all referendums held so far have been initiated by the majority of the Riskdag 
passing acts on consultative referendums. Since 1979 the Constitution has also allowed 
a suspensive referendum on constitutional amendments which have already been passed 
in the parliament. The request for a rejective referendum must be initiated by 1/10 of the 
members of the Riksdag, and the request must be supported by 1/3 of the members of the 
parliament. The referendum must be held in conjunction with the parliamentary election. 
The constitutional amendment will be rejected if the majority of voters votes ‘no’, and 
if the number of those voting no is more than of half of those who participated in the 
general election. This implies that the abstention from the referendum may be interpreted 
as an approval of the constitutional amendment. (Ruin 1996,172.)
The constitutional provisions for the consultative and suspensive referendums may be 
seen as outcomes of a lengthy political dispute. This dispute has been related to the two 
major changes in the Swedish political system: the introduction of the parliamentary 
form of government with universal suffrage and proportional representation in early this 
century, and the introduction of the unicameral parliament with a three-year mandate in 
the late 1960s. The arguments for the adoption of referendums were first put forward by 
the political left, ie. the Social Democrats and the Liberals (Folkpartiet). In 1907 the 
Liberal Party made a proposal according to which the referendum would be used when
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the two houses of the Riksdag could not reach a consensus. In 1917 the Riksdag 
discussed the proposal for the adoption of the initiative and the binding referendum. This 
proposal was not passed in the 1st Chamber because of the Conservative opposition. The 
arguments put forward at this stage of the discussion dealt with parliamentary 
sovereignty and the limits on parliamentary powers. In the 1921 a referendum committee 
was appointed to investigate the possibility of a binding referendum. Again, a decision 
was made in the Riksdag not to adopt the binding referendum. However, a constitutional 
provision for a consultative referendum was adopted in 1922, mainly because of the 
Liberal Party’s willingness to submit the prohibition issue to a referendum. (Hermansson 
1993; Suksi 1993,212-215.)
During the early 1950s, a constitutional reform committee suggested a decisive 
referendum on constitutional issues (a law-controlling referendum) and a consultative 
referendum initiated by a parliamentary minority (1/3 of the members of both chambers). 
Neither of these proposals were adopted. By this time the parties' positions on the issue 
had changed radically. Now the Social Democratic Party was the dominant party and the 
main opponent of the referendum, and the law-controlling referendums were promoted 
the Bourgeois parties which were in the opposition. The Social Democrats argued that 
the referendum contradicts the principles of parliamentarism and considered the 
referendum as a pro-status-quo institution which could be used to water down their 
reform policies. The Bourgeois parties supported the referendum more or less for the 
same reasons why the Social Democrats opposed it: they considered the referendum as 
a check on strong parliamentary majorities. By 1960 the proposals of the constitutional
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reform committee were finally eradicated by the Social Democrats.
In 1963 a new constitutional reform committee suggested a law-controlling referendum 
initiated by the parliamentary minority on constitutional issues. The Riksdag, still 
dominated by the Social Democrats, did not adopt this proposal. Only a provision for 
an ad hoc referendum was adopted in 1974. During the Social Democratic rule in the 
1960s and 1970s no provisions for a law-controlling referendum were adopted. The 
proposals put forward by the constitutional committees were not seriously considered 
until the Bourgeois governments since 1976. The reforms eventually made in 1979 were, 
however, rather small, and the current provision for suspensive referendum hardly will 
create a significant threat against the governmental power, and it is also likely to be used 
very rarely. (Hermansson 1993,166-181.)
5.2 Energy Policy Issue in the 1970s
The issue of nuclear power dominated the Swedish political agenda throughout the 1970s 
and it lost its salience only after the referendum in 1980. Holmberg and Asp (1984,11) 
describe the 1970s as ‘the nuclear power's decade’ in the Swedish politics. Ruin (1982, 
148-149) considers the raise of nuclear power issue on a political agenda as a part of an 
emergence of a new issue dimension, environmentalism, which did not follow the 
traditional left-right dimension. Environmentalism questioned the prevailing ideology 
of economic growth, and gave increasing emphasis to the protection of physical 
environment.
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The environmentalism* economic growth which divided both the political right and the 
left. According to Laver and Hunt (1992, 303-311), the Bourgeois parties’ policy 
platforms were close to each other on such issues as foreign policy, public spending and 
services, which may be seen as constituents of the left-right dimension. These parties’ 
policy platforms were further apart in such issues as supporting urban vs. rural interests, 
decentralization and environmentalism. On the other hand, the Communists (Vpk) and 
the Social Democrats were relatively close to each other on the left-right dimension, but 
they had clearly different positions on the environmentalism-economic growth 
dimension.1
Figure 5.1 The Five Main Parties’ Positions in the Left/Right and Pro/Anti-Nuclear 
Power Axis
Pro -nuclear power
Conservatives
Social Democrats
Liberals
Communists Centre
Anti-nuclear power
The environmental dimension to a certain extent coincided with another dimension in the 
Swedish politics, urban-rural. The Social Democrats, the main proponents of the
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centralized welfare-state, supported policies promoting technological development and 
economic growth, whereas the Communists and the Centre Party had a more reserved 
attitude to technology and growth. Especially Centre Party also supported a more 
decentralized form of government. In the nuclear power debate the economic growth, 
energy and welfare were the most repeated themes. The supporters of nuclear power 
denounced the opponents of nuclear power as unrealistic 'doomsday prophets'. (Asp & 
Holmberg 1979, 36.)
During the early years of the decade, the emphasis in the nuclear power debate was in the 
environmental risks of the nuclear energy, but the oil crisis shifted the focus to the 
problems of energy management and the disadvantages of the dependency on oil. The 
nuclear power issue became politically contentious in the spring 1973 when the 
parliamentary group of the Centre Party took a position against the development of 
nuclear energy. Since then, the Centre Party has been the locus of the anti-nuclear power 
sentiments. The idea of having a referendum on nuclear power issue, on the other hand, 
was first put forward by the Communists in Riksdag in 1975 in conjunction with the 
discussion on the Energy Bill introduced by the Social Democratic government. The 
Communist Party’s proposal was motivated by the fact that the anti-nuclear power 
representatives were in the minority in the Riksdag, which did not fully represent the 
anti-nuclear power sentiments of the public. The Communists thought that what was not 
possible to be achieved in the parliament was perhaps possible to be achieved in the 
referendum.
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The Energy Bill put forward by the Social Democrats suggested the construction of 13 
nuclear power reactors, together with certain measures for energy conservation. The bill 
was passed in the Riksdag in May 1975 with the support of the Conservatives 
(Moderaterna). The Liberals, who wanted only 11 reactors, the Centre Party and the 
Communists voted against the Energy Bill proposal. Furthermore, especially the Social 
Democrats and, to some extent, the Liberal Party were divided on the nuclear power issue 
so that the supporters of these parties were more anti-nuclear power than the party 
leaders. These positions remained more or less the same until the referendum.2 
(Holmberg & Asp 1984,32-34.)
In the 1976 election, the Social Democrats lost their dominant position in Riksdag, and 
found themselves in the opposition for the first time after 46 years in power. According 
to most interpretations, the nuclear power issue had contributed to the defeat of Social 
Democrats, although it was not the only reason. The nuclear power issue dominated the 
electoral campaign especially during the last weeks of the campaign. This happened 
despite the fact that the Social Democrats tried to avoid the issue in their campaign 
because of the internal split of the party. Communists, on the other hand, were rather 
united and against the nuclear power, but they did not want to jeopardize their coalition 
chances with the Social Democrats by raising the issue. The pro-nuclear power 
Conservatives and the Liberals also did not want to risk their coalition prospects with the 
Centre Party.
The Centre Party, however, tried to appeal to the anti-nuclear power sentiments of the
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public and thus maximize its electoral support. During the campaign, the Centre Party 
committed itself to a strict anti-nuclear power position. Already during the campaign, this 
was expected to create problems in the possible Bourgeois coalition government which 
was the only realistic alternative for the Social Democrat rule. Despite this, the Centre 
Party leader, Thorbjom Falldin, put forward a proposal according to which no new 
nuclear power plants would be charged and all nuclear power reactors would be phased 
out by 1985. Furthermore, he stated that the Centre Party will not participate in any 
government which gives permissions for building new nuclear power plants or for 
charging new reactors. (Lewin 1984, 315.)
After the election, the Conservatives, the Liberals and the Centre Party formed a 
coalition government in which the Centre was the biggest party, and its leader Thorbjom 
Falldin became the prime minister. The nuclear power issue proved to be difficult already 
at the formative negotiations. The strict commitment not to give permissions to built or 
charge reactors and to the phase-out of the existing reactors may have been beneficial in 
terms of the electoral result for the Centre Party, but it caused serious problems with its 
coalition partners. In the Bourgeois Government Declaration by the new government in 
1976 an energy committee was set up. This committee was supposed to prepare for the 
major energy political decisions to be made in 1978. The Declaration also contained a 
proposal to have a referendum on energy policy if the opinions were still divided in 1978. 
In other words, the referendum option was used as a mediating device. In the meanwhile, 
the new government had given a permission to a company to charge a new nuclear 
reactor, Barseback 2. The critics of the Centre Party interpreted this and the 
compromising tone of the Declaration so that the Centre Party has betrayed its voters.
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(Bjorklund 1982,255, Lewin 1983, 320-323.)
In 1977 the Nuclear Stipulation Act was passed in the Riksdag. According to the act it 
was forbidden to start any nuclear power plants unless the reprocessing and storage 
problems of spent fuel are satisfactorily solved. The Act also contained a reference to the 
future referendum as a measure to solve disagreements within the coalition. In the 
autumn 1978 the coalition government needed to consider the applications of the 
permissions to charge two new nuclear reactors, ie. Ringhals 3 and Forsmark 1. The 
government rejected the applications on the basis that the applicants had not shown 
where the waste could be stored, but the applications would be reconsidered after further 
more geological examinations on the storage of the radioactive waste. The further 
examinations were not considered to be real obstacles for charging the reactors, and 
therefore the opposition and the media blamed the Centre Party for breaking its electoral 
promise again. As a response to the negative publicity, an ultimatum by Prime Minister 
Falldin followed, according to which either all work on another nuclear power plant, 
Forsmark III, should be stopped or a referendum should be held. The coalition partners 
rejected the ultimatum and as a result the Centre Party left the government. (Vedung 
1979,42-75.)
The situation within the Bourgeois Coalition government shows how the referendum 
option is raised when the parties are strongly committed to their issue positions and 
therefore the normal parliamentary compromising and bargaining are not possible. After 
its strong pre-commitment to the anti-nuclear power position, the Centre Party faced a 
storm of criticism by the opposition and the media after each concession it made in the
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issue to its coalition partners. Prime Minister Falldin’s ultimatum may be interpreted as 
the last resort for the Centre Party to save its credibility under the criticism. The 
referendum option put forward in 1976 could not, after all, guarantee the continuation 
of the coalition because the parties, especially the Centre Party, were strictly committed 
to their positions and there was constant pressure for making decisions. Furthermore, the 
Centre Party’s commitment to the anti-nuclear issue position during the electoral 
campaign may be interpreted as a rather successful vote-maximizing strategy, which 
proved not to be as successful in terms of the governmental cooperation.3 (Compare with 
Strom 1990.)
After the breakdown of the Bourgeois coalition government a new Liberal minority 
government came into power. This government prepared a new Energy Bill with the 
support of the Conservatives and the Social Democrats, and the Committee was 
appointed to examine the possibility of the abolition of the Nuclear Stipulation Act. By 
this time, the referendum upon the nuclear power issue did not seem probable, because 
now - in addition to Social Democrats - also the Liberals and the Conservatives were 
against the referendum, and therefore there was no parliamentary majority supporting it.
The Harrisburg nuclear power plant accident in the US in March 1979 shocked the 
Swedes, and increased the popular pressures against the further development of nuclear 
energy, also among the pro-nuclear power parties, Social Democrats, Liberals and 
Conservatives. As a consequence, the Social Democrats began to promote a referendum 
on the nuclear power issue. They were now supported by the Liberals and the 
Conservatives. In spring 1979 the majority in the Riksdag decided that the referendum
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would take place six months after the election in September 1979, in other words, in 
March 1980.
One of the motivations behind the Social Democratic proposal for a referendum was that 
the party wanted to avoid the repetition of the situation of 1976 when the nuclear power 
issue caused the setback of the party, especially considering the anti-nuclear power 
sentiments caused by the Harrisburg accident. Therefore, the initiation of the referendum 
may be seen as an attempt of the Social Democrats to remove the issue from the electoral 
agenda. According to Holmberg and Asp (1984, 53-55) this explanation may be 
confirmed by the data on the extent to which the party leaders dealt with the nuclear 
power issue during the electoral campaign. Especially the Social Democratic leader Olof 
Palme avoided the nuclear power issue, and concentrated on the economic situation and 
employment. As Holmberg and Asp point out, the referendum strategy was not very 
successful because nuclear power issue, after all, dominated the mass media during the 
electoral campaign. Also the electorate, especially the supporters of the Centre and the 
Communists, considered it to be the most important issue of the elections. The Social 
Democrats could not regain their dominant position in the election, and a new bourgeois 
coalition government was formed with the Centre leader Falldin as a prime minister 
again.
The Swedish nuclear power referendum is a case in which the promoted the referendum 
on an issue which divided the parties and the traditional coalition patterns. For the 
bourgeois parties the motivation for promoting the referendum option was to keep the 
governmental coalition together despite the division on the issue, whereas for the Social
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Democrats the reason was to avoid electoral defeat. In Strom’s (1990) terms, the 
referendum option was raised by different parties to promote their policy goals 
(Communists), seek office (Bourgeois Coalition Government) and votes (the Centre 
Party, Social Democrats). The following table summarizes the political actors who 
raised the idea of having a referendum on the nuclear power issue during the 1970s and 
their motivations for doing this:
Table 5.1 Motivations for Raising the Referendum Option
Year Political Actor Political Situation & Motivation
1975 The Communist Party under-representation of the anti-nuclear power public
opinion in the parliament
1976 Bourgeois Coalition Government maintaining coalition cooperation
1978 Falldin ultimatum maintaining party’s credibility
1979 Social Democrats fear of electoral defeat caused by the growing
anti-nuclear power public opinion
5.3 The Nuclear Power Referendum
After having made the decision to hold a referendum, the Riksdag decided that there 
would be no further decisions on the nuclear power issue until after the 1979 election, 
and the Centre Party and the Communists were given the right to formulate a 'no' 
alternative, whereas the Energy Bill was to serve as the basis for a 'yes' alternative. It was 
especially in the interests of the Centre Party that the alternatives would not be 
formulated by the parliamentary majority, because the pro-nuclear parties dominated the 
Riksdag and therefore were able to vote through an anti-nuclear power alternative they 
would prefer. The Centre Party found this inconvenient because the party would
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necessarily be identified with the anti-nuclear alternative and a badly formulated 
alternative was feared to lead to an electoral defeat. For these reasons, Centre Party 
insisted on its right to formulate its own alternative, which, respectively, meant that the 
other parties had a similar right.
In March 1980, when the referendum took place, there were six functioning nuclear 
power plants in Sweden. Four others were ready but not working and two more under 
construction. The agenda of the referendum was agreed upon within the party leaders of 
five parliamentary parties. The referendum was framed as a choice between three 
alternative policy outcomes (ett linjeval). The alternative 1) was put forward by the 
Moderates, the alternative 2) by the Social Democrats and the Liberals, and the 
alternative 3) by the Centre and the Communists. The alternatives put forward to 
Swedish voters were the following:
1) The old Energy Bill will be carried out, and those nuclear power reactors now under 
construction will be completed but no reactors will be built. The reactors will be phased 
out on the basis of security reasons at the end of their working lives.
2) This alternative was similar to the alternative 1), but it also called for research on 
renewable energy sources, security control at the existing nuclear power plants and the 
state ownership of all important energy-producing plants in the future.
3) No more reactors will be built, and those in operation will be phased out within a 
period of no more than 10 years. More resources will be invested in the research on 
renewable energy and possibilities of energy-saving.4
The slogan 'Energy for Sweden' (Energi for Sverige) was used to campaign for the first 
alternative, 'Abolish Nuclear Power! But with Reason!' (Aweckla kdrnkraftenI Men med 
fornuft!) for the second alternative, and Nuclear power? No thanks' (Atomkraft? Nej
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tack) for the third. These slogans supported the impression that the second alternative 
was campaigned as a compromising one. The apparent reason why there were two yes- 
altematives with similar contents in terms of the nuclear power issue was that the Social 
Democrats and Conservatives could not get into an agreement on the question of 
nationalisation of energy production. The Conservatives saw the question purely in terms 
of the problems the nuclear energy may cause for the future generations, and the Social 
Democrats did not give any concessions on the issue of state-control.
Another interpretation for the two similar alternatives, especially given by the no-side, 
was that this was a strategy chosen by the yes-parties in order to maximize the overall 
support to the yes-side, so that undecided and anti-nuclear power Social Democratic and 
Liberals would be persuaded to vote for the alternative 2) which was framed ‘softer’ and 
less pro-nuclear power than the first alternative. Especially the Social Democrat strategy 
of presenting the second alternative as a mediating one was considered to be quite 
aggravating - especially when at the same time it was generally interpreted that votes for 
the first and the second alternative should be counted together. According to opinion 
polls, the pro-nuclear power position, in fact, increased its support after the question was 
put to the people terms of three alternatives rather than two (Little 1980). Each proposal 
was allocated a campaign fund, and the way in which this was done supports the 
interpretation of two factual alternatives: the alternative 1) received 8 million kronor, the 
alternative 2) 10 million kronor and the alternative 3) as much as the two other 
altogether, in other words, 18 million kronor. This was explained by the higher 
administrative costs caused by the involvement of two parties rather than one, but clearly 
shows that the first two alternatives were interpreted substantially to be one yes-
alternative. (Little 1982,7.)
After the definition of the three alternatives to be voted upon, started the controversy on 
the interpretation of the results of the three-alternative referendum. The debate did not, 
obviously, lead to any consensus among the parties. The Prime Minister and the leader 
of the Centre Party Falldin took the commonly held position that votes for the first and 
the second alternatives should be counted together. Surprisingly, the chairman of the 
national campaign committee for the second alternative considered that if none of the 
proposals received an absolute majority, but the second and the third alternatives together 
did, the immediate shutdown of all nuclear power stations would follow. The Social 
Democrat leader Olof Palme, on the other hand, maintained that if none of the proposals 
will achieve an absolute majority the second alternative should be implemented, even if 
alternative 1) gets 49% of the vote, alternative 3) 49% and alternative 2) only 2%, 
because the alternative 2) was a mediating one. Even this ambiguity of the interpretation 
of the results among the supporters of the alternative 2) may be seen as a strategy to 
frame their alternative as a mediating one and more anti-nuclear as the alternative 1). 
(Little 1982, 8.)
The turnout in the referendum was relatively low in Swedish standards, only 75 %, and 
the support for each alternative was as follows:
Line 1): 18.7%
Line 2): 39.3%
Line 3): 38.6%. 
spoiled papers 3.4%.
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This result was interpreted for example by Swedish radio that the yes-side gained 58% 
of votes and the no-side 38.6%. This interpretation was overwhelmingly dominant in the 
media and among the political elite. Right after the referendum the Riksdag made the 
decision, following the alternatives 1) and 2) of the referendum, that those nuclear power 
plants currently under construction will be completed but no more nuclear power plants 
will be constructed and the existing ones will be closed down by 2010. More recently, 
however, when alternative energy resources do not seem to be sufficient to compensate 
the nuclear energy, the idea of extending the use of the existing reactors has gained more 
and more support.
The three-altemative set-up of the referendum was a reason for much confusion. In social 
choice terms, it is possible to ask whether the alternative 2) was irrelevant because if did 
not differ from the alternative 1) with respect to the main question. The explanation 
given by the political parties that the referendum was 'ett linjeval', choosing between 
different policy programmes, does not seem very convincing. The three-altemative 
format was a result of party-political interests: none of the parties wanted to be identified 
with an alternative formulated by their rivals, and also the outcome-maximizing strategy 
of the Social Democratic and the Liberal Parties which wanted to frame their alternative 
less-pro-nuclear power than the alternative 1). From the procedural point of view the 
arguments put forward by the no-side against the idea of having two yes-altematives 
were quite legitimate. If there were three separate alternatives put forward in the ballot 
paper they should be considered as separate also when the votes are counted. For 
example the interpretation of the result given by the Swedish Radio implies that the 
choice was, de facto , between two mutually exclusive alternatives, yes and no, and the
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rest of the question-setting was more or less political tactics.
In the Swedish referendum, the problems of interpretation of the result were not as big 
as they could have been because, in addition that the ‘yes’-alternatives gained the 
majority, also the alternative 2) got the plurality of the votes. The situation would have 
been much more complicated if the alternative 3) had got the plurality, but not the 
absolute majority of the votes, because then there had been two alternatives claimed to 
be the legitimate winner. In sum, having a referendum with three alternatives and not 
agreeing on the criterion for the winner in advance is bizarre way of manoeuvring, 
especially when two of the alternatives had almost the same contents. The consequence 
of this was, like in 1957, the devaluation of the referendum institution among the 
Swedish electorate.
This is confirmed by the survey results of Holmberg and Asp (1984,539-541), according 
to which the majority of 51% of the Swedish voters were unhappy with the way in which 
the referendum was organised (the sample size, n=1529). The dissatisfaction was, not 
surprisingly, largest among the supporters of the alternative 3) and lowest among the 
supporters of the alternative 2): 67% of the supporters of the alternative 3) were not 
satisfied with the way in which the referendum was organised, compared for example 
58% of the supporters of the alternative 1) and 41% of the alternative 2). At the same 
time, the supporters of the alternative 3) were the most positive about the referendum in 
principle, 60% of them thought that it was good that there was a nuclear power 
referendum, compared to 22% of the supporters of the alternative 1), and 30% of the 
alternative 2) (n=1558). These results were more or less the same in the surveys made
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before and after the referendum.
It was difficult to reach a stable political decision or, using the social choice terminology, 
determine a majority winner in the nuclear power issue, because questions like the exact 
number of the reactors and the governmental control over energy production were 
involved in debate on the issue. The strict commitment of the Centre Party to the anti- 
nuclear power position, which paralysed the cooperation between the Bourgeois Parties, 
and the internal division of the Social Democratic Party were, however, the most 
important reasons for the instability. The referendum result may have been in many ways 
be arbitrary, but yet, it is likely that the result was more stable than any decision made 
in the parliament. However, recently the issue has become more disputable again, and 
even the idea of a new referendum has been put forward by the Swedish Labour 
Organisation (LO).
Although the implications of the referendum on the Swedish energy policy have not 
proved to be straightforward, one aim of the referendum was, however, achieved: the 
nuclear power issue was more or less removed from the political agenda after the 
referendum, although right after the referendum the supporters of the alternative 3) 
insisted on carrying on action. As Ruin (1996) puts this, in Sweden the referendum has 
been an instrument for defusing political issues. On the other hand, one may argue that 
the reason why the nuclear power issue disappeared from the political agenda was the 
exhaustion of the Swedish public: the Swedes were simply fed up with the nuclear power 
issue after the fierce political struggle which lasted almost for ten years. (Holmberg and 
Asp 1984,14.)
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Despite the fact that the referendum option was used as a party-political tactics, and that 
the interpretation of the result was ambiguous, it may be argued that the referendum was 
a very good example on how the referendum increases people’s participation and level 
of understanding in politics. Therefore, it served the ideals of participatory and 
deliberatory theories of democracy. Holmberg and Asp (1984,203-210) point out that 
the referendum campaign was the focal point of the nuclear power debate which lasted 
for most of the decade. Their survey (n=1548) shows, for example, that as many as 40% 
of the Swedish electors participated in informal discussions on the issue, 20% in different 
public meetings, 12% of them wore a campaign pin showing support to one of the 
alternatives, and 18% propagated their own views to the others. The supporters of the 
alternative 3) were especially active during the campaign. Holmberg and Asp conclude 
that, although the voters’ knowledge on the technical aspects of the nuclear power issue 
was quite low, most of the voters had quite consistent opinions on the issue and were 
able to vote accordingly. However, contrary to the ideas of the participatory theory of 
democracy, the nuclear power campaign rather decreased than increased the public 
interest in the politics, and nuclear power especially. The reasons for this negative 
outcome may have been that the adversary referendum campaign exhausted people’s 
interest in the nuclear power debate, and that the agenda-manipulation by the political 
parties caused devaluation of the referendum.
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Notes
1 Laver and Hunt (1992) analyze the most important issue dimensions in western democracies. The 
analysis is based on country experts’ opinions. Laver and Hunt assess the locations of the parties on 
certain issue dimensions and also the salience of the issues for each party. Their analysis shows that 
environmentalism-economic growth issue, of which the nuclear power issue is one element, was very 
salient most of the Swedish parties. This supports the analysis of the Swedish electoral politics and 
govemment-formation in the 1970s as a two-dimensional game. The environmentalism issue was 
salient especially for the Centre Party whereas the other Bourgeois parties were more concerned about 
the economic issues
2 The Centre Party had adopted an anti-nuclear stance at the party congress in 1973. This was shortly 
after followed by the communists.
3 Strom (1990) argues that the parties seek votes, office and policies. He also points out that there are 
many possible trade-offs and contradictions between these goals. The Centre Party’s vote-maximizing 
strategy, ie. commitment to the phase-out of nuclear power, may therefore be seen as a failure in 
terms of governmental office, because it did not leave room for bargaining within the governmental 
coalition. The breakdown of the Bourgeois coalition government in 1978has been analyzed by Lewin 
(1984) as a Chicken-game in which the Centre Party makes a pre-commitment to non-cooperation.
4 More accurately, the alternatives were as follows:
Referendum on the issue of nuclear power
There are now six working nuclear power plants in Sweden. Furthermore, four reactors are ready and 
two under construction. Riksdag has decided that a referendum on the role of nuclear power in the 
future's energy supply will be held in 23 of March 1980. The referendum deals with three different 
proposals.
(And then, alternatively:)
I vote for the proposal number
1) Nuclear power will be abolished in the pace which is possible considering the demand for 
electricity needed for maintaining employment and welfare. Among other reasons, in order to 
diminish the dependency on oil and while awaiting renewable energy resources will at most the 12 
nuclear power plants which now are working, ready or under construction be used. No more nuclear 
power plants will be built. Security reasons will be decisive for the order in which the reactors will be 
phased out.
I vote for the proposal number
2) Nuclear power will be abolished in the pace which is possible considering the demand for 
electricity needed for maintaining employment and welfare. Among other reasons, in other to 
diminish the dependency on oil and while awaiting renewable energy resources will at most the 12 
nuclear power plants which now are working, ready or under construction be used. No more nuclear 
power plants will be built. Security reasons will be decisive for the order in which the reactors will be 
phased out.
Economical use of energy will be strongly pursued and further stimulated. The weakest groups of the 
society will be protected. Action will be taken in order to control the consumption of electricity, for 
example ban the direct electric heating of new buildings.
Research and development on renewable sources of energy will be carried out under the control of the 
society.
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Efforts for improving environmental standards and security at the nuclear power plants will be made. 
A particular security investigation will be undertaken for each reactor. In order to increase citizens' 
control a local security committee will be established for each nuclear power plant.
The energy production by oil and coal power plants will be avoided.
The society will have the main responsibility for the production and the distribution of electric 
power. Nuclear power and other significant future electricity production plants will be owned by 
the state and the community. Profits from hydroenergy production will be withdrawn by taxation.
I vote for the proposal number
3) NO for continuing construction of nuclear power.
The currently functioning nuclear power plants will be phased out within at most ten years. A plan 
for diminishing dependency on oil will be made by choosing between 
- continuing and intensifying energy saving 
• intensively increasing investment on renewable energy sources
Stricter security norms will be imposed on functioning reactors. Reactors which are not yet charged 
will never be used.
The mining of uranium will not be allowed in our country.
If the current or a future security analysis so require, this alternative calls evidently for the immediate 
closure of nuclear power plants.
Activity against the nuclear proliferation and nuclear weapons will be intensified. No processing is 
allowed and the export of reactors and reactor technology will be terminated.
Employment will be increased by alternative production of energy, more effective energy economy 
and increasing the development of resources.
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6. Denmark - Referendums on European Integration
6.1 History of Danish Referendums
The adoption of the referendum in the Danish Constitution was first advocated by the 
Social Democratic Party which mentioned the referendum in its party programme as far 
back as in 1876. After the introduction of the parliamentary form of government in 1901 
and throughout the first half of this century, the political left, the Social Democrats and 
the Radical Liberals (Det radikale Venstre), promoted the institution. The Social 
Democrats supported the referendum as a radical measure combined with the popular 
initiative, and the Radical Liberals promoted the referendum on the most important 
issues, especially on constitutional amendments, and also the popular initiative. In 1915, 
the mandatory constitutional referendum was adopted as a result of a compromise 
between the Radical Liberals who based their arguments on the idea of popular 
sovereignty and the Conservatives (Hojre) who required protection for minorities. The 
provision for the mandatory constitutional referendum was essentially the same as today: 
the amendments to the Constitution needed to be submitted to a referendum and required 
the support of the majority of the votes cast of and 45 % of the eligible voters (in 1953 
the threshold was lowered to 40%). Before the 1915 reform, the constitutional status quo 
was protected by the requirement of the support of the majority for the constitutional 
amendments in two subsequent parliaments. (Suksi 1993,183-186; Svensson 1996, 34- 
35.)
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The first referendum in Denmark was held in 1916 on the issue whether or not Denmark 
should sell the Danish West Indies to the United States. This proposal was voted in a 
consultative referendum, in other words, the referendum was not held under the 
constitutional provision adopted in 1915. The turnout was only 37.4% and 64.2% of the 
voters voted ‘yes’ (Svensson 1996). The second referendum in Danish history was held 
in September 1920 upon constitutional reforms. Because the Social Democrats were not 
satisfied with the extent of the reforms, they recommended for their supporters to abstain 
from the polls. The party’s supporters seemed to follow the recommendation, because 
the turnout was just 49.6%. However, 96.9% of those who turned out to the polls voted 
‘yes’, which made a narrow winning total, 47.6% of the total electorate, which was just 
more than the 45% threshold of the 1915 Constitution.
In the 1930s the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals, both of which still promoted 
more extensive use of referendums, had gained a majority in both chambers of the 
parliament, Rigsdag. These parties supported a parliamentary reform in which the Upper 
House of the parliament, Landsting, would be abolished. At the same time the 
Conservatives, who were concerned about the protection of the minority interests after 
the parliamentary reform, had began to consider the referendum as a realistic substitute 
for the Landsting. As a compromise, the Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals and the 
Conservatives put forward a constitutional proposal for the legislative referendum, 
according to which either 2/5 of the MPs, or 1/3 of the MPs supported by 10% of the 
electorate could initiate a law-controlling referendum on bills passed by the 
parliamentary majority. In order to be repealed, the majority of the voters and 35% of the
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electorate should vote against the law. After these constitutional changes had been 
approved in the Rigsdag, they were submitted to the constitutional referendum in May 
1939. The Liberals (Venstre) advised their supporters to abstain from the vote (like the 
Social Democrats did in 1920), and the constitutional changes were defeated because 
only 44.46% of the whole electorate supported the proposal, which was below the 45% 
requirement of the 1915 Constitution. Of those who turned out to polls 91.9% voted ‘yes’ 
and thus the defeat may be explained by the low turnout, 48.9%. (Suksi 1993,183-186.)
After World War II there was a new attempt to change the Constitution so that the 
Rigsdag would be replaced by a unicameral parliament, the Folketing, and the 
referendum. The idea of law-controlling referendums as a substitute for the Landsting 
was promoted by the Liberals and the Conservatives who formed a coalition government 
between 1950 and 1953. Also the Radical Liberals supported this for ideological and 
strategic reasons. The Social Democrats accepted the institution in front of the united 
Bourgeois parties, but tried to make it as weak as possible by requiring the threshold of 
no-voters of the total electorate as high as possible. The reasoning behind this was that 
now the Social Democrats believed that the law-controlling referendums were directed 
against their reform policies. The new Constitution was approved in the referendum in 
May 1953, in which 78.8% of the voters approved the new Constitution. The turnout was 
59.1%, which means that 45.8% of the whole electorate voted for the new Constitution, 
which was just above the threshold. In 1953, simultaneously with the referendum on the 
new Constitution, there was a referendum on voting age as a result of which the voting 
age was lowered from 25 years to 23 years. (Suksi 1993,183-186; Rasmussen 1996,18-
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23.)
In the 1953 Constitution, there were four different sections concerning the referendum, 
which still today regulate the use of the referendums in Denmark. There is a provision 
for mandatory constitutional referendums (Section 88): a constitutional amendment 
requires the approval of the majority of Folketing and the support of 40 % of the total 
electorate (as mentioned before, until 1953 the threshold was 45%). Secondly, the 
rejective (suspensive) legislative referendum (Section 42) is used when one third of the 
members of the Folketing make a request to the prime minister to subject the bill to a 
referendum within three working days from the final approval of the bill. If the majority 
of the Folketing does not withdraw the bill, a majority of the votes and 30% of the total 
electorate is required to reject the bill in a referendum. Measures of a number of areas 
cannot be submitted to a referendum (for example, finance, governmental loans, salaries 
and pensions, direct and indirect taxes).
Thirdly, there is a provision for a referendum on transfer o f national powers to 
international authorities (Section 20): majority of 5/6 is required in the Folketing or an 
ordinary majority and the submission of the bill to the voters. In the referendum, like in 
the rejective legislative referendum, a majority of the votes and 30% of the total 
electorate is required to reject the bill. This provision was adopted partially in 
anticipation of the Danish entry to the European Common Market. Fourthly, the 
Constitution (Section 29) requires that laws on changing the voting age must be 
submitted to the referendum. The fifth possible type of the referendum, a consultative ad
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hoc referendum may be initiated by the parliamentary majority, although this is not 
constitutionally regulated. (Suksi 1993,183-186,194; Miller 1982, 58, Svensson 1996, 
34-36.)
The 1953 Constitution framed the referendum as a check on legislative and constitutional 
changes and a device for the protection of the popular minorities. This is particularly 
obvious in the referendums on transfer of national powers to international authorities and 
in law-controlling legislative referendums, which are clearly framed as a veto by 
parliamentary minorities. Also, the mandatory constitutional referendums are a pro- 
status-quo institutions and therefore anti-maj oritarian. The pro-status-quo character of 
the referendum in 1953 Constitution may be explained by the fact that the Conservatives 
and the Liberals, which are not otherwise very pro-direct-democracy in their ideological 
outlook, now considered the referendum as a corrective institution with respect to 
representative decision-making. (Suksi 1993,183-186.)
More recently, in their electoral campaign in 1988, the Radical Liberals promoted a 
constitutional reform with more extensive use of referendums, although the party did not 
attempt to carry out these reforms during its participation in the government in 1988-90. 
Furthermore, the opposition parties in the left, the Socialist People’s Party, and in the 
right, the Progress Party (Fremskridtpartiet), have expressed their support for more 
referendums. The Progress Party has also been the most active promoter of the 
suspensive referendums since its breakthrough into the politics in 1973. According to 
Svensson, these demands express more anti-elitist sentiments of the alienated groups of
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the society rather than genuine demand for further democratisation of the Constitution. 
(Rasmussen 1996, 130-135; Svensson 1996,36,49-50.)
The referendums held under the 1953 Constitution have dealt with three broad types of 
issues, land use, voting age, and European integration. The referendums on European 
integration will be analysed in the following section. The table 6.1 displays all 10 
referendums held in Denmark since 1945. The letters in the brackets refer to the 
constitutional status of the referendum: M stands for mandatory referendum, R for 
rejective (suspensive) referendum, T for transfer of powers, and O for ad hoc (optional) 
referendums. The referendums on transfer of national powers to supranational 
organisations may be considered to be suspensive (non-mandatory or facultative). 
However, because the 5/6 majority in the Folketing is quite difficult to achieve, the 
referendum is, in fact, quite ‘mandatory’ in character. (Suksi 1993,205.)
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Table 6.1 Danish Referendums since 1945:
Year Issue yes-votes turnout
yes-votes 
of the 
electorate
1953 New Constitution (M) 78.4 59.1 45.8
no-votes of 
the
electorate
Voting Age lowered from 25 to 23 or 21 (M)1 54.6 57.1 n.a.2
1961 Voting Age lowered from 23 to 21 (M) 55.0 37.3 n.a.
1963 Approval of agricultural acquisition law (R) 38.4 73.0 44.5
Approval of state small-holders law (R) 38.6 73.0 44.3
Approval of municipal purchase rights (R) 39.6 73.0 43.6
Approval of nature conservation law (R) 42.6 73.0 41.5
1969 Voting age lowered from 21 to 18 (M) 21.2 63.6 n.a.
1971 Voting age lowered from 21 to 20 (M) 56.5 83.2 n.a.
1972 Joining EEC (T) 63.3 90.1 32.9
1978 Voting Age lowered from 20 to 18 (M) 53.9 63.4 n.a.
1986 Single European Act (0) 56.2 74.8 n.a.
1992 Maastricht Treaty (T) 49.3 83.1 41.7
1993 Maastricht Treaty (T) 56.7 86.5 n.a.
1 yes-altemative means support for 23 years, no-alternative support for 21 years
2 n.a. means means that the requirement for a minimum share of no-votes of the total electorate did not apply 
to the referendum in question
(Source: Svensson 1996, 39)
So far there have been no referendums under the Section 88 of 1953 Constitution 
providing for the mandatory constitutional referendum. The first referendum under the 
new Constitution held in 1961 dealt with voting age. In this referendum, the voting age 
was lowered from 23 to 21 years. Later on, there have been three other referendums on 
the voting age: in 1969, 1971 and 1978 (see the table 6.1). In 1969 the majority of voters 
rejected the proposal to lower the voting age from 21 to 18. Two years later, the voting 
age was lowered from 21 to 20 years, and in 1978 the voting age was finally lowered 
from 20 to the current 18 years.
The referendum in 1963 was held on a more politically divisive issue: public regulation
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of the land use. The referendum in 1963 has remained the only occasion of the application 
of the suspensive referendum under the section 42 of the Constitution. The ruling 
coalition government between the Social Democrats and Radical Liberals put forward a 
legislative programme to cope with the problems of rapidly rising land prices and 
purchases of Danish land by foreigners before the expected entry to the European 
Common Market. These laws would have increased the public regulation of private 
property, which the Bourgeois parties found unacceptable. The referendum was initiated 
by the parliamentary minority consisting of the Liberal and the Conservative members 
of the Folketing, and it was required against four laws passed in the Folketing. All four 
laws were rejected in the referendum by the negative majorities ranging from 57.5 % to 
61.6%, and the turnout was as high as 73%, which meant that clearly more than the 
required 30% of the total electorate voted against the laws. This proves that the rejective 
referendum may protect the minority interests and also be corrective with respect to the 
misrepresentations of the public opinion. However, the requirement of 1/3 of the 
members of the Folketing has proven to be quite difficult for small parties to overcome. 
As Svensson has described, the protection of minorities offered by suspensive 
referendums applies only to a minority of a substantial size. (Miller 1982, 59-60; 
Svensson 1996,44-51.)
6.2 Preceding Referendums on European Integration
It has become common to submit the issues related to the European integration process 
to referendums. So far, the Western European countries have experienced 16 referendums
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on issues related to EEC/EU and two referendums on European Economic Area. Five of 
these referendums have been held in the 1970s, three in the 1980s, and eight in the 1990s. 
Denmark has held four referendums on the European integration. The first one took place 
in Autumn 1972, and it was about Danish membership in the EEC. The referendum was 
held under the Article 20 of the 1953 Constitution This means that it was a referendum 
on delegation of national sovereignty to supranational organisations and, therefore, it was 
a binding referendum, and, depending on the interpretation, suspensive or mandatory.
Interestingly enough, the main political parties decided to hold the referendum despite the 
support of the membership in the Folketing. As mentioned earlier, according to the 
Danish Constitution, the membership agreement should either be passed by 5/6 of the 
members of the Folketing, or the majority of the Folketing and then submitted to a 
referendum. The Social Democratic Party, however, took a position that the referendum 
should be held regardless of the support achieved in the Folketing. Already in May 1971 
a central Social Democratic politician (Per Haekkerup) suggested an advisory referendum 
on the membership issue before the vote in the Folketing. The reason behind this 
suggestion was clear party-political tactics: the EEC issue was feared to cause the Social 
Democratic Party a loss of votes to the anti-EEC Socialist People’s Party in the election 
in the Autumn 1971, because the rank-and-file supporters of the Social Democrats were 
divided on the membership issue. Also, it was quite clear that the 5/6 majority would not 
be achieved in the Folketing to be elected, and hence the referendum would take place 
anyway, so there was no reason for not using the referendum also to remove the issue 
from the electoral agenda. (Petersen & Elklit 1973.)
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Later on in spring 1971, the Social Democratic Party more officially demanded a binding 
referendum after the parliamentary vote regardless of whether the 5/6 majority was 
achieved. This proposal was agreed by the Radical Liberals and more reluctantly also by 
other Bourgeois Parties, and was passed in the parliament already during the spring 1971. 
By referring to the coming referendum, the Social Democrats tried to remove the 
membership question from the agenda of the election in September 1971, and thus not to 
be identified with the pro-membership position. Also the Radical Liberals were internally 
divided on the issue, which explains their support to the Social Democratic proposal. 
(Petersen & Elklit 1973,198-213; Svensson 1996,40-41.) The Social Democrats were 
only partially successful in their strategy: the party increased its share of the popular vote 
form 34.2% in 1968 to 37.3%, but its main rival on the anti-EEC side, the Socialist 
People’s Party, also gained support moving from 6.1% to 9.1% of the total vote. 
However, a minority Social Democratic government was formed after the election. 
(Miljan 1977, 181-189.)
Later on, the timing of the referendum turned out to be a political issue. The supporters 
of the membership wanted to hold the referendum before the Norwegian membership 
referendum, whereas the opponents wanted to vote after Norwegians who, according to 
the opinion polls, seemed to be more reluctant to join the EEC than the Danes. The idea 
was to bring about a similar bandwagon or domino effect as in the Nordic referendums 
on EU-membership in 1994.This confirms, again, that the governments may try to 
manipulate referendums by using the information provided by the opinion polls. To the 
disappointment of the supporters of the membership in both countries, the Social
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Democratic minority government decided to let Norwegians vote first - perhaps to calm 
down the opponents of the membership, especially when the Social Democratic 
government was dependent on the support of the Socialist People’s Party in the Folketing. 
(Petersen & Elklit 1973.)
In the parliamentary vote in December 1971 on the authorization of the government to 
sign the Treaty of Accession, 141 MPs voted for, 32 against and 2 abstained. This result 
did not fulfil the 5/6 requirement and therefore the referendum was, as expected, also a 
constitutional necessity. The turnout of the referendum was 90,1%, highest ever in the 
Danish history, and 63,4 % of the voters voted for the membership, which was 57% of 
the total electorate. It must be pointed out that although 30% of the total electorate voted 
against the bill, it was approved because the other constitutional condition for the 
rejection of the bill, the majority of no-votes, was not achieved.
In the 1972 referendum, like in the following referendums on European integration, the 
main argument for the membership was based on the possible economic advantages of 
the membership, and the main argument against the membership expressed the fear of the 
loss of political sovereignty. As the outcome of the referendum reveals, the 'economic 
logic' overweighed the political arguments. Already in this referendum, like in the other 
referendums on the integration issue later on, there was a confrontation between the main 
parties and the political and economic elites on one hand, and social organisations, the 
radical left and grass-root movements on the other hand.
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The difference between the opinions of the elites and the public is also confirmed by the 
comparison of the more than 80% parliamentary support of the membership to the 
popular support which was just 63%. This may be explained by the fact that the rank-and- 
file of the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals remained divided on the issue. 
(Svensson 1996, 40-42.) This situation confirms the arguments put forward in the 
Chapter 2 that even fairly proportional representative systems may distort the majority 
will in multi-issue elections. Furthermore, the 1972 referendum shows that the 
referendum may actually be used by political parties to separate issues from the electoral 
agenda and thus preventing them from influencing electors' choices. In fact, it may be 
argued that the pro-European composition of the Folketing in 1972 was, to certain extent, 
a result of an intentional strategy by the Social Democrats to prevent voters’ alignments 
based on the integration issue.
The second referendum on European integration in 1986 was about the Single European 
Act. This was, interestingly enough, a consultative and advisory referendum and not held 
under any specific constitutional provision. Single European Act (SEA) changed the 
division of powers between European institutions so that it gave up more powers to the 
European Parliament and the Commission compared to the Council of Ministers. At the 
negotiation stage, the Danish view had been that the Council of Ministers should remain 
as the key actor in European decision-making. The advisory referendum was called by 
the Prime Minister Poul Schltiter leading a minority government, because its proposal to 
accept the Single European Act was rejected by the majority of the Folketing. The 
majority consisted of Social Democrats, Radical Liberals, Socialist People’s Party and
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Left Socialists. During the campaign the Prime Minister assured the Danish electorate 
that ‘The political union is stone-dead’ - a statement which was often repeated especially 
during the 1992 referendum campaign (Siune 1992,98). In the referendum of February 
1986 56.2% of the voters voted in favour of the Single European Act and 43.8% against. 
The Radical Liberal and Social Democratic parliamentary groups committed themselves 
to follow the result of the referendum. As a result of the referendum the Social Democrats 
revised their policies to more pro-European direction and also Danish European policy 
took generally a more active form, especially in the so-called social dimension (Borre 
1986; Petersen 1995,198-204).
It must be pointed out that although the 5/6 parliamentary majority upon the delegation 
of national powers is rather drastic, the popular support needed in the referendum on 
these issues is lower than in constitutional amendments. This fact has been important 
because in the 1972, 1992 and 1993 referendums on European integration the 
interpretation of the Constitution has been contentious. Those against the new integration 
treaties have argued that the issues in these referendums were constitutional, which would 
have raised the procedural hurdle of the ratification of the treaties. Furthermore, the 
Single European Act was interpreted by the opposition to be a question of transfer of 
national powers rather than an issue to be solved in a consultative referendum. In the 
absence of an independent constitutional court, the interpretation of the Constitution has 
remained politically contentious even after the referendums. In fact, after the 1993 
referendum, a question of the judicial basis of the referendum was made to a Danish 
court. (Siune 1994,32.) For example in Ireland all referendums on European integration
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(membership in 1972, the Single European Act in 1986, and the Maastricht Treaty in 
1992) have been constitutional. The referendums in 1972 and 1992 were based on a 
parliamentary decision, and in 1987 the Supreme Court made the decision that the Single 
European Act was in contradiction with the Irish Constitution. (Gallagher 1996,91.)
63  Referendums in 1992 and 1993
The third and fourth Danish referendums on the European integration were fundamentally 
about the same issue: the acceptance of the Treaty on European Union. The treaty was a 
result of one-year negotiations between the European governments, and the final 
agreement was reached in Maastricht in December 1991. The goal of the Maastricht 
Treaty was to create a European political union with integrated political and economic 
system. The Treaty included various elements, such as building up a European Monetary 
Union (EMU), European citizenship and new social dimension. The Treaty also implied 
changes in Union's decision-making rules: the cases for the unanimity rule and for the 
extended use of majority rule were defined. In many respects the Maastricht Treaty went 
far beyond the Danish visions of the future of European integration, especially the ideas 
of political union with the increase of the powers of the Parliament and the Commission, 
common foreign and security policies and the EMU, although in the final draft of the 
Treaty Danmark got a special protocol on the EMU allowing it to have a referendum on 
the issue and hence not finally committing to it. (Petersen 1995,206.)
The majority of close to 80% of the members of the Folketing supported the Treaty in the
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parliamentary readings. This was not, however, enough to avoid a referendum because 
of the constitutional requirement of 5/6 majority in the Folketing in the issues concerning 
transfer of national powers to international organizations. In the parliamentary vote, only 
Socialist People’s Party and The Progress Party voted against the Treaty. These parties 
also recommended their supporters to vote ’no’ in the referendum. All the main parties, 
the Conservatives, most eagerly the Liberals, the Radical Liberals and the Social 
Democrats campaigned for the Maastricht Treaty. However, it was known that especially 
a significant proportion of the Social Democratic voters were against the Treaty.
Yet, in the referendum in June 1992 the majority of 50.7% against 49.3% of the voters 
voted against the Maastricht Treaty, and the turnout was 83.1%.' The rejection of the 
Treaty thus followed from two facts: there were more 'no' votes than ‘yes’-votes, and 30% 
of the total electorate voted against the Treaty. The share of the no-voters was largest 
among the supporters of the anti-integration parties, the Socialist People’s Party and the 
Progress Party, but also more than 60% of the supporters of the Social Democrats voted 
against the Treaty (Siune 1993). Furthermore, in this referendum the gap between the 
parliamentary and the public opinion was wider than ever before, which may, again, be 
explained be the fact that integration has not become a salient issue in the elections 
because of the frequent referendums on the issue. There has not been an increase in the 
support to the anti-integration parties, which have tried to raise the integration issue on 
the political agenda. On the other hand, the under-representation of the anti-integration 
opinion in the Folketing has been, to certain extent, corrected by the referendums. (Borre 
1986.)
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After the referendum the anti-unionists demanded that the result of the referendum should 
be respected and that the government should inform the other member states of 
Denmark's inability to ratify the Treaty. The pro-unionists feared that this solution would 
imperil the integration process and lead Denmark's isolation. (Petersen 1995,209.) The 
Danish government faced a dilemma: how to find a solution which would keep Denmark 
in the EU, and which would please both the other EU governments and the Danish 
electorate. A period of reflections and negotiations followed. The solution was the 
'National Compromise', the programme called ‘Denmark in Europe’, which was agreed 
upon between seven parliamentary parties - only the Progress Party was not involved. The 
compromise was initiated by the Socialist People's Party, originally anti-integration in its 
outlook. The document 'Denmark in Europe' was formulated together with the other 
opposition parties, the Social Democrats and the Radical Liberals, and the government 
agreed with it.
The document included four exemptions from the full participation in the European 
Union: (1) Denmark does not participate in the common defence policy, in other words, 
it does not become a member of west European Union; (2) Denmark does not participate 
in the third stage of the European Monetary Union, the single currency and the economic 
policy obligations related to it; (3) Denmark is not committed to the creation of Union 
citizenship; (4) Denmark maintains its sovereignty in the areas of justice and police 
affairs. The document also included demands for more subsidiarity and openness in 
decision-making. (Svensson 1994, 71-72, Siune & al. 1994, 107-108, Petersen 1995, 
217.)
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This document was presented to other EU governments before the summit in Edinburgh 
in December 1992. After days of negotiations, the heads of the European governments 
approved most of the demands of the document'Denmark in Europe'; Denmark was given 
the right to abstain from the four areas of integration mentioned above. Also the other 
issues raised by the Danish government, subsidiarity, openness and the enlargement of 
the community, were covered in the conclusions. In the Danish media, the results of the 
Edinburgh summit were presented as a great victory for the Danes, although the 
concessions mainly concerned policies which were not implemented immediately 
anyway. Some international observers considered the Danish ‘victory’ in the negotiations 
as a ‘smart illusion' (Reuters, 20th December; quoted by Siune & al. 1994, 25). The 
outcome of the negotiations was, however, accepted by three opposition parties - the 
Social Democrats, the Radical Liberals and also the Socialist People's Party, which 
formerly was on the no-side. Now only the Progress Party remained in the opposition to 
the Treaty. As a reaction to the success in Edinburgh, also the public opinion turned out 
to be favourable to the 'new1 Maastricht Treaty. (Svensson 1994,72.)
A less than a year after the first referendum, in May 1993, Danes went to polls again on 
the Maastricht Treaty, now amended with the concessions made in Edinburgh. The 
referendum was held despite the fact that the Edinburgh Agreement was actually 
approved by the sufficient five-sixths majority in Folketing. It was, however, considered 
to be politically necessary to hold the referendum on the issue. A special law on an 
optional and binding referendum was now constructed by combining the constitutional
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Articles 19 and 42 (Svensson 1996, 39). The result of the 1993 referendum was that 
56.7% of the voters voted 'yes' against 43.2% who voted 'no'. The turnout was somewhat 
higher than in the 1992 referendum, 86.5%.
This result raises several questions of the reasons of the different outcomes in the two 
referendums: Is it possible to explain the change in the voting pattern by the larger 
turnout in the latter referendum? Did the Danes simply change more positive about the 
integration process between 1992 and 1993? Was the Edinburgh Agreement the reason 
for the more positive vote, and to what extent the Danish electorate interpreted the 
agreement as a substantial change in the nature of the issue? If the substantial content of 
the Edinburgh Agreement was not the reason for the shift in the opinions, were those 
Danish voters who changed their minds simply irrational or vulnerable to the political 
pressure and manipulation by, this time even more united, political elites? (See also 
Svensson 1994, 69.)2
The difference between the results of the two referendum cannot be explained just by the 
larger turnout. Siune & al. (1994) found out in their survey that approximately 10% of the 
voters who voted 'no' in the first referendum actually changed their minds and voted 'yes' 
in the second referendum, compared to 2% of yes-voters who turned to 'no' (n=948). The 
ecological analysis shows a few differences in the voting behaviour of the two 
referendums. First, women turned towards 'yes' more strongly than men, which 
diminished the differences between the genders - in the 1992 referendum 53% of men 
and 46% women voted 'yes' compared to 61% of men and 56% of women in the 1993
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referendum. Second, young voters were more stable in their voting behaviour than old 
voters. Third, and perhaps most interestingly, those who were the least interested in 
politics were the most prone to change their minds between the referendums.3 This may 
be explained by the fact that this group was probably the most receptive to the 
argumentation of the political elites of the hazardous consequences if the Danes voted 
'no' for a second time. (Siune & al. 1994,95, 110,124-125.)
Siune & al. (1994,113) argue that the difference in the voting behaviour between the two 
referendums was not due to the changes in the attitudes toward the European integration. 
Throughout the European integration process, the Danish electorate has been quite 
consistent in what it sees favourable and what unfavourable in it. In general, the economic 
integration, apart from the single European currency, has been popular among the Danes, 
whereas the idea of political union with common security policy and citizenship has been 
fairly unpopular. The difference between the 1992 campaign and the earlier campaigns 
in 1972 and in 1986 was that now the EU was not presented only as an economic 
community but also as a political union, and the Treaty was considered as a stage in the 
development towards federal Europe. In this situation, voters' perception was that they 
choose between economic benefits and the sovereignty of the state.
The substantial content of the Edinburgh Agreement does not seem to provide a fully 
satisfactory explanation for the change in the opinions either. Siune & al. (1994, 108) 
conclude that 33% of all voters found that the Edinburgh Agreement did not include 
anything new. Of those who voted 'no' in both referendums 51% thought that the
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Edinburgh Agreement did not make any difference in the policies, 24% of the yes-voters 
did so, and as many as 20% of those who changed their mind from 'no' to 'yes'. This 
means that at least 20% of those who changed their minds did so for other reasons than 
the substantial contents of the Edinburgh Agreement.4
Siune & al. (1994) argue that a crucial explanation for the change of opinion was how the 
issue was framed by the media and the political elites. Because of the complexity of the 
issue, the electors were quite receptive and more dependent on the interpretations and 
opinions given by the political elites (politicians, business and trade union leaders) and 
the media (journalists). One major difference between the campaigns of 1992 and 1993 
was, which dimensions of the integration issue were emphasized. Compared to the 
campaign of 1992, in the 1993 campaign the emphasis was in the issues to which the 
Danes had a more positive attitude. For example, the awareness of the social dimension 
was reinforced in the 1993 campaign compared to the 1992 campaign. Also, the issues 
of the Economic Monetary Union and the Single Currency were detached from the 
campaign agenda because of the Edinburgh Agreement.
The difference between the two referendum campaigns may also be characterized so that 
in the second one the most controversial dimensions of the Maastricht Treaty were not 
discussed, and the decision-making on them was postponed to the future. It was a matter 
of controversy what the real implications of the opt-outs achieved in Edinburgh are, 
because all these issues were not that much about immediate political reforms but about 
future developments which have not been fulfilled so far. Very much will depend on the
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other developments in European integration. Petersen (1994,219) argues: "Compared to 
the situation in late 1992, the implications of the Edinburgh Agreement certainly seem 
less serious in 1994."
Also, the option of deeper integration in these areas was not completely excluded, but the 
future cooperation was just defined as a matter of later referendums. Therefore, Denmark 
may always turn from its path of exemptions to the mainstream of European integration. 
The issues of the Edinburgh Agreement have not been abolished among the Danish 
integration options for good. This has proved to be the case especially in the issue 
concerning the monetary union, which has continuously remained on the political agenda. 
There was a certain difference between the choices in 1992 and in 1993: in 1992 the yes- 
option would framed as a more irreversible option, meaning a commitment to the 
deepening integration process, whereas no-option left these questions open. After the 
Edinburgh Agreement, the no-option seemed to be more irreversible, leaving Denmark 
outside the European mainstream, whereas the yes-alternative left the solutions for the 
most difficult issues open. In both ballots the choice was perceived as asymmetrical, but 
in the first vote the yes-alternative was considered to be irrevocable, whereas in the latter 
referendum the no-altemative was perceived to be so.
In the Chapter 4 it was assumed that the mandatory referendums would have an 
anticipatory effect on the governmental policies, and that the government/parliamentary 
majority would adjust its policies towards the median voter preferences in order to avoid 
the defeat in the referendum. The reason why the Danish government did not do this
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before the 1992 referendum on the Maastricht Treaty was, obviously, that the Treaty was 
a result of intergovernmental negotiations and therefore the hands of the Danish 
government were bound. In terms of Gerber’s model introduced in the Chapter 4, because 
of the external constraints, the Danish legislature could not react to the constraint of the 
mandatory referendum, and adjust its policies closer to the median voter preferences. That 
the external constraints were stronger than the one created by the referendum only shows 
how little scope for manoeuvring there is for a small country like Denmark within the 
European Union.
The first Danish no-vote had effect on the events elsewhere in Europe, which changed the 
nature of the vote in the second referendum - not only in terms of Edinburgh agreement 
but also in terms of the perceptions of the schedule of the integration process. In sum, the 
Danish referendums on the Maastricht Treaty had two, rather contradictory lessons: 1) 
The provision of the Danish Constitution for the referendum gave the electorate the 
opportunity to voice their opinions, and actually change the course of events; 2) Even the 
result of a binding referendum is not necessarily the final word in the issue in which the 
political and the economic stakes are very high.
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Notes
1 Also in France there was a referendum on the ratification of the Maastricht Treaty. President 
Mitterrand initiated the referendum under the Article 11 of the Constitution. The referendum took 
place after the Danish one, and the result was a very narrow victory for the supporters (51% ‘yes’, 
turnout 69.7%). In Ireland the referendum was held under the constitutional provision in June 1992, 
and the turnout was 57.3%, and 69.1% of the voters voted ‘yes’ and 30.9% voted ‘no’. (Bogdanor 
1994, 55-56, 84.)
2 An alternative explanation for the change of mind of the Danish electorate has been offered by 
Franklin & al. (1994) who argue that more important than the Danish attitudes to the European 
integration issue was the popularity of the Danish government promoting the treaties. They claim 
that: ‘Perhaps, after all, the Maastricht referendum in Denmark was really a referendum on the 
performance of the national government.’ Franklin & al. This claim is based on the assumption that 
the integration issue was a low-salience issue among the Danish electorate. This does not seem to be 
correct because there were deep divisions in the Danish society and within the parties.
3 Siune et al. (1994) put forward the following survey results:
Percentage of voting ’yes’
1992 1993 Difference
Very much interested
in politics
Somewhat interested in
53 61 +8
politics
Only a little interested
51 58 +7
in politics
Not at all interested in
49 58 +9
politics 24 63 +39
Source: Siune et al. (1994)
4 Furthermore, the interpretation of the constitutional and substantial importance of the Edinburgh 
clauses depended largely on the side of those who judged it This division of opinions was also 
reflected in the opinions of the constitutional lawyers who interpreted the agreement.
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7. Popular Initiative in Switzerland
7.1 Historical Background of Swiss Direct Democracy
Swiss direct-democratic institutions have been studied by several scholars, and there are 
quite recent studies which give a comprehensive account on the role of direct democracy 
in the Swiss political system (Kobach 1993, 1993b; Linder 1993; Mockli 1993).1 The 
historical background of modem Swiss institutions of direct democracy may be traced 
back to the assemblies of German tribes.2 The first form of Swiss direct democracy was 
Landsgemeinde, 'the annual sovereign assembly of male citizens possessing the requisite 
status to vote'. The first records on these assemblies are from the time when the Swiss 
confederation was formed: the first confirmed meeting took place in the canton Schywz 
in 1294.3 Landsgemeinde was a practise also in the other mountain cantons which later 
on became members of the confederation. (Kobach 1993,16-17.)
Peasants in the medieval Switzerland had probably more rights and freedoms than the 
most peasants in Europe in the feudal era, for example, they had the right to carry arms. 
In this respect, it is possible to argue that the Swiss cantons to be egalitarian and, 
therefore, possibly more democratic. Barber (1974,137), echoing Rousseau, emphasizes 
the moral content of freedom in the early mountain communities in his book on 
communitarian democracy in the canton of Graubtinden:
"The Raetian concept of freedom exhibited to a certain immaturity to be sure, but as a 
result, freedom never came to be thought of as a commodity that might only be enjoyed 
in the loneliness of the private arena, that condemned men to a solitary sanctuary where
230
only the alienated were considered free, where the most irrational behaviour, so long as 
it was impeded by physical coercion, had to be regarded as free, and where the most 
rational and moral behaviour, if it conformed to the dictates of law and the public will, 
had to be deemed bondage."
Some scholars, however, have a less romantic vision on the early forms of Swiss 
democracy emphasizing its illiberal character:
"Although modem popular mythology sometimes characterizes the early alliance as an 
idyllic mountain democracy, most historians paint a less utopian picture. Like much of 
Europe in the Middle Ages, the Swiss cantons were ruled by local oligarchies that used 
heavy-handed approach in dealing with the peasantry." (Kobach 1993,16)
However, in some cantons these practices have continued and adjusted to modem 
conditions, and they have also influenced the Swiss federal-level practices of direct 
democracy. Especially during the 19th century Swiss constitutional thought was a 
influenced by the ideas of the French Revolution, liberal constitutionalism and the 
natural right ideas. In fact, it is a matter of dispute as to what extent there is a direct 
continuity between the medieval local traditions and the modem Swiss Constitution, or 
whether the continuity is rather a myth promoted by the authors of the Constitution. 
However, the arguments of the movement promoting direct democracy in the 
constitutional debate in the mid-19th century were a blend of international influences and 
local traditions. (Linder 1994,88-92; Mockli 1993, 32-40). Therefore, the development 
of Swiss direct-democratic institutions may be characterized as more ‘organic’ than the 
development of direct democracy in the Western parts of the United States where the 
institutions were adopted because of the influence of radical democratic movements.
Direct-democratic traditions and practices of the Swiss communes and cantons are 
probably the most interesting and distinctively 'Swiss' forms of democracy. I will,
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however, concentrate on nation-level referendums, and for this reason I will focus on the 
Swiss federal referendums, which are 19th and 20th century inventions.4 In the 1848 
Constitution, the forms of political life of the modem, federal Switzerland were first 
defined. The Constitution was influenced American federalism and the ideas of the 
French Revolution, and it was an important factor in unifying the linguistically and 
religiously diverse small societies into a federal state, at the same time securing the 
identity of the minorities in relation to the German-speaking and protestant majorities. 
The Constitution included two different provisions for federal referendums, the 
mandatory constitutional referendum and the initiative for the total revision of the 
Constitution. As a result of the democratic movement in the 1860s, most cantons adopted 
the legislative referendum and initiative and popular election of the government and the 
council of estates (Standerat). The following landmarks characterize the later 
developments of the federal-level direct democracy: the optional (law-controlling) 
legislative referendum initiated by citizens or cantons was adopted in 1874, the 
constitutional initiative in 1891, and the referendum on international treaties in 1921 
(M6ckli 1994, 60-64).5
7.2 Current Direct-Democratic Institutions
Both the initiative and the referendum are used at the federal, cantonal and communal 
levels (Bund, Kantone, Gemeinden). The direct-democratic institutions have many 
consequences to the political life and the organizational structure of the Swiss society. 
After the World War II, roughly two-thirds of all referendums in democratic countries
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at the nation-state level have been held in Switzerland. In this chapter, I mainly focus on 
citizens1 role in initiating referendums, and therefore I concentrate on the constitutional 
initiatives and abrogative and suspensive referendums. I will discuss the citizens’ 
participation and the deliberation related to these institutions, and their impact on the 
organisation of the interest groups. I will also consider the representatives’ reactions to 
initiatives and petitions, and the implications of the popular initiatives and referendums 
on the Swiss political system more generally.
It may be rather difficult to make generalizations from the Swiss experience on how 
direct democracy works in the modem state, because the Swiss political system is, in 
many respects, exceptional. Swiss political system is often considered to be an example 
of a consociational democracy. In consociational democracies, political conflicts are 
resolved by top-level negotiations between different groups. Consociationalism, or 
'politics of accommodation' is defined by Lipjhart (1969) as follows: "Consociational 
democracy means government by elite cartel designed to turn a democracy with 
fragmented political culture into a stable democracy." According to Barry (1989), 
Lipjhart set the following requirements for consociational democracy: the Elites of rival 
subcultures' are willing and able to accommodate the divergent interests and demands 
because they are committed to the maintenance of the system and they see the 
accommodation as a means to reduce the destabilizing effects of the internal conflicts. 
In consociational society, interests are represented by different power blocs which do not 
have consensus between them, and the leaders of which are responsible for negotiating 
settlements. Switzerland, The Netherlands, Belgium and Austria are the typical examples
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of consociational democracies. Linder (1993) characterizes the Swiss political system so 
that is based on power-sharing rather than power-competition as a strategy to resolve 
conflicts between the culturally different groups.
Switzerland has a federal structure with 26 cantons and a bicameral legislature, Federal 
Assembly (Bundesversammlung), which consists of States Council and National Council. 
In 1959 the executive government, the Federal Council (Bundesrat), was made fully 
proportional. Since then, the composition of it has followed 'the magic formula', which 
means that the seven members of the Federal Council represent all major political parties 
(two Social Democrats, two Christian Democrats, two Radical Democrats and one from 
the Swiss People's Party). The government is also consensual in the sense that the 
members of the Federal Council (informally) represent the linguistic cleavages of the 
society: there are four German-speaking members, two French-speakers and one Italian- 
speaker.
This arrangement gives a distinctive character to Swiss democracy because since the 
proportionalisation of the government the elections have not brought about any real 
political changes. Until recently the electoral support for the major parties has declined, 
which, consequently, has undermined the legitimacy of the consensual form of 
government. The 1995 elections, however, showed an opposite trend: the four parties in 
the government increased their share of support by 4.2 percentage units compared to the 
1991 elections, and thus gained 73.9% of the total vote. It may be argued that this feature 
of Swiss politics, the absence of effective electoral competition and lack of strong
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opposition parties, is an important factor in understanding the role that the popular 
initiative and the rejective referendums have in channelling the opposition and anti­
establishment opinions. (Kobach 1993,36; Caramani 1995.)
The federal referendums are always decisive, and therefore an integrated part of the 
legislative process. They may either be mandatory, ie. constitutionally required, or non- 
mandatory, ie. initiated by some political actors such as a certain number of citizens or 
cantons. A referendum may be initiated by the parliamentary majority only in the case 
of parliamentary counterproposals on constitutional initiatives. According to some 
sources, Switzerland has 11 different types of federal referendums. (Trechsel & Kriesi 
1996, 187). Kobach (1993, 42) summarizes them in four main categories, which are 
followed here:
1. Mandatory constitutional referendum: All changes to the federal Constitution, total 
revisions and amendments, must be submitted to a referendum. The Federal Assembly 
may initiate the total revision of the Constitution. If the two chambers, however, disagree 
on the principle on the issue of revising the Constitution, the issue may be submitted to 
a preliminary referendum. If the majority of the voters support the revision of the 
Constitution, the parliament is dissolved and new elections are held. The new parliament 
is expected to draft the new Constitution, which must be submitted to another 
referendum. In the second referendum, a double majority is needed. This means that the 
proposal for the new Constitution needs to be supported by the majority of the votes in 
the country as a whole and also a majority of votes in more than half of the cantons (the
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Federal Constitution, Articles 120, 123). The partial revisions of the Constitution are 
initiated like normal laws but they also need to be supported by a double majority (the 
Federal Constitution, Article 121, 1). Furthermore, since 1977, the mandatory 
referendum has been required on all issues concerning membership in collective security 
organizations and in supranational communities. A double majority is required for the 
approval of the membership. It must be pointed out that the referendum is not mandatory 
in questions like for example joining an international organization or subscribing to a 
multinational treaty standardizing law. (Kobach 1993; Mockli 1993,95-96; Trechsel & 
Kriesi 1996,188-189.)
2. Referendum on international agreements (Article 89 of the Federal Constitution): 
According to the constitutional amendment made in 1921, a referendum will be held on 
international treaties if 50.000 voters or eight cantons so demand. The support of the 
majority of voters (not a double majority) is required to pass the treaty. In the 
amendment made in 1977, the possibility of a rejective referendum was extended to 
'treaties that cannot be denounced, proposals to join international organisations and acts 
that imply multilateral standardization of law\ (Aubert 1978,40-42; Kobach 1993,44- 
45; Mockli 1993,97-8.)
3. Rejective (facultative) referendums on legislation (Article 89): The rejective 
referendum was first adopted as a part of the completely revised Constitution of 1874. 
All laws and decrees (with limited duration) are liable to a referendum if, within ninety 
days of its publication during which the bill is suspended, 50.000 (until 1977, 30.000)
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citizens eligible to vote sign a petition demanding it, or if eight cantons demand it6. To 
become effective, the law or decree needs to be supported by the majority of voters in 
a referendum (a double majority is not required).
The suspensive referendum may not be possible, if the decree includes an urgency clause 
which is accepted by the majority of each chamber. Urgent clauses may be in force only 
for one year or less. Until 1949, the Federal Assembly was able to prevent most rejective 
referendums by declaring the law in question as urgent. In 1949 this right was limited by 
the following regulations for abrogative referendums on urgent clauses: a) Urgent clauses 
that are according to the Constitution are liable for an abrogative referendum after they 
have come into force. If the referendum takes place and the clause is rejected, the clause 
will be renounced after a year of its approval and cannot be renewed, b) Urgent clauses 
which are unconstitutional are submitted to a mandatory referendum within a year of the 
approval of the clause by the Federal Council. If no referendum is held, the law will be 
renounced a year after its approval and cannot be renewed. (Mockli 1994,98.)7
4. Popular initiatives on constitutional changes: Any seven Swiss citizens who are 
eligible to vote may begin the initiative process by submitting a request for an initiative 
and a description of the desired change of the constitutional law. After submitting the 
request they have 18 months to collect 100.000 signatures to support the petition (50.000 
signatures before December 1977 when also the 18-month deadline was imposed)8.
There are two types of constitutional revisions that may be pursued through the initiative,
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total and partial. The initiative for the total revision of the Constitution was introduced 
in the Swiss Constitution already in 1848. According to the Constitution (Article 120, 
paragraph, 1), the total revisions of the Constitution are sent directly to the people after 
the signatures are deposited. If the majority of the electorate votes in favour of the 
revision, the parliament is dissolved and an election is held to elect a constitutional 
assembly to undertake the revision. After this, the new Constitution is taken to the 
people, and the double majority is required. There have been only two initiatives for the 
total revision of the Constitution (in 1880 and 1935) and both of them have been rejected 
in the referendum. (Kobach 1993, 16.)
The initiative for partial revisions of the Constitution was first introduced in the 
Constitution in 1891 (Article 121, paragraph 2). There are two different types of 
initiatives for partial revisions of the Constitution: either they may suggest the general 
terms of the change (generally-worded), or they can present the precise text of the 
proposed amendment (specifically-worded). In the generally-worded case, if the Federal 
Assembly agrees with the proposal, it draws up an amendment following the proposal 
and submits it to the people. It takes effect if the double majority is achieved in a 
referendum. However, if the Federal Assembly disagrees with the proposal, which is 
more likely, the proposal must pass a preliminary referendum in which just the majority 
of the votes is required. If the proposal is approved by the majority in the referendum, 
the Federal Assembly must draft an appropriate text and send it to the people again. At 
the second round, the double majority is required. A specifically-worded initiative needs 
to be submitted to the people only once, when the double majority is required. A great
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majority of the initiatives have been specifically-worded. Before the proposal is put to 
the ballot, the government can either endorse it, recommend its rejection and/or submit 
a counterproposal of its own. Typically, counterproposals accept some of the petitioners1 
demands while omitting others.
The double majority requirement on constitutional amendments and on international 
issues was adopted in order to prevent the tyranny of the majority and to protect the self- 
determination of the cantons. This was considered to be important during the formation 
of the Federal State in which the cantons gave up their sovereignty. More recently, the 
double majority requirement has been criticised on the grounds that it gives the 
opportunity for small minorities to block the decision-making, and gives a 
disproportionate advantage to status quo, especially given the increasing asymmetry of 
the population sizes of the cantons. The population of the smallest canton is just 2% 
(Appenzell-Innerrhoden) of the largest one (Zurich) (Trechsel & Kriesi 1996,188).9
7.3 The Role of the Direct-Democratic Institutions in Swiss Politics
The table 7.1 displays the number of the Swiss federal referendums per decade and the 
average turnout in them during the last hundred years. The Swiss referendums held since 
1945 are listed in the Appendix III
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Table 7.1 Number of Referendums 1881-96
Decade no ref:s issues issues/yr issues/ref. average
turnout’*
1881-90 8 12 1.2 1.5 59.5
1891-00 18 24 2.4 1.3 57.4
1901-10 9 12 1.2 1.3 54.5
1911-20 12 15 1.5 1.3 55.0
1921-30 17 28 2.8 1.5 60.9
1931-40 17 23 2.3 1.4 62.0
1941-50 18 21 2.1 1.2 58.3
1951-60 30 42 4.2 1.4 50.2
1961-70 23 29 2.9 1.3 45.4
1971-80 30 87 8.7 2.9 39.6
1981-90 27 66 6.6 2.4 39.9
1991-96 18 65 10.5 3.5 422)
Total 227 424 3.6
') I have counted the turnout in every single issue separately. This is the reason why my results differ from 
Kobach's (1993b, 348) who counted ballots with multiple questions as one ballot.
2)The turnout data from 1993 onwards is only at the accuracy of whole percentages.
The table shows an increasing trend in the number of referendums, issues and also 
omnibus referendums, in which more than one issue is voted upon. This may be 
explained by the increase in the amount of legislation to be passed, which is due to the 
expanding scope of the state activity. Figure 7.1. illustrates the average number o f issues 
voted yearly:
Figure 7.1 Number of Referendums 1881-1996
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Between 1881 and the end of 1996, there have been 184 mandatory referendums, 120 
rejective referendums, and 120 referendums on popular initiatives. The relative 
frequencies of mandatory referendums, rejective referendums as well as popular 
initiatives have remained relatively stable during this period of time.10 Of the mandatory 
referendums, 136 (73.9%) have been accepted by the majority, whereas only 57 (47.5%) 
of the rejective referendums have received the support of the majority. This may be 
explained by the fact that only laws which create active opposition will be submitted to 
rejective referendums. Only 12 (10%) of those constitutional initiatives which have been 
submitted to a referendum have been accepted. This will be discussed later on in this 
chapter. (Trechsel and Kriesi 1996, see Appendix III).
There are a few significant differences between the Californian and the Swiss practices 
of popular initiatives and referendums. First, the number of decisions made by the 
citizens is much bigger in California than in Switzerland. According to Mockli (1994, 
145-146), in California there have been in average 9.5 decisions made in referendums 
yearly between 1884 when the institution was adopted and 1990, whereas in Switzerland 
there have been only 2.5 direct decisions yearly between the adoption of the institution 
in 1848 and 1990, although the number is constantly increasing. Second, in Californian 
referendums there are typically several issues to be voted upon. Between 1970 and 1990 
there have been 326 decisions made in referendums and people went to polls 24 times 
in California, whereas in Switzerland during the same period of time there had been 158 
decisions made in 63 different referendums. In other words, omnibus referendums are
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more typical in California than in Switzerland, although they have become more 
common also in Switzerland.
A specific problem of Swiss direct democracy is that the turnouts in most referendums 
have been very low. The average turnout also shows a declining trend during the past 
hundred years. The following figure how shows the electoral turnouts and the turnouts 
of referendums in electoral years have declined in 1919-1991.
Figure 7.2 Turnout in Elections and Referendums in Electoral Years
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There have, however, been a few distinctive occasions of higher turnouts: for example 
in December 1992, 78.3% of the electorate cast their votes on the issue of the 
membership in the European Economic Area (EEA). This is an example how 
controversial and salient issues elicit high turnouts. In average, omnibus referendums 
have had lower turnouts than single-issue ones and the participation tends to be lower in
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ballots on technically complex issues. The explanation for this may be that the voters 
have more difficulties in taking stands on technically complex issues and on variety of 
issues in omnibus referendums.11 The decline of the turnouts in the elections and 
referendums since 1971 has been explained by the fact that since then the women have 
been allowed to vote, but there are also some other explanations for this development.12
According to Kobach, (1993,85) the problem of Swiss direct democracy is much more 
the apathy and the low participation rates than the irresponsibility or unpredictability of 
the electorate, which is often seen as a threat by those who oppose the extensive use of 
direct democracy. There are several possible explanations for the low turnouts in Swiss 
politics. One can see this as a sign of the increasing political apathy which is common 
for most Western democracies. Low turnouts have also been explained by ‘the saturation 
theory’: the Swiss electorate is simply tired of frequent referendums. The saturation 
theory can be supported by the data which shows that the increase in the number of 
referendums seems to correlate with the low turnout, although the participation numbers 
in 1970s and 1980s are not significantly lower than, for example, in the 1960s. This fact 
would support the third possible explanation, suggested for example by Kobach (1993b), 
according to which the consociational character of Swiss political system seems to make 
participation insignificant. The decreasing turnout has been the trend also in the National 
Council elections, especially after the year 1959 when the executive government was 
completely proportionalized and the 'magic formula' was introduced. It is easy to see why 
this has affected the electoral turnout: since then the composition of the government has 
not been dependent on the electoral outcomes, it does not seem to be important to
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participate in the elections at all. Kobach offers the consensual character of Swiss 
government as an explanation also for the decreasing referendum turnout since the 
1960s, although the link between these two is not so self-evident. In fact, it could be 
expected that referendums would have become even more important channels for 
expressing political protest in the absence of inter-party competition for the 
governmental office.
The low participation numbers in the referendums raise the question: is it possible for 
interest groups to achieve their political goals by exploiting the fact that the majority of 
voters do not participate? Is the referendum, instead of being the measure of defining ‘the 
will of majority’, rather, an instrument in service of intensive minorities? Kobach 
discusses the problem o f‘false majorities’ by analysing some referendums in which the 
turnout has been low, and compares the results of these with the results of opinion polls 
(with samples which are representative with respect to the whole population) on the same 
issues. He comes to the conclusion that the results of referendums may be biassed in 
favour of some well-organized groups, but the cases of false majorities are quite few. He 
comes up with only one example, concerning the referendum in February 1983 on energy 
policy.13
An ‘individualist’ democratic theorist could argue that the low turnout and the false 
majorities are not real problems, because those who do not vote most probably do not 
have interests in the issue in question, and those whose interests are involved will vote. 
In fact, the abstention of the disinterested from the referendums maybe seen as a cure to
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the deficit of the majoritarian voting that it does not take into account the asymmetries 
in the intensities of the preferences. Likewise, the supporters of the epistemic or 
republican conceptions of democracy would probably not be so concerned about the low 
turnouts either, because the outcomes may be better if only well-reflected and deliberated 
opinions are counted.
7.4. Law-Controlling Referendums
It may be argued that the rejective (facultative) referendums make the parliamentary 
majority accountable to the public on issue-by-issue -basis in the system in which the 
parties do not have that much of electoral accountability. The possibility of a bill being 
submitted to a rejective referendum strongly affects the operation of the Federal 
Assembly. Kobach (1993b, 360) refers to a survey in which the members of the 
parliament were asked whether they would threaten with a rejective referendum if a law 
which they oppose would be likely to be passed. 63% of the respondents said they would 
do so, 40% had actually done so, and 77% of these felt that they had been successful in 
their threat. The members of Federal Assembly did not usually refer to the party as the 
organization launching the referendum campaign, but rather some interest group, because 
their financial strength makes the threat more credible.
Rejective referendums decrease the internal cohesion of the parties of the Federal 
Assembly. They make the parliamentary coalitions rather loose and not long-lasting, 
because the possibility of the referendums increases the room for strategic manoeuvring
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by the members of the parliament and the minorities across the parliamentary parties. 
This decreases the internal cohesion of the parties. Furthermore, the threat of the 
referendum makes it more difficult for the parties to formulate consistent, multi-issue 
policy programmes, because parts of them may be watered down in rejective 
referendums. The majority alliances change from issue to issue, which, in more negative 
terms, can be characterized as a lack of consistent policy programmes. Kobach (1993b, 
361) describes this: "Consequently, alliance partners cannot be assured that agreements 
made by parliamentary parties will survive future referendal challenges. It is difficult to 
build a lasting coalition on shifting sands." Also logrolling between parliamentary parties 
is more difficult, because, instead of compromise with the majority, the minority groups 
may get their way or at least delay the implementation of parliamentary decisions by 
referendums.
Trechsel and Sciarini (1996) have empirically studied the relationship between the 
probability of a rejective referendum to be launched with the majority of a law gets in the 
lower house of the Federal Assembly, National Council, and found a strong negative 
correlation. Elite consensus, therefore, seems to prevent rejective referendums. This 
argument may also be supported by such findings that the proportion of the laws 
challenged and the rejection rates have fallen since 1959 when ‘the magic formula’ was 
introduced. (See Kobach 1993b, 343-344.)
The possibility of rejective referendums increases the importance of pre-parliamentary 
stages of the preparation of laws, during which the government consults the opinions of
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parliamentary opposition and interest groups. (See Trechsel and Kriesi 1996.) Neidhart 
(1970) first put forward a hypothesis that a consequence of referendums is that the 
political elites seek to integrate all the important actors (potential proposers of initiatives) 
to the political process in order to avoid a referendum. Furthermore, the possibility of all 
law-controlling referendums, both rejective and mandatory ones, forces the government 
to find solutions which are acceptable by the popular majorities, especially because the 
Swiss voter tends to behave as "Neinsager", and reject all arguable proposals.
Although the rejective referendums are often initiated by political insiders, they give 
opportunities for the electorate to reject the policies of the ruling coalition. In Smith’s 
(1976) terms, they may be anti-hegemonic in character (see Section 4.3.1). The Swiss 
electorate has also for several times showed resentment for bureaucracy and 
governmental intervention in the referendums. For example in September 1992, two law 
proposals were brought down in a rejective referendum: the proposal for increasing the 
salaries of MPs and funding for political parties (27.6% for, turnout 45.6%), and the 
proposal for improvement of facilities and administrative services for MPs (30.6% for, 
turnout 45.5%). (Kobach 1993,258-259.)
The law-controlling referendums may be corrective with respect to the failures of the 
parties and other representative institutions to reflect the public opinion, like it was 
argued in the Danish case in the Chapter 6. As an example Kobach (1993, 1995) 
mentions the rejection of the UN membership in a mandatory referendum in 1986 and 
the rejection of the European Economic Area (EEA) agreement in a mandatory
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referendum in 1992. The membership in the UN was accepted by approximately 3/5 
majority both in the National Council (112 for and 78 against) and in the Council o f States 
(24 for and 16 against). Of the main parties represented in the Federal Council only the 
Swiss People’s Party took a stand against the membership. Yet, in the referendum in 1986, 
only 24.3% of the voters supported the membership. The turnout was relatively high, 
50.7%. This result reveals a clear division between the opinions of the representatives and 
the people. Furthermore, the opinions on the membership issue were also divided between 
the rank-and-file and the leadership of the political parties and other organisations. The 
situation was similar in the mandatory referendum in May 1992, in which the EEA treaty 
was narrowly defeated by the majority of 50.3% of voters. As mentioned earlier, the turnout 
was as high as 78.7%. Again, the MPs in the Federal Assembly voted overwhelmingly for 
the treaty, nearly 2/3 o f the members o f the National Council and more than 4/5 o f the 
members o f the States Council, which shows the division o f the opinions o f the elites and 
the citizens. Frey and Bohnet (1993, 72-73), using public choice terminology, argue that 
popular initiative and the law-controlling referendums work against the cartelizing and rent- 
seeking tendencies o f the political representatives. The law-controlling referendums allow 
the citizens to veto proposals in which the Federal Assembly does not represent the public 
opinion. The popular initiatives remove the agenda-setting monopoly from the politicians 
and enable citizens to propose issues, including those which the representatives would 
rather like to exclude from the agenda. Therefore, it may be argued in Gerber’s (1996; see 
Chapter 4) terms that initiatives and referendums function as non-electoral constraints on 
the legislature.
Furthermore, it seems that there is a considerable discrepancy between the Swiss institutions 
of direct democracy and their Californian counterparts, because it seems that in Switzerland 
initiatives are used by the Californian institutions are more prone to be exploited by rent-
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seekers. This may be explained by differences in the regulation o f  the institutions. The 
Californian institutions o f popular initiative were dealt with in the Chapter 4, and it was 
argued that the Courts’ interpretations of The First Amendment to outlaw campaign 
spending restrictions have contributed to the development o f a professional ‘initiative 
industry’. In the following section the Swiss institutions o f popular initiative will be 
discussed with some further references to California.
7.5. Constitutional Initiative
7.5.1 Institutional Development
The procedures for making a popular initiative have got sophisticated forms during its 
existence. Nowadays complicated bargaining procedures are related to popular initiatives. 
The bargaining related to the Swiss popular initiatives has become so important that the 
Swiss initiatives may hardly be regarded as ‘direct legislation’. But, despite this it may be 
argued that the popular initiative makes the political agenda more reflective to the opinions 
and concerns o f the public.
Between 1891 and 1996, there have been 262 initiatives, 120 o f which had been voted in a 
referendum. Only 12 of them have been successful at the poll. Of the 142 initiatives not 
voted in a referendum, 4 have been declared invalid by the parliament, 50 have been 
withdrawn (indirect counterproposal), 15 have been withdrawn and the counterproposal 
submitted to a referendum, 3 have been written off, 41 have failed to reach the signature 
limit in time, 23 were at the parliamentary stage, and 6 were pending (See also Mockli 
1994, 149) The current procedures for making a popular initiative are as follows (Mockli 
1994, 105):
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After the initiative committee between at least seven members has been founded, the 
textual content of the proposed law is formulated. The Federal Office inspects the foimat, 
title and the withdrawal clause of the initiative {RuckzugklauseT). If the Federal Office 
rejects the proposal, either it may be reformulated or the initiative committee may appeal 
to the Federal Court, which either rejects it or accepts it. If the proposal is accepted, the 
collection of the signatures may start: 100.000 signatures are required within 18 months. 
If the collection of the signatures is successful, the initiative is submitted. The 
submission of the initiative is followed by the parliamentary stage which may take up 
to 4-5 years. The parliamentary stage may be characterized as bargaining between the 
initiative committee and the Federal Council. First the Federal Council reformulates the 
proposal within 24 to 30 months, and after this the Federal Assembly suggests either the 
dismissal or the approval of the proposal. If the proposal is approved, the referendum 
takes place. The request for the dismissal of the initiative may be followed by a 
counterproposal formulated by the Federal Council, and the initiative committee may or 
may not withdraw the initiative.
The parliamentary counterproposals have an important role in the negotiations on the 
withdrawal of the initiative. There are two possible ways in which the initiators can 
politically have their way through governmental counterproposals. First, there may be 
a direct counterproposal to amend the Constitution made by the Federal Assembly and 
be submitted to the referendum. The referendum may be conducted either on both the 
proposal and the counterproposal, or only on the counterproposal if the initiative 
committee is satisfied with the concessions made by the Federal Council and decides to
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withdraw their proposal. Direct counterproposals contain some of the demands of the 
initiators, and, because of the parliamentary support, they are often found more 
acceptable by the electorate than the initiative. More often, however, the government 
makes an indirect counterproposal which means that the government makes a law 
proposal which is expected to be passed in a normal parliamentary way. An indirect 
counterproposal satisfies some of the initiators' demands. Indirect counterproposals also 
quite often lead to the withdrawal of the initiative. This is in accordance with Gerber’s 
(1996) model put forward in Chapter 4, according to which the representatives try to 
avoid initiatives, or in this case initiative-based referendums, by putting making laws 
which are closer to their own and the median voter preferences than the proposals put 
forward by the promoters of the initiatives.
As mentioned before, of all initiatives submitted to a referendum in Switzerland only 
1/10 has been accepted in referendums between the years 1881 and 1996. This is 
relatively low compared to the average of more than 1/3 of all American states. There has 
been a 33-year period (1949-82) during which none of the initiatives voted upon won a 
popular majority. There have been, however, five initiatives which have won the 
majority in referendums since then.14 However, the impact of popular initiatives, as well 
as abrogative and suspensive referendums, is much larger than the small numbers of 
successful initiatives would suggest. As Bogdanor (1994,65) has argued, in Switzerland 
as well as in Italy, “the most important referenda...have been those that have not been 
held." This means that the existence of direct-democratic institutions change the nature 
of interaction and power relationship between political actors even in cases when it is not 
actively used. On the other hand, it could be argued that this is true with respect to other
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countries and other types of referendums as well: the cases for raising the referendum 
option on the political agenda may be more important than actual referendums.
In the case of popular initiative this is especially due to the recent development of the 
bargaining procedures between the initiative sponsors and the government. The 
procedures for governmental counterproposals and withdrawals were legally provided 
in 1952. Since then, there have been three revisions of these laws which all had made it 
easier to withdraw the initiatives. For example in the latest revision in 1978 made the 
majority of the initiative committee sufficient for the withdrawal (it also made it 
necessary that there were at least seven members of the committee). Before this a 2/3 
majority was required. However, the proportion of withdrawn initiatives was at highest, 
50%, in 1950-1960, and it has decreased considerably since then. Kobach (1993b) argues 
that the explanation for this is that the Swiss political system is now less consociational 
and more confrontational than during the 1950s and 1960s, and thus it has become more 
difficult to gain sufficient concessions at the parliamentary stage.
Bruno Hofer (1987) makes the distinction between earlier, 'original concept' initiatives 
and modem initiatives. Earlier initiatives were made with the intention of triggering the 
referendum and winning the support of the majority of the voters, whereas modem 
initiatives aim at winning in the bargaining and the success at polls is not necessarily 
even the objective of the sponsors of the modem initiatives. Especially a large proportion 
of the post-war initiatives have been made in order to achieve some concessions from the 
coalition government during the bargaining of its withdrawal. Therefore, Neidhart’s
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argument that these pre-parliamentary bargaining procedures have transformed Swiss 
democracy from 'plebiscitariari to 'bargaining' democracy applies also to popular 
initiatives. Kobach, on the other hand, stresses the importance that the initiative 
committee has some members who are active in politics and thus able to negotiate with 
the government. (Kobach 1993b, 358 Kobach 1993,104,115-116.)
Before 1987 it was not possible to have a ‘double yes' in the referendums on popular 
initiatives, in other words, to vote ‘yes’ to both to initiative and counterproposal. Before 
the ‘double yes’ -option, the governmental counterproposal was a much more efficient 
threat, which also diminished the utility of taking the initiative to the polls without a deal 
with the government. Moreover, there have been relatively more successful initiatives 
since the introduction of the ‘double yes’ option (4 in 10 years). As Kobach describes the 
effect of counterproposals before 1987:
"Indeed, before the allowing of the double-yes option in 1987, the constitutional 
counterproposal was a particularly effective weapon for killing initiatives at the polls. 
The government could sabotage an initiative by splitting its support. In such cases, the 
government did not care if its own counterproposal failed to win a popular majority. In 
fact, failure was sometimes a preferable outcome, as long as the original initiative was 
dragged down as well.”
Also the indirect counterproposals are used by the government to undermine the success 
of the initiative at polls, and, therefore, they are bargaining weapons between the 
government and initiative committees. The government may carry out the reforms 
suggested in the counterproposal despite the fact that the initiative committee has 
rejected them and takes the issue to a referendum. In this situation, the function of the 
indirect counterproposal is to persuade the voters to believe that the reforms put forward
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in the initiative are no longer necessary. (Kobach 1993,109,198.)
The government has also some other ways of watering down inconvenient initiatives. 
Mockli (1993,261) mentions some mechanisms by which the parliament can make the 
initiative harmless: delays, dissociation of the initiative-makers, tactical choice of the 
referendum day and voting recommendation. Nowadays the initiative process may take 
up to seven years or more because the Federal Assembly remains free to spend years for 
the consideration of the proposals. Delay is, in fact, sometimes used as an intentional 
tactic designed to break an initiative's momentum. Kobach (1993,106-107) mentions as 
an example of this the initiative submitted in 1977 to relax Switzerland's banking secrecy 
regulations. The referendum took place seven years later in 1984 when it had already 
been lost its momentum, and the proposal got only the support of 27% of the voters.
In this respect, the Swiss system of popular initiatives allows much more manoeuvring 
by the political elite than its Californian counterpart. In California a referendum on a 
constitutional amendment may be initiated by collecting the signatures of 8% of the 
electorate. Referendums on normal statutes can be initiated by 5% of the electorate (Lee 
1978, 91-93). The most significant difference between the Californian and the Swiss 
practices are that in California the vote must take place within 18 months after the 
submission of the initiative without bargaining between the initiative committee and the 
parliament. In other words, in California the relationship between the initiative and the 
referendum is much more straightforward than in Switzerland. Therefore, although all 
Swiss referendums, especially popular initiative-based ones, are in Smith’s (1976) terms
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rather uncontrolled because the government cannot initiate them, there is room for elite 
control even within this institutional framework. Furthermore, Budge's (1993) fear of the 
dysfunctions of what he calls the unmediated popular vote do no materialize in the case 
of Swiss popular initiatives, because due to all mediating stages they can hardly be called 
as 'unmediated popular vote' and the extreme proposals will obviously have difficulties 
at the parliamentary stage.
Not even the implementation of the successful initiatives is as straightforward in 
Switzerland as in California. In California the legislative proposal is very carefully 
formulated already in the referendum, and a successful proposal is enacted a day after the 
referendum. In Switzerland, on the other hand, there is often room for different 
interpretations on the legislative consequences of a successful initiative, and the initiative 
committee needs to be active in controlling that the result of the referendum will be 
carried out by the government. Mockli recommends that there should be some 
constitutional mechanisms to control the implementation of the referendum outcome also 
in Switzerland. He also calls for the media control in order to guarantee the correct 
implementation of the 'popular will' because of the insufficient constitutional controls. 
(Mockli 1993,267-268)
7.5.2 Issues and Impact on Political Organization
The number of initiatives made yearly has constantly increased during the more than a 
century it has been in use. The increase has been especially significant during the last
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three of decades. The number of initiatives submitted was in average 1.3 yearly during 
the years 1960-69, 3.9 in 1970-9, 4.7 in 1980-1989, and 5.0 in 1990-1996. The 
significant increase in the numbers of initiatives has been explained by different factors, 
one of which is the rise of post-materialism as a new political dimension and the new 
political activism related to this. This also explains the recent increase in the number of 
initiatives concerning environmental issues. Furthermore, after the 1974 economic crisis, 
there have been numerous initiatives on the health of the economy, promoted by the 
parties on the left and the trade unions. (Kobach 1993b, see also Mockli 1993,150).15
The issues of all initiatives made between 1891, when the provision for initiatives for 
partial revisions of the Constitution was adopted, and the end of 1996 may be classified 
as follows:
Table 7.2 Initiatives by Issue Type
Number Percentage
democratisation and political order 28 10.7%
energy/traffic/environment 58 22.1%
consumers/prices/tenants 17 6.5%
defence/military/peace 22 8.4%
foreigners 16 6.1%
workplace and employment 12 4.6%
taxes and economic policy 27 10.3%
social insurance 27 10.3%
women's issues, abortion 9 3.4%
agriculture 8 3.1%
education and culture 9 3.4%
alcohol, tobacco, drugs 12 4.6%
others 17 6.5%
262 100.0%
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Epple-Gass (1992) distinguishes between the 'old' and 'new1 issues of initiatives. The 
watershed in his study is the year 1969. The initiatives between 1891 and 1969 dealt with 
such issue areas as social policy, democratization and social order, economic policy, 
peace and military politics. The new themes which have come up after 1969 were 
environmental protection and women's issues. Social policy issues remained the most 
typical issues to be raised in initiatives, whereas the issues related to democratisation 
were less frequently raised. Also the policy on foreigners, especially limitation of their 
number, has been a common issue for both old and more recent initiatives. Furthermore, 
the types of issues have changed within each category: earlier in this century alcohol 
prohibition was an issue, whereas more recently there have been more initiatives on 
drugs. The category ‘other issues’ includes such initiatives as the ban on casinos and the 
successful one on the 1st of August as the Swiss National day. During the 1990s there 
have also been some initiatives on the Swiss relationship with the European Union.
The initiative gives an opportunity to raise issues for those political movements which 
are not represented in the consociational decision-making processes. It is, however, a 
question of debate whether the institution of popular initiative enhances the activity of 
grassroots movements or whether it is more an instrument of already well-organised 
interest groups. Kobach (1993b, 355-6) has examined the percentage of the initiatives 
submitted by the 'political outsiders' between 1974 and 1992, and gained the result that 
2/5 of them have been submitted by groups which can be considered to be outsiders, 
meaning those parties which are not represented in the Federal Council and voluntary 
organisations. The only political insiders which have extensively used initiatives are the
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Social Democratic Party and the Swiss Federation of Trade Unions.
Epple-Gass (1993) points out that more then 1/3 of the initiatives handed in after 1969 
have been on issues typical for the new social movements, such as peace movement, 
environmental and anti-nuclear power movements, women's movement and third world 
groups. Epple-Gass also argues that the direct-democratic institutions have certain 
implications to the organization of the civil society in Switzerland because they enhance 
the activity of issue-oriented citizens' movements. The new social movements have also 
a special character in Switzerland because they very often start as initiative movements.
Linder (1993, 104-105) distinguishes between 'realist* and 'radical' groups behind the 
referendums. The realist groups seek for legislative change either at the polls or in the 
negotiating with the government. This is the way how the Social Democrats and the trade 
unions try to establish support for their policies in the absence of parliamentary support. 
The radical groups, on the other hand, aim at political agenda-setting and influencing the 
public opinion more generally, by raising political taboos and non-issues in their 
initiatives. The radical initiatives are often made aware of that their chances of the success 
at the polls are very small. A good example of this was the referendum on the abolition 
of the army in 1989.
The anti-army initiative was launched by GSoA (Gruppe fur eine Schweiz ohne Arme und 
fur eine umfassende Friedenspolitik) mainly in order to raise public discussion and in this 
way to change the public consciousness and the perceptions on the policy alternatives -
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contrary to the earlier initiatives by the peace movement which were more directly made 
to change governmental policies. Before the referendum, the Federal Council tried to 
counteract the anti-army campaign by creating a ‘Subdivision for Peace’ within the 
Department of Defence. This was attacked by the anti-army activists as a cosmetic 
change. The initiative for the abolition of army was rejected in the referendum, with 
35.6% yes-votes and the turnout as high as 68.6%. The government could not, however, 
ignore the 'successful' initiative because, for example, the head of the Department of 
Defence (Kaspar Villiger) stated in his appeal to the people to against the initiative that 
the government would be forced to make reforms if more than 30% supported it in the 
referendum. The significant support for the anti-army initiative lead to some reforms in 
the military systems, as well as to the introduction of the civilian service as an alternative 
for military service. This was approved in another referendum in May 1992 (Kobach 
1993,204-215). Later on, the same organisation, GsoA, campaigned against the purchase 
of military fighters with the initiative which was rejected in a referendum in May 1993 
(57.25% against, turnout 56%).16
On the other hand, the initiative campaigns have proven to be quite exhaustive for the 
financial and personal resources of small voluntary organizations. The requirement for 
100.000 signatures in 18 months has turned out to be quite difficult to overcome: between 
the adoption of the current signature requirement in 1979 and the end of 1996, as many 
as 41 initiatives have failed to fulfil this requirement compared to 88 successful ones. 
(See also Kobach 1993, 95-96.) Another important question concerning the popular 
initiative is whether or not they can be 'purchased'. As pointed out in the Section 4.7.2,
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in the American states the popular initiatives have been criticised for becoming an 
instrument of the privileged groups which can hire professionals to collect the signatures 
and which have assets to cover the costs of referendum campaigns. In Switzerland there 
are some restrictions which aim to limit the possibility of 'purchasing' a referendum: for 
example, the signatures need to be collected by volunteers who are, however, usually paid 
for each signature.
However, Kriesi’s (1994) study shows that the campaign stage is often decisive: 
especially in more technical and less emotional issues the voters reach their decision just 
before the vote. Therefore, the risk of manipulation seems to biggest in technical issues. 
The Swiss voters have, however, several different sources of information, of which the 
media, especially the press and the television, and the governmental information booklet 
sent out together with the ballot papers are among the most important. (Trechsel and 
Kriesi 1996, 198-9.) Sometimes there has been, however, a considerable discrepancy 
between the resources available for the sponsors of the initiative and those who oppose 
it. Kobach (1993,96) mentions as an example the referendum in 1988 on the prohibition 
of the real estate speculation, in which 20 million Swiss Francs were spent by groups 
opposing the initiative. This was much more than what the initiative campaigners had to 
spend, and as the initiative was defeated in the referendum, some complaints about the 
‘purchased’ referendum were raised. The problems related to the disproportionate 
campaign spending raises the question of the need for a ceiling for money spent on the 
campaigns and the possibility of public funding for both sides of the campaign, neither 
of which are applied in Swiss referendums. (See also Mockli 1994,274-277.)
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7.6 Conclusions
Switzerland is often used as an example of how the use of popular initiatives and 
referendums could be expanded in modem states. There are, however, some reservations 
when generalizing from the Swiss experience, and the Swiss experience may not be 
directly applied to other countries. On the other hand, the experience of how referendums 
and initiatives enhance consensus among the political elites representing different 
cleavages of the society, and at the same time allow political outsiders’ interests to be 
voiced, could be a useful example especially for other multi-cultural societies. (See 
Kobach 1993b)
The popular initiative and the law-controlling referendum have a specific function in the 
Swiss consociational government. These institutions compensate the lack of inter-party 
competition for governmental office by providing an opportunity for the opposition, ie. 
parties outside the governmental coalition, opposition within the ruling parties and the 
popular movements, to influence the political agenda and challenge the policies of the 
ruling coalition. The decrease of the party cohesion caused by rejective referendums 
would possibly have more severe consequences in normal parliamentary systems, and the 
frequent referendums would probably damage the parties’ ability to form coalitions and 
provide credible and coherent alternatives in elections.
Kobach (1993,253-255) stresses the mechanisms by which the Swiss direct democracy 
countervails the problems created by otherwise consensual decision-making. The
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consociational government imposes barriers for the interest groups and parties outside the 
coalition government to voice their opinions. The popular initiative opens the agenda for 
the political outsiders, which may use the initiative to gain concessions from the coalition 
government and publicity and popular support for their issue positions. This applies to 
some of the smaller Swiss parties (the Greens, the Autopartei) which are active users of 
initiatives.
The popular initiative also potentially destabilizes the existing party system, because it 
gives opportunities to political outsiders to determine the political agenda. The 
destabilizing effect of the initiative is, however, counteracted by the constant composition 
of the Federal Council, and the bargaining and negotiation stages between the government 
and the promoters of the referendum. The destabilizing consequences of popular 
initiatives would probably be quite different in especially in multi-party parliamentary 
systems with proportional representation. Moreover, the problems of inconsistencies of 
policies caused by popular initiatives are probably much bigger in systems in which the 
referendum automatically follows from a successful initiative.
The control exercised by the Swiss government over the popular initiatives may be, 
however, in many respects too high. The government may make a big difference with 
respect to the success of the initiatives, and the initiatives are not treated equally by the 
political elites. It seems, however, that in Switzerland the popular initiative has 
maintained some of its innovative character and has been able to enhance political 
activism at the grass-roots level, better than its counterparts in the American states. Some 
popular initiatives, as well as rejective referendums, have been clearly anti-establishment
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in character. Because the prospects for an initiative to be successful at the polls are 
relatively low, the initiatives are increasingly used to win concessions in the 
parliamentary bargaining or to define the issues on the political agenda. Especially 
influencing the public opinion and the public agenda have become an increasingly 
important target of the initiatives.
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Notes
1 The Issue 2, Spring 1993 of Publius, The Journal o f Federalism (Vol. 23) includes several articles 
on the Swiss political system.
2 These kinds of local meetings were also held elsewhere in Europe. For example in Scandinavia the 
oldest written account on these assemblies is from the year 888 in the Legend ofAnsgar, which says 
that an assembly with some sort of governmental power convened at Birka near Stockholm. The 
Nordic writings form the twelfth and thirteenth century indicate that assemblies existed, in addition 
to Scandinavia, in other places where there were Scandinavian settlements. According to Lindal 
(1981,16-19) "...the assemblies were open-air meetings, generally held at fixed times and locations. 
Their functions included the arbitration of disputes, condemnation of lawbreakers, selection and 
deposition of kings, and "legislation"." All freemen who were entitled to bear arms were allowed to 
participate in the assemblies, but there was also a great deal of manipulation by the chieftains. The 
application of the majority rule was described first by Ari the Wise in Islendingbdk (The Book of the 
Icelanders, ca. 1120-1130), which proves that it has been applied in the 12th century Iceland.
3 The earliest form of the Swiss confederation was Bundesbrief formed in 1291 between the cantons 
Schwyz, Unterwalden and Uri in order to resist the imperialistic aspirations of the Habsburgs (Elazar 
1993)
4 The fust referendum at federal level was held upon the Second Helvetic Constitution in June 1802 
when Switzerland was a Napoleonic protectorate. The Constitution was adopted, although the 
majority of those who voted in the open ballot voted against the Constitution (92.423 No and 72.453 
Yes). The justification given for this conduct was that those who did not vote at all (167.172 men) 
were supposed to support the Constitution.
5 Here the term 'optional referendum' is used differently than in the previous chapters. Most Swiss 
scholars used the term optional referendum to refer to the referendums which are initiated by popular 
or cantonal petition (abrogative and suspensive referendums). As pointed out earlier, in Switzerland 
there are not optional referendums in the sense I have used the term, to refer to the referendums 
initiated by the parliamentary majority.
6 The cantons have never initiated a rejective referendum.
7 These two types of vote were actually introduced by a popular initiative launched in 1946 in order 
to prevent parliamentary abuses of the urgency clause. (Trechsel & Sciarini 1996,189.)
8 The new legislation on collecting the signatures in 1977 made it more difficult for social 
organisations to make a constitutional initiative. This meant, among other things, that the 
organisations had to be more resolute in their opinions of the defects of the constitutional status quo.
9 Moreover, Linder points out (1993,74) that the smallest theoretical minority blocking the 
constitutional amendments where the double majority is required is just 9% of voters. This means 
51% of the voters in the smallest cantons against all other voters, which is, of course, a highly 
hypothetical situation.
10 Trechsel and Sciarini (1996) have analysed the probability of the success in a referendum by the 
percentage of yes-votes in the National Council. The correlation is rather strong in the case of 
mandatory referendums (R=0.26) and popular initiatives (R=0.27) but weak in the case of optional 
(rejective) referendums. As Trechsel and Sciarini describe this (1996,14): "In other words, whereas 
the intra-elite consensus has a direct influence on the use of the optional referendum, it then loses 
most of its impact on the opinion formation at referendum." Furthermore, they argue that "...intra- 
parliamentary consensus over a legislative act fades away as soon as this act is challenged by a 
successful referendum committee."
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11 Kobach points out that 69% of the Swiss electorate votes at least occasionally which means that 
the number of voters who votes at least once a year in some sort of referendum is much more than the 
recent average turnout of 40%.
12 The figure is based on the data by Kobach (1993, 84):
electoral turnout turnout in ref
1919 80.4 43.3
1922 76.4 67.4
1925 76.8 66.5
1928 78.8 50.4
1931 78.8 57.8
1935 78.3 72.1
1943 70.0 54.7
1947 72.4 69.6
1951 71.2 52.8
1955 70.1 55.5
1959 68.5 54.8
1963 66.1 45.3
1967 65.7 37.9
1971 56.9 47.8
1975 52.4 32.0
1979 48.0 43.6
1983 48.9 34.2
1987 46.5 45.0
1991 46.2 31.9
13 The proposed constitutional amendment would have transferred authority from the cantons to the 
central government. The referendum yielded 50.9% majority in favour of the proposition. The turnout 
was as low as 32.4%. According to opinion polls, however, only 41% was in favour of the 
proposition.
14 In 1982 the price control initiative launched by Women's Consumer Forum three years earlier got 
the majority of 56.1% of votes. This victory was especially significant because the proposal had to 
compete with a governmental counterproposal, and this was before the ‘double yes’ option was 
allowed. In December 1987 the initiative to stop the construction of Rothemturm military base 
yielded a popular majority of 57.8%. In September 1990 54.6% of the electorate voted in favour of 
the initiative imposing a 10-year moratorium on nuclear plant construction. After this there have been 
three other successful initiatives: in September 1993, 83.8% of the electorate supported the l ft of 
August as a public holiday, in February 1994 51.9% of the voters supported a proposal for protection 
of the Alps from transit traffic, and in June 1996,77.6% of the voters voted for a proposal for 
environmentally friendly agriculture. (Kobach 1993b, 356; see Appendix III)
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8. CONCLUSIONS
8.1 Referendum and Theories of Democracy
As has been suggested by Austin Ranney (1991), the referendum has new practices but 
old theory *. Especially, the analogy of between the referendums and the classical forms 
of direct democracy in ancient city-states and communities is, in many respects, too 
simplistic and does not give a right kind of account of the complexities of agenda-setting 
and preference-aggregation in large societies. The aim of this thesis has been to provide 
a more complex and up-to-date theoretical approach of how referendums are used and 
what kinds of function they have in modem, liberal democracies.
In Rousseau's theory and the epistemic conception of democracy, democratic decisions 
are assumed to be somehow ‘wiser’ than individual judgments. This apparently means 
that there exists a correct decision which reflects the metaphysical general will. 
According to Rousseau, the general will is indestructible; it exists despite the beliefs and 
the behaviour of the people. In the society in which the people promote just their own 
interests, the general will is silenced and is 'subordinated to other wills which prevail 
over it':
"Where his private good is not concerned, he wills the general good in his own interest 
as eagerly as anyone else. Even in selling his vote for money, he does not extinguish the 
general will in himself: he evades it. The fault he commits is to change the form of the 
question, and to answer something different from what is asked him: so instead of saying, 
with his vote, 'It is advantageous to the state', he says, 'It is advantageous to this man or 
to that party that such or such proposal should be adopted'." (Rousseau 1763/1976,150- 
151.)
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Rousseauan reasoning has certainly played a role in the discussion and the development 
of modem democratic institutions. Rousseau's theory complies with our ideas of what 
kinds of issues are appropriate to be settled by a referendum: those issues which are not 
too divisive and which affect the whole electorate similarly, and in which, therefore, it 
is possible to talk about the common good. Also, Rousseau’s idea that majoritarian, 
direct democracy is appropriate only in small and homogenous communities, or in other 
situations in which the self-interest does not affect individuals’ judgements too much 
may be well applicable also in current societies.
Some theories of representative democracy emphasize the superior capacities of the 
representatives to make judgements of the common good. The representatives may be 
considered to be like Burkean trustees (Section 3.7), devoted to promote the public 
interest. The underlying idea in this argument is similar Rousseau’s idea that the 
democratic process should bring about decisions which reflect the common good. 
Furthermore, it has been argued that the complexity of the political problems in modem 
societies requires such expertise knowledge which the ordinary citizens do not have; 
hence it is better to leave decision-making for the representatives. However, as Budge 
(1993) points out, even the representatives are ‘living beyond their intelligence’ when 
making decisions on issues with far-reaching consequences. The other problem with the 
expertise argument is that it is based on the underlying assumption of the correct 
decisions, and therefore it ignores the value aspect of the choices and the fact that the 
political elites may act upon their own specific interests.
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Certain values, such as maintaining economic growth, may be dominant in the 
representative decision-making. There may be, however, differences between the values 
of the political elites and those of the citizens, as the Danish referendums on European 
integration, the Swedish nuclear power referendum and other examples show (discussed 
in Chapters 5, 6 and 7). The Swedish nuclear power case also illustrates how the 
possibility to participate in the referendum encouraged a large proportion of the people 
to engage actively in serious discussions on the fundamental values of the society.
Following individualist interpretations of democracy, Buchanan and Tullock (1961) put 
forward their counterargument to Rousseau’s theory. They argue that individuals' 
interests may differ from each other for reasons other than those of ignorance. The 
democratic ideal is not unanimious consent but arbitration between conflicting interests 
and preventing any of them from becoming too dominant in the society by 
institutionalizing checks and balances. Indeed, the idea of underlying common interest 
does not seem to be applicable in many of the public issues in large, complex societies: 
there are many cases for genuine interest conflicts, for example political problems may 
be seen as zero-sum-games in which there are clearly losers and winners. From this 
perspective, Rousseau’s theory may be best applicable in collective action problems 
where cooperation is the common interest, but even in them there are many trade-offs 
between individual interests, who is going to contribute and how.
Such authors as Schumpeter or Riker represent a rather cynical view that the role of the 
people in democratic systems is just the exercise of ‘random veto' on the political rulers 
in general elections. According to Schumpeter and Riker, the will of the people is a
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manufactured outcome of the political process, and it cannot be used as a justification for 
political decisions. Schumpeter bases his argument on the conflictual character of the 
modem society, Riker on the impossibility of defining the popular will and the 'path- 
dependancy' of political decisions. Citizens' participation may only be effective in terms 
of eliminating the worst political rulers, and thus indirectly protecting individual interests 
and freedom. The referendum is rather difficult to fit in Schumpeter’s and Riker’s view 
of democracy as competition between power elites. Especially the ad hoc and optional 
referendums may be considered just another instrument in the hands of the political elites 
competing for power and trying to maximize their electoral support, and it may be argued 
that these kinds of referendums actually confuse the rules of competition and blur the 
responsibility of those in power.
Apart from the theories of democracy based on the assumption of homo economicus, the 
Rousseauan assumptions of the general will and the objective truth in politics are 
disputable even if political problems are considered on their own right differently from 
economic interaction. Rousseau's theory can be criticised for being 'inapplicable' in 
modem politics, and it is apparently in contradiction with the metaphysics with most of 
the current democratic theories. Sartori (1987, 269), for example, points out that 
'logically and rationally true democracy is by no means true democracy that actually 
exists and functions' and that 'democracies nurtured by the French 'raison'have in fact 
turned out to be, empirically, least or non-working democracies'.2 The idea of the 
objective truth in politics is probably the most problematic element in Rousseau's theory: 
it has been exploited as a justification for dictatorial policies. Furthermore, the idea of 
the deliberation which takes place within the individuals and not in the communication
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between the people is in contradiction with the participatory models of democratic 
deliberation. The idea of purely individual deliberation may also be used as an excuse for 
plebiscitary practices, in which atomized individuals formally participate in politics 
without much deliberation or actual influence.
The view that the political reason does not exist in the singular may be more acceptable 
than Rousseau's idea of the general good. Barber's (1984) theory on strong democracy 
is therefore another survivor after the criticism against majoritarian forms of democracy. 
Barber’s theory is based on the assumption that there is no truth in the moral and political 
problems - or that it is not yet known. The approach to political decision-making is 
somewhat similar to that of Rousseau’s: it is considered in terms of finding the best 
solutions to political problems rather than maximizing individuals’ welfare. Barber’s 
conception of human beings is, however, more modest than Rousseau’s: man's reason 
is, indeed, to certain extent 'a slave of his passions'. Barber’s theory is based on more 
individualistic premises according to which each individual has their own sphere of 
interests. Individual self-interest, however, does not completely determine their political 
behaviour, like it is assumed in the most ‘Hobbesian’ versions of liberal democracy. 
There are prospects that people become more other-regarding or reasonable in their 
political judgments, and that their capacity to consider political problems improves. 
Barber's aim is to maintain the liberal safety mechanisms whilst increasing the 
possibilities of participation and developing the forms of citizenship.
Another question is how realistic it is to assume that certain kinds of institutions would 
enhance political participation which, on the other hand, would reinforce the
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reasonableness of citizens’ opinions. For example, at least the currently existing forms 
of referendums do not always increase the reasonableness of political opinions. 
Sometimes the aggressive and adversary referendum and initiative campaigning can even 
deepen the existing social divisions, and the campaigns may have, in Elster’s (1983,112- 
113) terms, only 'paid the lip service of common good'.
As a solution to this problem, Barber (1984) pointed out several ways of increasing 
mutuality and institutionalizing the 'strong democratic talk'. These institutional reforms 
should all be carried out simultaneously because they are expected to have mutually 
enforcing effects. The doubts about the possibilities of this kind of institutional 
engineering are well founded, and especially the fitness of the referendum as a measure 
of increasing participation may be questioned - as Barber himself does. Although likely 
to increase political discussion and deliberation, the referendum seems to be quite 
‘individualistic’ means of mediating the opinions of the citizens. The referendum does 
not necessarily enhance communication and interaction between the citizens like for 
example participation in political organizations. Also, citizens’ limited ability to 
influence policies by voting in referendums probably makes them to less willing to invest 
much time and energy on deliberating and discussing about the policy alternatives.
Also, unfortunately from the participatory theorists’ point of view, there is some 
empirical evidence which proves that citizens have a limited interest in participation in 
referendums. The intensive campaigning in the Swedish nuclear power referendum, 
according to the surveys made afterwards (Holmberg & Asp 1984), increased the level 
of knowledge about the issue in question, but decreased people’s interest in politics at
271
least in the short run. However, the reason for this may have also been the obvious 
strategic manipulation of the referendum by the political parties. The Swiss citizens tend 
to be quite indifferent and passive in using their excessive channels of participation. It 
seems that there is a ‘saturation point’ of political participation, and therefore 
referendums may actually receive more public interest if used occasionally rather than 
frequently. Furthermore, in the US states the 'institutions for the strong democratic talk’ 
have been disproportionately dominated by relatively privileged or highly committed 
groups promoting their particular policy goals.
8.2. Referendum and the Will of the Majority
The opinion of the majority of voters revealed in a referendum is a powerful legitimizer 
of political decisions. The notion of the ‘will of the majority’, based on the idea of the 
popular sovereignty, has a strong normative appeal. It appears that a decision made in 
a referendum is in many occasions somehow more legitimate and therefore more stable 
than a decision made by the parliamentary back-stage bargaining between the political 
elites. For example, the recent increase of the number of ad hoc referendums in Europe 
can be explained by the need to legitimize constitutional changes, such as joining 
supranational organisations. Similarly, a no-vote in a law-promoting referendum and a 
veto exercised by the majority of the voters in law-controlling referendums is a powerful 
legitimizer of the non-action and the legislative status quo.
The results of social choice theory imply that there are no good logical or rational reasons 
to believe that any preference-aggregation method would always reveal the will of the
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majority which exists in singular and independently of the process of determining it. 
There is no non-dictatorial preference-aggregation method which would always choose 
an alternative preferred by the majority if there are more than two alternatives and at least 
three voters. Furthermore, as discussed in the earlier section, the support of the majority 
may not even be considered as the ideal for democratic decisions. Therefore, the belief 
in the legitimacy of the results of the referendums as an expression of the will of the 
people has weak logical and normative grounds. The crucial question is, therefore, what 
are the processes in which ‘the will of the majority’ is determined. This question draws 
the attention to the problems of agenda-setting, opinion-formation and voting procedures.
Political manipulation may take place at three levels. First, if it is assumed that 
individuals have certain preferences over given alternatives, political manipulation means 
the exploitation of the ‘path-dependency’ of the social choices. Methods like the 
selection of a voting method, the selection of the order of the alternatives put to the vote, 
framing the question, separating the issues and so on belong to this type of manipulation. 
This kind of manipulation of procedures may be analysed in terms of social choice 
theory which considers the preferences as given and fixed during the political process. 
The problem with referendums is that the public is rather powerless in front of the 
manipulation of the procedures - compared for example with parliamentary decision­
making. In parliamentary votes the limited number of voters helps the access to the 
relevant information and help them to interact and act strategically. This makes the 
voters less vulnerable to agenda-manipulation.
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Second, political manipulation may also be understood as a control over the public 
agenda, the power to define the issues and feasible alternatives to be considered in 
decision-making. The competition between the political elites, especially between the 
parties, in the representative democracies may largely be analysed in terms of defining 
the issues and the alternatives. Third, political manipulation may mean influence on 
people's preferences over the given alternatives by campaigning, controlling the 
information on the basis of which the voters make their decisions, and controlling the 
way in which the benefits and drawbacks of the alternatives are put forward. Especially 
the media plays a crucial role in the third kind of political manipulation. The problems 
related to preference-formation are not much discussed in social choice theory, because 
it takes the preferences as given and fixed. (Elster 1983, 105.) The last two types of 
manipulation means the exploitation of the fact that the individuals may not have very 
clear opinions about the issues and the policy alternatives, and that the citizens are not 
able to communicate directly and set their own agenda in large societies.
The first kind of manipulation is, to various extent, possible to political elites in all kinds 
of referendums, although in popular initiatives and law-controlling referendums the 
procedures of organising referendums are more explicitly regulated than in optional and 
ad hoc referendums. The second kind of manipulation is typical for all referendums in 
which the government is the source of the legislative proposal. However, in the case of 
the popular initiative and in the Italian abrogative referendum the citizens may counteract 
the agenda-setting monopoly of the political elites. The third kind of manipulation, the 
influence the public opinion-formation is typical for all referendums.
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All three forms of manipulation are also an important element of political competition. 
For example in the Swedish nuclear power case discussed in the Chapter 5 the parties 
used the referendum as a weapon in the struggle over the political agenda, and the 
Swedish parties exercised all three forms of manipulation: the parties tried to shape the 
procedures in a way which was beneficial to the party in question; they tried to make the 
nuclear power an issue or a non-issue, and select alternatives which would benefit the 
position of the party in question; and they tried to affect the opinions of the public by 
framing the benefits and the drawbacks of nuclear power.
The ‘fairness’ of referendums in these kinds of situations may be due to the fact that 
there is competition between the parties and none of the parties can dominate the 
political agenda too much. Sometimes, some parties may be in disproportionately 
disadvantageous position. The governments may, for example, support financially only 
one of the sides, like it was the case in the Austrian EU-campaign. In some cases the 
media and the political elites may rather unanimously support one of the sides, like it was 
the case in the Finnish EU-referendum in 1994 and in the Danish Maastricht-campaigns 
discussed in the Chapter 6. In these kinds of situations the questions of the fairness of 
the referendum may be justly raised.
Among competitive elections, there are different types of systems which have some 
shared characteristics, competing parties, secret ballots and so forth. Likewise the 
referendums may be argued to be fair and democratic in a minimal sense if they are used 
in a constitutional way, if they give real policy alternatives, and if there is fair 
competition and ballot between the alternatives. There are, perhaps, even stronger
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requirements for procedural fairness in the case of referendums than in the elections: the 
solutions they provide are difficult to be changed, unlike the results of elections which 
can always be overruled in the following one. Therefore the decisions achieved in 
referendums are typically irreversible and therefore the losers may be more sensitive to 
possible imbalances in the campaigns. (Esaiasson 1996,44.)
Furthermore, although the frequent referendums may cause saturation among the voters, 
they may also have some advantages. More frequent referendums may be better in 
accordance with the pluralist interpretations of democracy, according to which the overall 
fairness and legitimacy of democratic systems is due to the fact that the participants of 
the democratic process are not divided to constant minorities and in majorities. Being on 
the losers’ side in a referendum may not feel so dramatic if there are prospects to be on 
the winners’ side in another referendum on an equally important issue.
8.3 Institutional Analysis and Normative Theories
In each instance of the referendum, the public opinion is brought as an element into 
decision-making. Referendums, however, differ from each other in terms of: i) what are 
the legal and normative implications of the expressions of the majority will (binding- 
consultative), ii) for what reasons and purposes the majority will is consulted (analysis 
of agenda-setting), iii) how 'genuine' the will of the majority is, and to what extent it has 
been manufactured by those in control of the organization of the referendum and the 
campaigning (social choice theory, empirical analysis of campaigning and participation, 
and normative theories of democracy). These distinctions are relevant both for empirical
276
analysis and for normative evaluation of institutions. It has been shown that the 
possibility of different forms of referendums has very different consequences on how 
democratic systems work.
Because of institutional variation, it may be easy to agree with Gordon Smith's (1974) 
argument that there will not be 'a general theory of the referendum', unless the theorizing 
on such concepts as democracy, representation, and majority rule are regarded as such. 
The institution in itself, people coming to polls to vote upon some policy issue, is a rather 
low common denominator, although all referendums at least in principle enhance public 
participation, deliberation and discussion. However, in comparative analysis the 
differences between agenda-setting institutions must be taken into account. As Uleri 
(1996) has put forward, referendums may be law-promoting or law-controlling, used 
either as a decision-making procedure or as a control over the parliamentary decision­
making. Likewise, the distinction between the actors who may initiate the referendum 
is crucial; the referendum may be mandatory (constitutionally required) or initiated by 
the political representatives or by the citizens.
The case studies have been used to 'test' the validity of the theoretical propositions on the 
properties of different forms of referendums. These propositions are based on the 
theoretical literature on referendums as well as previous comparative studies. The 
propositions characterize the 'built in’ properties of the institutions and the justifications 
given to the institutions. The case studies prove that, although the forms of referendums 
prima facie bear some of these suggested properties, the performance of the institutions 
cannot be characterized without reference to the actual political actors and the other
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characteristics of the political system. The propositions about the different forms of 
referendums are not necessarily very good characterization of actual practices. In many 
respects, the discussed cases have been 'deviant'. This suggests a few other factors 
explaining the functions of the referendum, apart from those 'built in' properties of the 
institutions. Especially in the case of Switzerland it is appropriate to ask whether it is 
possible to make any generalisations based on it because the Swiss political system is, 
in many respects, an exceptional one among democracies.
Ad hoc and optional referendums
The ad hoc referendums, initiated by the parliamentary majority, are probably the most 
difficult to provide theoretical justifications - apart from the ones related to the 'popular 
will' and 'general good' which can be questioned both by the results of social choice 
theory, and by the theoretical arguments on the nature of the political problems. There 
are many interlinked ideological and strategic reasons for the political representatives to 
submit certain kinds of issues to a referendum and not to submit others. It may be argued 
that especially the ad hoc referendum is an instrument by which legitimate and stable 
political decisions are tried to be achieved when the normal parliamentary methods of 
finding solutions, compromising and bargaining, are not successful. The delegation of 
the issue to the other authorities, such as the referendum, is a solution to a parliamentary 
or governmental deadlock.
It may also be argued that the ad hoc and optional referendums are more often dictated 
by unchecked strategic considerations by the political elites than any other forms of
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referendums. However, they are often used as an escape from situations when the 
parliamentary machinery is 'paralysed' and, therefore, it is not often possible for any 
single political party to control the referendum totally. The prospects of ad hoc 
referendums are biggest when the parliamentaiy party system fails to represent a certain 
issue dimension: a phenomenon confirmed for example by the Swedish nuclear power 
referendum and the referendums on European integration. In the case of the nuclear 
power referendum in Sweden, the referendum option was used in the same issue as a 
strategy by all of the most important political forces for different reasons, for policy 
outcome maximization, for vote-maximization in elections, and for maintaining the unity 
of the governmental coalition.
Bogdanor (1994, 91-95) explains the increasing number of referendums in Western 
Europe in terms of the defence of the ‘frozen’ party systems which is incapable of 
representing the most salient issues of contemporary politics. The party systems, which 
in most West European countries is based on the class conflict, fail to represent the issues 
emerging in post-industrial societies in globalizing economy. The referendums may be 
seen as attempts of the traditional parties to defuse the emerging issues. Furthermore, the 
demand for referendums may be seen as a reaction to the alienation of the public from 
the traditional political parties, because the referendums offer the increasing number of 
citizens outside the party organisations and without strong party identification to 
participate in decision-making without the mediation of the parties. Finally, the 
referendums may be seen as legitimizing devices in situations in which the party-based 
decision-making suffers from a lack of legitimacy, often due to the alienation from the 
parties, or the parties’ inability to represent certain issues dimensions. The critics of this
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development may argue that the referendums represent plebiscitarian forms of 
participation, a direct appeal of political elites to the alienated masses. In other words, 
the referendums do not enhance the same kind of responsibility which would be required 
in participation in political organisations. According to the critics, the occasional 
referendums are not sufficient substitutes to the other mediating political institutions 
which are losing their appeal to the public.
Law-Controlling Referendums
The abrogative, suspensive and mandatory referendums have a more liberal character 
with their preference to the status quo and protection of the minority interests. In this 
respect, these referendums can be interpreted in terms of 'Madisonian' theory of 
democracy which is concerned about the unlimited powers of majorities as a potential 
threat to the democratic process and the overall fairness of the society. In fact, in some 
countries (Denmark, New Zealand, Sweden) the law-controlling referendums have been 
regarded as a substitute for the bicameral legislature. The mandatory, suspensive and 
abrogative, except for the Italian one, referendums increase the responsiveness of the 
representative decision-making to the public opinion. These institutions allow the 
decisions made by the governing coalition to be checked by the electorate, not just in the 
regular elections but also on issue-by-issue-basis in referendums. The mandatory 
referendum changes the character of the constitutional process, especially by favouring 
the political status quo and forcing the representatives to take the public opinion into 
account. The suspensive and abrogative referendums increase the influence of the 
opposition parties and the interest groups.
280
As the Danish case of the referendums on the Maastricht Treaty shows, the anticipatory 
effects of law-controlling referendums depend on the ability of the governments to 
compromise with the opposition ad adjust its policies according to the voters’ 
preferences. In the Danish case the government had their hands tied and hence was 
unable to react to the demands of the strong opposition. Because of the external 
constraints, there was a limited scope for adjustments of the governmental policies 
according to the public opinion. Therefore, the anticipation of the mandatory (or 
suspensive) referendum did not change the governmental policies much.
The mandatory, abrogative and suspensive referendums are also expected to be corrective 
in terms of the possible misrepresentation of the public opinion, but, paradoxically, like 
other referendums they may also be reason for them. The fact that the referendum may 
cause misrepresentation of opinions on certain issues in the parliament was illustrated 
in the Danish case where anti-integration opinions have not considerably changed the 
existing party system. Furthermore, although the Danish constitution quite clearly 
regulates the use of the referendums, there seems to be many opportunities for the 
political parties to use the institution for strategic purposes, and, in this respect, the 
Danish mandatory referendums resemble ad hoc or optional referendums in many 
respects.
Popular Initiative
The popular initiative changes the character of public agenda-setting by bringing in the 
citizens as agenda-setters. This feature of the popular initiative may be regarded as
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valuable from both individualists’ and participatory democrats’ point of view. Following 
participatory theory of democracy, the popular initiative may be seen as a channel 
through which the citizens' may raise their true concerns on the political agenda. Here the 
initiative is an essential part of the citizens’ self-government, and grass-root political 
activity is considered to be an essential part of it.
The economic approach to democracy, on the other hand, has another normative 
criterion, the effectiveness of the political system in fulfilling people's interests. Frey 
(1992), for example, offers an argument in support of the popular initiative based on 
public choice theory. Frey’s underlying vision of politics is 'Hobbesian', which means 
that the political decisions are considered to be based on individual self-interests. He 
argues that the initiative is a way to control the rent-seeking tendencies of political elite 
by eliminating their agenda-setting monopoly and by enabling the citizens to raise such 
issues on the political agenda which are against the interests of the elites. He also argues 
that the federal structure of the Swiss government has similar effects.
The Swiss case shows how the popular initiative has become a bargaining device 
between the government and interest groups rather than an uncontrolled mechanism of 
popular agenda-setting and ‘direct legislation’. It may be argued that in Switzerland the 
extensive use of initiatives and law-controlling referendums compensates the lack of 
governmental accountability. Different agenda-setting and veto-rights provided by 
different forms of referendums allow the political outsiders to challenge the policies of 
the ruling coalition. Furthermore, referendums decrease intra-party cohesion, and 
generate shifting majority coalitions in the legislature. They make the government
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accountable on issue-by-issue basis rather than in the elections. It may be argued that the 
initiative and the referendum also sustains and legitimizes the consociational form of 
government, making such arrangements as the Swiss 'magic formula' possible. The 
legitimizing effect of referendums is not limited to single political decisions, but the 
existence of the different forms of referendums increases the legitimacy of the whole 
political system. It is, however, questionable what kinds of consequences the frequent 
law-controlling referendums and popular initiatives would have in more parliamentary 
political systems, because both of them potentially destabilize the existing parties and 
coalition patterns.
At this point the question of the social conditions of direct democracy must be raised. I 
do not necessarily share Barber's belief in the institutional engineering as a key to create 
an active civil society. In the countries of the case studies there is one characteristics 
which should enhance participation: the relatively small size of the countries. This makes 
the scale of political decisions more comprehensible for the citizens, and, in terms of 
public choice theory, makes the costs of the organisation of collective action smaller. 
Also, in small societies each individual contribution is more visible, and there are 
probably more mechanisms of social control than in large societies. At least theoretically, 
these conditions enhance the growth of social organizations, which is essential for the 
such institutions as the popular initiative, if it is supposed to be based on voluntary 
activity rather than on professional ‘initiative industry’.
An argument put forward against the initiative is that number of insignificant initiatives 
paralyse the decision-making machinery. One way of preventing this is to increase the
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number of signatures required for the initiative or otherwise raise the procedural hurdle 
of making initiatives. This, however, does not necessarily work in a positive way. Rather 
it may make the initiative a tool in the hands of those already privileged in the society. 
In Switzerland the initiative campaigns may have already become too exhaustive for 
voluntary organizations, even though there are some recent exceptions of successful 
campaigns with large publicity. The organizations also need to have considerable 
financial and personal resources to carry out initiative campaigns. Therefore, if the 
popular initiative is expected to be an instrument of political innovations and to give 
opportunities to grassroots political activity, the procedural hurdles for making an 
initiative should not be much higher than what they are for example in Switzerland at the 
moment. Also, to prevent over-representation of economic interests, there probably 
should be an upper limit for campaign spending and ban on professional signature- 
collection.
Obviously the relationship between the normative theories and empirical experience is 
complicated. It may be argued that the existing forms of popular initiative are not 
working satisfactorily in terms of certain normative theories of democracy, but this does 
not necessarily mean that the whole institution should be abandoned as inappropriate. In 
fact, as the institutional analysis proves, rather minor changes in the procedures can have 
considerable impact on how the institution works. It may be further argued that the 
institutions could be improved by carrying out some reforms, but that it is not in the 
interest of political elites to carry out these reforms. For example, in the United States 
the federal government has lately expressed rather critical opinions on the popular 
initiative.
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The referendum is often interpreted in such populist terms as 'the will of the people'. This 
does not give an accurate account of the issues related to the agenda-setting, and the 
formation and the aggregation of preferences. Because the referendum phenomenon is 
not 'unitary' in these respects, the theoretical approaches to it cannot be either. The 
common denominator between all forms of referendums is the democratic idea of 
'bringing in the people' (Suksi 1993), in other words, increasing citizens' participation 
and influence in political decision-making. The crucial question is, therefore, why and 
under whose control this is done. In this sense, the popular initiative most clearly works 
to increase people’s participation in politics. The popular initiative also represents a more 
classical interpretation of democracy because it, at least theoretically, enhances citizens' 
political equality by giving them the right to raise issues on the political agenda.
Despite my criticism against the strategic reasons behind the ad hoc referendums, the 
agenda-manipulation by the elites and the biassed nature of referendum campaigns, there 
are still many cases in which the referendum serves the very democratic principle that the 
citizens' opinions should matter in politics. Maybe the best property of referendums is 
that they are based one-man-one-vote principle and hence they give the ordinary citizens 
an opportunity to participate in decision-making on political issues - although this is also 
used as grounds of criticism. The constitutional regulation seems to be crucial with 
respect to the fairness of referendums and to the extent to which they work according to 
democratic principles. However, the case studies prove that when there are strong 
interests at the stake and the political elites are united, the public opinion or 
constitutional rules do not matter too much. Therefore, the constitutional regulation does 
not as such solve the problems of manipulative abuses of referendums, but they set
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certain limits to the behaviour of the political actors promoting their own political goals.
Notes
1 Quoted by MOckli 1994,31.
2 It may be necessary to point out here that the results of social choice theory question even the 
logical and rational structure of Rousseau’s theory.
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Appendix I:
The Institutions of the Nation-Wide Referendums in 22 Western Democracies
1. Australia
Federal system with bicameral legislature: Senate and House of Representatives
1. Mandatory constitutional referendum: A proposed amendment to the Constitution must 
receive an approval of an absolute majority of both Houses of the parliament. After this, it 
must be submitted to the voters in each state within two to six months. A double majority 
is required, in other words, more than 50 percent of the voters nationwide must support the 
proposal, as well as a majority of voters in a majority of the states. If one of the Houses 
objects to the proposed change, and the other approves it a second time, then the governor- 
general may submit the proposal to the electors.
2. Ad hoc referendum: There have been three ad hoc, consultative referendums to ascertain 
public opinion in certain issues: in 1916 and 1917 concerning conscription for military 
service and in 1977 concerning the preferred national anthem.
Aitkin, Don (1978): Australia. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): Referendums. A 
Comparative Study o f Practice and Theory. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research. Washington D.C., pp. 123-139.
Hughes, Colin A. (1994): Australia and New Zealand. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 154-173.
Kobach, Kris W. (1993): The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland. Dartmouth, 
Aldershot.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
2. Austria
Federal system with bicameral legislature: Federal Council and National Council 
(Bundesrat, Nationalrat)
1. Optional Referendum (article 43): If the National Council resolves or majority of MPs so 
demand, every bill passed has to be submitted to referendum before authentication.
2. Mandatory Constitutional Referendum (article 44): Total revisions of the constitution or 
the revisions of the four fundamental principles of the Constitution (democratic principle, 
republican principle, federal principle, and the principle of the rule of law) require national 
approval by a binding referendum after it has been passed by the parliament.
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3. Suspensive Constitutional Referendum (article 44): In the case of constitutional 
amendments which do not affect the fundamental principles of the Constitution, 1/3 of the 
members of either chambers may require a binding referendum.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97.
Pelinka, Anton; Greiderer, Sylvia (1996): Austria: the referendum as minority protection. 
Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe. 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 20-32.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
3. Belgium
Federal state with bicameral legislature: Senate and Chamber of Representatives.
The possibility of holding a referendum is not mentioned in the Constitution. (There has 
been one referendum: in 1950 on the Return of King Leopold III).
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97.
4. Canada
Federal state with bicameral legislature: Senate and House of Commons.
Canada has no legitimate constitutional process of its own, and the unanimous consent 
between the federal and the ten provinces has become the default process. Long 
constitutional debate, especially of the status of Quebec in the 1980s, has produced a need 
to find mechanisms to legitimize constitutional agreements by using referendums.
Leduc, Lawrence (1993): Canada's Constitutional Referendum of 1992: A 'Great Big No'. 
Electoral Studies, Vol. 12, No. 3, pp. 257-263.
5. Denmark
Unitary state with regional devolution (Faeroe and Greenland) and with unicameral legislature 
(Folketing)
In the 1953 constitution, there are four different sections concerning the referendum, and 
in addition to these, there is a possibility of optional referendums.
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1. In the section 88, there is a provision of mandatory constitutional referendums: 
constitutional amendment requires acceptance of the Folketing and the support of the 
majority of the voters and at least 40 % of the total electorate required (until 1953 45%)
2 Suspensive legislative referendum (section 42): Suspensive legislative referendum is used 
when one third of the members of the Folketing request a referendum within three working 
after a bill has been passed. After request the majority of the Folketing may withdraw the bill 
within five working days. If it does not, the bill will be submitted to a referendum at earliest 
within 12 and at latest within 18 working days. A majority of the votes, and the votes of at 
least 30% of the total electorate is required to reject the bill. Measures of a number of areas 
can not be subject to the referendum (e.g. finance, government loans, salaries and pensions, 
direct and indirect taxes). If the law is urgent it may be directly affirmed by the Queen. Even 
in this kind of situations the referendum is possible. If the bill is rejected in the referendum, 
it will be renounced within 14 days.
3. In section 20 of the Constitution, there is a provision of mandatory referendum on 
transfers o f national powers to international authorities: majority of 5/6 is required in the 
Folketing or an ordinary majority and the submission of the bill to the voters. Like in 
suspensive referendum, the bill is rejected if the majority of the voters and at least 30% of 
the whole electorate votes against the bill.
4. Section 29 of the constitution requires that laws changing the voting age must be 
submitted to the referendum.
5. Optional Referendum: it is possible for the Folketing to adopt a special law providing for 
a consultative referendum as a means of determining the public opinion before parliamentary 
or governmental action is taken.
Miller, Kenneth (1982): Policy-Making by Referendum: The Danish Experience. West 
European Politics, Vol. 5, January 1982, pp. 52-67.
Siune, Karen (1993): The Danes said No to the Maastricht Treaty. The Danish EC 
Referendum of June 1992. Scandinavian Political Studies, Vol. 16, No. 1, pp. 93-103. 
Siune, Karen; Svensson, Palle (1993): The Danes and The Maastricht Treaty: The Danish 
EC Referendum of June 1992. Electoral Studies, Vol. 12, No. 2, June 1992, pp. 99-111. 
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Svensson, Palle (1996): Denmark: the referendum as minority protection. Gallagher, 
Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.): The Referendum Experience in Europe, MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, pp. 86-105.
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6. Finland
Unitary state with regional devolution (Aland) and unicameral legislature (Eduskunta)
Optional referendum (According to the 1986 Constitutional amendment): A consultative 
referendum is decided as an act of the parliament. This means that the support of 
parliamentary majority is needed for the referendum.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Suksi, Markku (1996): The Referendum as a dormant feature. Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, 
Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe. MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 
52-65.
7. France (Fifth republic)
Unitary state with bicameral legislature: Senate and National Assembly.
1. Mandatory or suspensive constitutional referendum (article 89 of the 1958 Constitution): 
The right to propose constitutional amendments belongs concurrently to the President on the 
proposal of the Prime Minister and to members of legislature. The amendment must be 
passed by the two houses of the legislature in identical terms. Once this has happened, the 
referendum is mandatory for those amendments which are initiated by the legislature, and 
facultative for those which are initiated by the President. In the latter case the President has 
an option to submit the law proposal to the Congress (the Senate and the National Assembly 
meeting together), which must pass it with the 3/5 majority. The amendment becomes 
effective when it has been approved by referendum or passed by the Congress. Therefore, 
the referendum does not necessarily take place if the legislature and the President reach a 
sufficient consensus. In fact, all five constitutional amendments made since 1958 have been 
approved by the Congress, and there have been no referendums under the article 89.
2. Optional legislative referendum: (<article 11) On the proposal of the government during 
the parliamentary session, or on the joint proposal of the two Assemblies, the President may 
submit to a referendum any proposed bill (not yet passed by the legislature) dealing with the 
organization of the public authorities, approving a French Community Agreement, or 
authorizing the ratification of a treaty which, although not in conflict with the constitution, 
would affect the working of institutions. If the result of the referendum is favourable to the 
adoption of the bill, the President of the republic promulgates it. (Suksi 1993,141.)
Morel, Laurence: France: towards less controversial use of the referendum. Gallagher, 
Michael & Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.): The Referendum Experience in Europe. MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, pp. 66-86.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
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Wright, Vincent (1978): France. Butler & Ranney (eds.): Referendums. A Comparative Study 
o f  Practice and Theory. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research. 
Washington D.C., pp. 139-168.
8. Germany
Federal state with bicameral legislature (Bundesrat, Bundestag)
German constitution does not include any provisions of the referendum at the national level, 
but according to Articles 29 and 118 of the Constitution (Grundgesetz), territorial changes 
of area as between states are subject to referendum
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97.
9. Greece
Unitary state with unicameral legislature (Vouli)
Optional Referendum: According to the 1975 Constitution, as modified by constitutional 
amendments passed in 1986, the President may call a binding referendum 'on crucial national 
issues', if this is supported by an absolute majority of the legislature, and to call a referendum 
'on crucial social questions', if this is supported by 60% of the legislature.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97.
10. Iceland
Unitary state with unicameral legislature (Althing)
1. Constitutional referendum: required on the position of the state church.
2. Abrogative legislative referendum: A bill passed by the Althing will be submitted to the 
President for approval within two weeks. If the President disapproves the bill it will 
nevertheless become valid but must, as soon as circumstances permit, be submitted to a 
referendum. The law will become invalid, if it is rejected.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht, p. 
149.
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11. Ireland
Unitary state with bicameral legislature (Oireachtas: Senate and Dail).
1. Mandatory constitutional referendum (1937 Constitution, article 46): 'Every proposal for 
amendment shall be initiated in Dail Eireann as a Bill', and having passed both houses 'shall 
be submitted by Referendum to the decision of the People'. In order to the law to be passed, 
the majority of the given votes is sufficient.
2. Suspensive legislative referendum (article 27): A bill (not a constitutional amendment) 
which has been passed through both houses of the Oireachtas can be put to referendum 
before it has been signed as law by the President. After being passed it can be challenged by 
a petition of the majority of the members of the Senate and at least 1/3 of the members of 
the Dail. This joint petition is then addressed to the President, who, after consultation with 
the Council of State but acting in his own discretion, might decline to sign the bill because 
it contains "a proposal of such national importance that the will of the people thereon ought 
to be ascertained". The President has ten days from the receipt of such a petition to make up 
his mind. If he decides not to sign there are two possible courses of action. The bill may be 
put to referendum within a period of eighteen months and is vetoed if a majority of votes are 
cast against it and if the total number of votes cast against it amount to at least a third of the 
votes on the register. If the referendum does not take place, Dail Eireann will be dissolved 
and new elections will be held. This provision has never been put to practise.
Gallagher, Michael: Ireland: the referendum as a conservative device? Gallagher, Michael 
& Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.) The Referendum Experience in Europe. MacMillan, 
Basingstoke, pp. 86-105.
Girvin, Brian (1986): Social Change and Moral Politics: The Irish Constitutional 
Referendum 1983. Political Studies, Vol. 34, March 1986, pp. 61-81.
Manning, Maurice (1978): Ireland. Butler & Ranney (eds.): Referendums. A Comparative 
Study o f Practice and Theory. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy Research, 
Washington D.C., pp. 193-209.
12. Italy
Unitary state with regionalisation and bicameral legislature: Senate and Chamber of 
Deputies.
1. Suspensive constitutional referendum (article 138 of the Constitution of 1947): Either 
500.000 voters, one-fifth members of either legislative chamber or five regional councils 
may demand a referendum on a constitutional law within three months after it has been 
passed by the both houses of the parliament. The constitutional referendum will not take
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place if it has not been passed by two-thirds majority in both chambers of Italian Parliament. 
There has been, however, no referendums according to this article. Article 132 provides for 
a similar referendum on modifying the borders of Italian region, which has also not been 
used. In order to be accepted the constitutional amendment needs the majority of the valid 
votes.
2.Abrogative legislative referendum {article 75 of the 1970 Constitutional Amendment): A 
referendum will be held to decide on the total or partial repeal of a law or any parts of it or 
of any measure which is already in force of law if it is demanded by 500.000 voters or by 
five regional councils. The proposal submitted to the referendum is approved if the majority 
of those who are eligible to vote have participated, and if it has received a majority of valid 
votes. The abrogative referendum cannot, however, be applied on certain issues.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97.
Mockli, Silvano (1994): Direkte Demokratie. Ein intemationaler Vergleich. Verlag Paul 
Haupt. Bern., 127-130.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 
Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (1996): Italy: referendums and initiatives from the origins to the crisis 
of democratic regime. Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum 
Experience in Europe. MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 106-125.
13. Luxembourg
Unitary state with unitary legislature: Chamber of Deputies
According to the Constitution the electorate may participate in referendums, which has been 
interpreted to mean the possibility of optional, consultative referendums.
14. The Netherlands
Unitary state with bicameral legislature: First Chamber and Second Chamber
The possibility of holding a referendum is not mentioned in the Constitution, and the 
Netherlands has never held a referendum at the state level. The Constitution, however, 
provides for local referendums.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.): 
Referendums around the World, MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-97 .
Holsteyn, Joop van (1996): The Netherlands: national debates and local experience. 
Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe.
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MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 126-152.
15. New Zealand
Unitary state with unicameral Parliament
1. Suspensive Constitutional Referendum: After the upper house of the Parliament, the 
Legislative Council was abolished in 1950, there was a concern about the loss of checks and 
balances. This lead to a reform of the Electoral Act in 1956, according to which 
constitutional matters such as the maximum terms and number of members of the House of 
Representatives, secret ballot, minimum voting age, and redistricting procedures may be 
only amended and repealed if the 75% majority of the parliament's total membership 
supports it, or the majority of electors at a referendum.
2. Optional Referendum: In some issues, especially in moral questions and those related to 
lifestyles, the parliamentary majority may make the decision on using referendums.
Hughes, Colin A. (1994): Australia and New Zealand. Referendums around the World. 
(Butler and Ranney eds.) MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 154-173.
16. Norway
Unitary state with unicameral legislature (Storting)
The possibility of holding a referendum is not mentioned in the Norwegian Constitution, but 
there have been a few consultative, ‘ad hoc ’ referendums on issues of great importance 
which have been initiated by the Storting.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Referendums around the World. (Butler and 
Ranney eds.), MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-98.
Wyller, Thomas Chr (1996): Norway: six exceptions to the rule. Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, 
Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe. MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 
139-152.
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17. Portugal
Unitary state with unicameral legislature: Assembly of the Republic
According to the 1989 Constitution, the President can call a binding referendum at the 
request of the Parliament or the government on a 'question of national interest, excluding 
budgetary and fiscal matters’.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Referendums around the World. (Butler and 
Ranney eds.), MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-98.
18. Spain
Unitary state with regionalisation and bicameral legislature (Cortes): Senate and Congress 
of Deputies.
1. Mandatory Constitutional Referendum (on fundamental revisions of Constitution): The 
article 168(3) of the Constitution provides for a mandatory constitutional referendum on the 
total revisions of the Constitution or partial revisions affecting certain basic matters. The 
total revision of the Constitution must be first approved by 2/3 majority of each chamber of 
the Cortes for two times, with general elections intervening. After the second approval, the 
revision is put to the referendum.
2. Suspensive Constitutional Referendum: The article 167 of the Constitution deals with the 
partial revisions of the Constitution which do no affect the basic principles, when the article 
168 is applied. A partial revision of the Constitution either requires 3/5 majorities in both 
houses or an absolute majority of the members of the Senate and a 2/3 majority of the lower 
house. After the amendment has been passed, 1/10 of the members if either house can 
demand a referendum.
3. Optional referendum (as regulated in the Constitution): Political decisions of special 
importance may be submitted for an optional, consultative referendum: "The referendum 
shall be convoked by the King at the proposal of the Prime Minister (President of the 
Government) after previous authorization by the Congress of Deputies."
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Referendums around the World. (Butler and 
Ranney eds.), MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-98.
Boix, Charles (1991): Partisan Voting in the Spanish 1986 NATO Referendum: An 
Ecological Analysis. Electoral Studies, Vol. 10, pp. 19-32.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht.
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19. Sweden
Unitary state with unicameral legislature (Riksdag)
1. Optional referendum : majority of the Riksdag support the act concerning an optional, 
consultative referendum.
2. Suspensive Constitutional Referendum (Constitutional Amendment 1979, chapter 8, 
article 15) Any changes to the Constitution must be accepted by two separate Riksdags. If 
1/10 of the members of the Riksdag require and 1/3 support the motion at least ten months 
before the next election, the referendum will be held at the same time as the election between 
two readings. For an amendment to be rejected in the referendum, there must be a majority 
against the proposal, and the number of votes cast against it must exceed half the votes 
validly cast in the simultaneous election. This procedure may also be applied to international 
agreements and the transfers of powers to international organisations.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Referendums around the World. (Butler and 
Ranney eds.), MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-98.
Ruin, Olof: Sweden: the referendum as an instrument for defusing political issues. 
Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum Experience in Europe. 
MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 171-185.
Suksi, Markku (1993): Bringing in the People. Martinus Nijhoff Publishers, Dordrecht. 
20. Switzerland
Federal state with bicameral legislature {Bundesversammlung): States Council and National 
Council.
Swiss referendums are always decisive and they can either be mandatory or facultative, but 
the use of the facultative referendum can not be decided by the parliamentary majority or by 
the government.
1. Constitutional referendum: All changes to the federal constitution (total revisions and 
amendments) are always submitted to a referendum; to be accepted they must get a double 
majority, i.e. it must win the support of a majority of the votes cast in the country as a whole 
and also a majority of votes in more than half the twenty-two cantons.
2. International agreements: joining a collective security organization or supranational 
community: mandatory referendum and double majority required; joining an international 
organization or ratifying a multinational treaty on standardizing law and so on; Federal 
Assembly can hold an optional referendum.
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3. Laws and decrees (with limited duration) are liable to a referendum if, within ninety days 
of publication, 50.000 citizens sign a petition demanding it or eight cantons demand it. To 
take effect the law or decree needs to be supported by majority of voters (majority of cantons 
is not required); referendum may not be possible: if decree includes urgency clause and is 
accepted by the majority of each chamber; and if the decree is for one year or less.
4. Popular initiatives: any seven Swiss voters can begin the process by submitting a request 
for initiative and a description of the desired change in the constitution and they have 18 
months to collect 100.000 signatures in support of the petition (before 1977: 50.000). There 
are two types of constitutional revision that may be pursued via the initiative, total and 
partial. Total revisions are sent directly to the people after signatures are deposited, and if 
a majority of the nation votes in favour of revision, then the parliament is dissolved and new 
elections are held to elect a constitutional assembly to undertake the revision. Partial 
revisions can take two forms: they can either suggest the general terms of the change, or they 
can present the exact text of the proposed amendment.
In the generally-worded case, if the Federal Assembly agrees with the suggestion, it simply 
draws up a specific amendment and submits it to the people. It takes effect if a double 
majority is achieved. However, if the legislature disagrees (which is more likely), then the 
proposal must pass a preliminary referendum in which double majority is not required. Then 
if it is approved, the legislature must draft an appropriate text and send it to the people again. 
The second time around, a double majority is required.
A specifically-worded initiative need go to the people only once, great majority of the 
initiatives take this form. Before the proposal is placed on the ballot the government can 
either endorse it, recommend rejection and submit a counterproposal of its own. Typically, 
such counterproposals accept some of the petitioners' demands while omitting others.
Aubert, Jean-Fran?ois (1978): Switzerland. Butler & Ranney (eds.): Referendums. A 
Comparative Study o f Practice and Theory. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research. Washington D.C., pp. 39-66.
Kobach, Kris W. (1993): The Referendum: Direct Democracy in Switzerland. Dartmouth, 
Aldershot.
Trechsel, Alexander H.; Kriesi, Hanspeter (1996): Switzerland: the referendum and initiative 
as a centrepiece of the political system. Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The 
Referendum Experience in Europe. MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 185-208.
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21. United Kingdom
Unitary state with regional devolution and bicameral legislature: House of Commons and 
House of Lords
Britain does not have a codified constitution and it has been regarded to be a purely 
representative democracy with parliamentary sovereignty. Since the 1970s the use of 
referendum is decided by the parliamentary majority, and the electorate has participated in 
referendums on constitutional issues at both national and regional level.
Balsom, Denis (1996): The United Kingdom: constitutional pragmatism and the adoption 
of the referendum. Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Pier Vincenzo (eds.). The Referendum 
Experience in Europe. MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 209-226.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1981): The People and the Party System. The Referendum and electoral 
reform in British politics. Cambridge University Press, Cambridge.
Bogdanor, Vemon (1994): Western Europe. Referendums around the World. (Butler and 
Ranney eds.), MacMillan, Basingstoke, pp. 24-98.
22. United States
Federal state with bicameral legislature: Senate and House of Representatives
The US does not have referendums at the federal level, but there is a possibility for an 
advisory referendum
California
A constituent part of the federation
1. Constitutional amendment initiative proposed by popular petition and submitted to the 
voters, 8% of the electorate must sign the petition.
2. The direct statutory initiative: statutes proposed by petition and submitted to the voters, 
5% of the electorate must sign the petition.
3. The optional referendum, the suspension of the enforcement of law until it has been 
referred to the voters and approved by them (have not been used since 1952).
(4. Indirect statutory initiative, statutes proposed by petition, submitted to the legislature and, 
failing of passage by that body, then submitted to the electorate; removed from the 
constitution in 1966).
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Caves, Roger W. (1992): Land Use Planning. The Ballot Box Revolution. Sage Publications 
1992. Direct democracy in California.
Lee, Eugene C (1978): California. Butler & Ranney (eds.): Referendums. A Comparative 
Study o f Practice and Theory. American Enterprise Institute for Public Policy 
Research.Washington D.C., 87-123.
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Appendix II:
National Referendums in 21 Western Democracies 1944-1996
C O U N T R Y  T IM E ISSU E Y E S  T U R N O U T
Australia 19 Aug 1944 Postwar reconstruction and
democratic rights 47.0 96.5
28 Sept 1946 Federal provision of social services 54.4 94.0*
Organized marketing of primary products 50.6 94.0*
Federal powers over industrial
employment 50.3 . 94.0*
29 May 1948 Legisl. powers over rents and prices 40.7 93.7
22 Sept 1951 Fed. powers to deal with communism 49.4 95.6
27 May 1967 Ratio of senators to representatives 40.3 93.8
Legislative powers over aboriginals 90.8 93.8
8 Dec 1973 Commonwealth control over prices 43.8 93.4
Commonwealth control over incomes 34.4 93.4
18 May 1974 Simultaneous Hse/Senate elections 48.3 95.5
Mode of altering the constitution 48.0 95.5
Equalize House constituencies 47.2 95.5
Local government borrowing rights 46.9 95.5
21 May 1977 Simultaneous HseVSen. elections 62.2 92.3*
Senate vacancies 73.3 92.3
Territory franchise for referendum 77.7 92.3
Retiring age for federal judges 80.1 92.3
Electoral rights 77.7 92.3
National song (non-const, multiple alt.) 92.3
1 Dec 1984 Terms of senators 50.6 94.0*
Interchange of powers 47.1 94.0
3 Sept 1988 Max. 4-yr. terms for both houses 32.9 92.1
Equalize House constituencies 37.6 92.1
Recognition of local government 33.6 92.1
Trial, religion and property rights 30.8 92.1
'"constitutional amendment which achieved a national majority, but failed because not winning m
majority of the states.
Austria 5 Nov 1978 Zwentendorf nuclear power plant 49.5 64.1
12 June 1994 Joining EU 66.6 81.3
Belgium 12 Mar 1950 Return of King Leopold III 57.6 92.4
Canada 26 Oct 1992 Constitutional reform package 44.6
Denmark 28 May 1953 New Constitution 78.8 59.1
Voting Age lowered from 23 to 21 54.6 57.1
30 May 1961 Voting Age lowered from 23 to 21 55.0 37.3
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25 June 1963 Approval of agricultural acquisition law 38.4
Approval of state small-holders law 38.6
Approval of municipal pre-emption law 39.6 
Approval of nature conservation law 42.6
24 June 1969 Voting age lowered from 21 to 18 21.4
21 Sep 1971 Voting age lowered from 21 to 20 56.5
2 Oct 1972 Joining EEC 63.3
19 Sep 1978 Voting Age lowered from 20 to 18 53.8
27 Feb 1986 Single European Act 56.2
2 June 1992 Maastricht Treaty 49.3
18 May 1993 Maastricht Treaty 56.8
Finland 16 Oct 1994 Joining EU 56.9
France 21 Oct 1945 End of Third Republic 96.4
Assembly to draft constitution
and interim power for Assembly 66.5
5 May 1946 Adoption of Constitution 47.2
13 Oct 1946 Adoption of Constitution 53.2
5th Republic
29 Sept 1958 Adoption of Constitution 85.1
8 Jan 1961 Self-determination for Algeria 75.0
9 Apr 1962 Algerian independence 90.8
27 Oct 1962 Direct election of president2 62.2
27 April 1969 Senate power and regional
devolution2 47.6
23 April 1972 Enlargement of EEC 68.3
6 Nov 1988 Future of New Caledonia 80.0
20 Sep 1992 Maastricht Treaty 51.0
2 Unconstitutionally initiated by President De Gaulle 
Germany No referendums after The World War II
Greece 1 Sept 1946 Return of King George II 60
29 Sept 1968 Approval of Constitution 91.9
29 July 1973 Institute Republic 77.2
8 Dec 1974 End of Monarchy 69.2
Iceland 29 May 1944 Separate from Denmark 99.5
Institute a republic 98.5
Ireland 17 June 1959 Abolish proportional representation 48.2
16 Oct 1968 Increase variation in electorates 39.2
Abolish proportional representation 39.2
10 May 1972 Joining EEC 83.1
7 Dec 1972 Lower voting age to 18 84.6
Remove const, status of church 84.4
5 July 1979 New adoption law 99.0
Election system in Senate 92.4
73.0
73.0
73.0
73.0 
63.6 
83.9
90.1
63.4
75.4
83.1
86.5
70.8
79.1
79.1
79.6
67.6
79.5
73.8 
75.3
77.0
80.1 
60.2
36.9 
69.8
90
77.7
74.7 
75.6
98.4
98.4
56.1
62.9
63.0
70.3
48.0
47.9
27.9
27.4
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7 Sept 1983 Abortion ban 66.9 53.4
14 June 1984 Allow votes for non-citizens 75.4 45.5
26 June 1986 Permit divorce 36.5 605
26 May 1987 Single European Community Act 69.9 43.9
19 June 1992 Maastricht treaty 69.1 57.3
25 Nov 1992 Abortion information 34.6 64.9
Abortion travel 62.4 65.3
Freedom of information on abortion 59.9 65.2
24 Nov 1995 Allow legalisation of divorce 50.3 62.0
28 Nov 1996 More difficult release for bale for serious
crimes 74.8 29.2
Italy3 12 May 1974 Repeal Divorce 40.7 87.7
11 June 1978 Abolish police's special anti-crime powers 23.5 81.2
Abolish state funding for parties 43.6 81.2
17 May 1981 Abolish police's special anti-terrorism
powers 14.9 79.4
Abolish life imprisonment 22.6 79.4
Restrict arms licences 14.1 79.4
Liberalise law on abortion 11.6 79.4
Restrict law on abortion 32.0 79.4
9 June 1985 Repeal government wage-index decree 45.7 77.9
8 Nov 1987 Make effective the civil liability of
magistrates 80.2 65.1
Support trial of ministers 85.0 65.1
Anti-nuclear power (site selection) 80.6 65.1
Anti-nuclear power (subsidies) 79.7 65.1
Anti-nuclear power (Ban Italian participation
In nuclear power plants abroad) 71.9 65.1
3 June 1990 Prohibit hunting 92.2 43.4*
Prohibit hunting 92.3 42.9*
Restrict toxic residues in foodstuffs 93.5 43.1*
9 June 91 Abolish multiple preference voting at
Chamber elections 95.6 62.5
18 Apr 1993 Abolish State Enterprise Ministry 90.1 76.9
Abolish PR in Senate elections 82.7 77.1
Abolish Agriculture Ministry (a) 70.1 77.0
Abolish Tourist Ministry (a) 82.2 76.9
Environmental powers for local health
offices 82.5 76.9
Decriminalise personal use of soft drugs 55.3 77.0
Abolish state funding for parties 90.3 77.0
Abolish government role in state bank
appointments 89.8 77.0
11 June 1995 Abolish restrictions on union accorded
negotiating rights 49.97 56.9
Reduce restrictions on unions accorded
negotiating rights 62.1 56.9
Abolish restrictions on negotiating rights in
state sector 64.7 56.9
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Repeal compulsory residence for mafia
suspects 63.7 57.0
Privatise state broadcasting services 54.9 57.2
Abolish power of municipalities to limit
retail trade 35.6 57.0
Abolish union dues deduction by employers 56.2 57.1
Change mayoral election rules in
larger municipalities 49.4 57.1
Abolish powers of subnational governments
to limit business hours 37.5 57.1
Private companies can own only one
TV channel 43.0 57.9
Ban commercial advertising during
broadcasting of films 44.3 57.9
Companies may sell advertising on no more
than 2 national TV channels 43.6 57.8
Other Referendums
2 June 1946 Republic or Monarchy 54.3 89.1
18 June 1989 Confer a constituent mandate upon 88.1 81.0
Italian MEPs
3 A 'yes' vote is for the abrogation of the law.
4 The results of these referendums were automatically invalidated, 
because the turnout was less than 50%.
Luxembourg No referendums after the World War II
Netherlands No referendums ever
New 9 Mar 1949 Allow off-track betting 68.0 56.3
Zealand Maintain 6 p.m. drink curfew 75.5 56.5
3 Aug 1949 Maintain conscription 77.8 61.5
23 Sept 1967 Three-, not four-year parliaments 68.1 71.2
Longer drinking hours 64.5 71.2
19 Sept 1992 Retain electoral system 84.7 55.2
4 alternative systems 70.5 55.2
6 Nov 1993 Approve MMP election law 53.8 82.6
Norway 25 Sept 1972 Joining EEC (O) 46.5 79.2
28 Nov 1994 Joining EU (O) 47.8 89.0
Portugal No referendums after the World War II
Spain 6 July 1947 Approval of succession law 95.1 94.0
14 Dec 1966 Approval of constitution 95.9 89.2
15 Dec 1976 Approval of political reform programme 97.3 77.7
7 Dec 1978 New Constitution 91.7 70.0
12 March 1986 Stay in NATO 52.5 59.7
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Sweden 16 Oct 1955 Drive on right 15.5 53.2
13 Oct 1957 Three alternative pension plans
(i) 45.8 72.4
(ii) 15.0
(iii) 35.3
23 March 1980 Nuclear power. line 1 18.9 75.6
line 2 39.1
line 3 38.7
13 Nov 1994 Joining EU 52.2 83.3
U.K. 5 June 1975 Stay in EEC 67.2 64.5
USA No referendums at the federal level
* for referendums which have failed for some special majority requirement
Sources:
Butler, David; Ranney, Austin (eds.) (1994): Referendums around the World. MacMillan, 
Basingstoke.
Gallagher, Michael; Uleri, Piervincenzo (eds.) (1996): The Referendum Experience in Europe. 
MacMillan, Basingstoke.
Documentation Centre for Direct Democracy, University of Geneva, database 
(http:Wc2d.unige.ch).
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Appendix III:
Referendums in Switzerland 1945-1996:
Date Issue Yes Turnout
1 21 Jan 1945 National railways act (R) 56.7 52.8
2 25 Nov 1945 Protection of the family (C) 76.3 55.5
3 10 Feb 1946 Coordination of public transport (C) 33.6 65.2
4 8 Dec 1946 Right to work (I) 19.2 51.3
5 18 May 1947 Economic reforms/labour legislation (I) 31.2 59.4
6 6 July 1947 Economic articles (A) 53.0 79.7
7 Old-age pension act (R) 80.0 79.7
8 14 Mar 1948 Monopoly of sugar (R) 36.2 56.5
9 22 May 1949 Emission of banknotes (A) 38.5 61.0
10 Prevention of tuberculosis (R) 24.8 61.0
11 11 Sept 1949 Direct democracy (emergency clause) (I) 50.7 42.5
12 11 Dec 1949 Status of federal officials (R) 55.3 72.0
13 29 Jan 1950 State aid for housing construction (R) 46.3 52.8
14 4 June 1950 Federal finances (A) 35.5 55.3
15 1 Oct 1950 Speculation on real estate and labour (I) 27.0 43.7
16 3 Dec 1950 Seats on the National Council (A) 67.3 55.7
17 Federal taxes from 1951 to 1954 (A) 69.5 55.7
18 25 Feb 1951 Transport by automobile (R) 44.3 52.4
19 15 Apr 1951 Emission of banknotes (I) 12.3 53.1
20 Emission of banknotes (C) 68.1 53.1
21 8 July 1951 Taxation of public enterprises (I) 32.6 37.6
22 2 Mar 1952 Construction of new hotels (R) 46.1 40.1
23 30 Mar 1952 Agriculture act (R) 54.0 64.1
24 20 April 1952 Federal sales tax (I) 19.0 49.1
25 18 May 1952 Financing of armaments (I) 43.7 53.9
26 6 July 1952 Financing of armaments (A) 42.0 44.2
27 5 Oct 1952 Tax on tobacco products (R) 68.0 52.6
28 Antiaircraft shelters (R) 15.5 52.6
29 23 Nov 1952 Control of prices (A) 62.8 56.4
30 Supply of cereals (A) 75.6 56.4
31 19 April 1953 Postal tariffs (R) 36.5 52.7
32 6 Dec 1953 Federal finances (A) 42.0 60.3
33 Prevention of water pollution (A) 81.3 59.1
34 20 June 1954 Federal certificates of professional capacity (R) 33.0 40.9
35 Aid for Swiss war victims (R) 44.0 40.7
36 24 Oct 1954 Federal taxes from 1955 to 1958 (A) 70.0 46.8
37 5 Dec 1954 Protection of sites (I) 31.2 51.9
38 13 Mar 1955 Consumers' and lessees' protection (I) 50.2 55.5
39 Consumers' and lessees' protection (C) 40.6 55.5
40 4 Mar 1956 Control of prices (A) 77.5 48.7
41 13 May 1956 Utilization of hydraulic forces (I) 36.9 52.1
42 State aid for a private timber
transformation enterprise in Graubunden (R) 42.5 52.6
43 30 Sept 1956 Supply of cereals (amendment) (A) 38.7 44.0
44 Referendum on expenses (C) 45.5 43.8
45 3 Mar 1957 Civil defence (A) 48.1 53.1
46 Radio/TV legislation (A) 42.8 53.0
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47 24 Nov 1957 Nuclear energy (A) 77.3 45.5
48 Supply of cereals (A) 66.7 45.5
49 26 Jan 1958 Misuse of economic power (I) 25.9 51.8
50 11 May 1958 Federal finances (A) 54.6 53.2
51 6 July 1958 Cinema (A) 61.3 42.3
52 Highway System (C) 85.0 42.4
53 26 Oct 1958 Forty-four-hour work-week (I) 35.0 61.4
54 7 Dec 1958 Gambling in casinos (A) 59.9 46.2
55 Utilization of the SpOhl River (T) 75.2 46.4
56 1 Feb 1959 Women's suffrage (A) 33.1 66.7
57 24 May 1959 Civil Defence (A) 66.3 42.9
58 29 May 1960 Control of prices (A) 77.5 39.0
59 4 Dec 1960 Legislation on milk production (R) 56.3 49.8
60 5 Mar 1961 Legislation on pipelines (A) 71.4 62.8
61 Taxes on motor fiiel (R) 46.5 63.3
62 22 Oct 1961 Legislative Initiative (I) 29.4 40.1
63 Dec 1961 Watch-making industry (R) 66.7 45.8
64 1 April 1962 Nuclear arms prohibition (I) 34.8 55.6
65 27 May 1962 Nature and landscape protection (A) 79.1 38.7
66 Salary of parliament members (R) 31.7 38.7
67 4 Nov 1962 Seats on the National Council (A) 63.7 36.3
68 26 May 1963 Nuclear Arms (I) 37.8 48.8
69 8 Dec 1963 Federal finances (A) 77.6 41.8
70 Scholarships (A) 78.5 41.7
71 2 Feb 1964 Fiscal amnesty (A) 42.0 44.3
72 24 May 1964 Professional education (R) 68.6 37.0
73 6 Dec 1964 Control of prices (A) 79.5 39.2
74 28 Feb 1965 Limitation of credits (R)* 57.7 59.7
75 Limitation of construction (R)* 55.5 59.7
76 16 May 1965 Milk and milk products (R) 62.0 37.4
77 16 Oct 1966 Swiss abroad (A) 68.1 49.9
78 Fight against alcoholism (I) 23.4 48.0
79 2 July 1967 Speculation on real estate (I) 32.7 37.9
80 18 Feb 1968 Fiscal amnesty (A) 61.9 41.8
81 19 May 1968 Fixed prices on tobacco products (R) 48.2 36.91
82 1 June 1969 Federal technical high school (R) 34.5 33.9
83 14 Sept 1969 Town and country planning (A) 55.9 32.9
84 1 Feb 1970 Control of sugar (R) 54.2 43.8
85 7 June 1970 Foreigners, reduction of number (I) 46.0 74.1
86 27 Sept 1970 Sports education (A) 74.5 43.8
87 Housing and family (I) 48.9 43.8
88 15 Nov 1970 Federal finances (A) 55.4 40.9
89 7 Feb 1971 Woman's suffrage (A) 65.7 57.7
90 6 June 1971 Protection of the environment (A) 92.7 37.9
91 Federal finances (A) 72.7 37.8
92 5 Mar 1972 Construction of lodgings (I) 28.9 35.7
93 Construction of lodgings (C) 58.5 35.7
94 Protection of lessees (A) 85.4 35.7
95 4 June 1972 Control of the construction market (R)* 83.3 26.7
96 Defence of the Swiss currency (R)* 87.7 26.7
97 24 Sept 1972 Exportation of arms (I) 49.6 33.1
98 3 Dec 1972 Old-age and sickness pension(amendment)(I) 15.6 52.9
99 Old-age and sickness pension(amendment)(C) 74.0 52.9
100 Free-trade agreement with the EC (A) 72.5 52.9
101 4 Mar 1973 Education (A) 52.8 27.5
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102 Scientific research (A) 64.5 27.5
103 20 May 1973 Repeal of the confessional articles (A) 54.9 40.3
104 2 Dec 1973 Prices and salary control (R)* 59.8 35.0
105 Credit control (R)* 65.1 35.0
106 Control of the construction market (R)* 70.4 35.0
107 Limitation to amortization allowance (R)* 68.0 35.0
108 Protection of animals (A) 84.0 35.0
109 20 Oct 1974 Foreigners, reduction of number (I) 34.2 70.3
110 8 Dec 1974 Federal finances (A) 44.4 39.6
111 Reduction of federal expenses (A) 67.0 39.5
112 Health insurance (I) 26.7 39.7
113 Health insurance (C) 32.1 39.7
114 2 Mar 1975 Economic policy (A) 52.7 28.4
115 8 June 1975 Federal finances (A) 56.0 36.8
116 Defence of the Swiss currency (R)* 85.5 36.8
117 Brake on federal expenses (A) 75.9 36.8
118 Customs, tariff, fuel (R) 48.2 36.8
119 Financing the highway system (R) 53.5 36.8
120 7 Dec 1975 Freedom of domicile/social assistance (A) 75.6 30.9
121 Legislation on water resources (A) 77.5 30.9
122 Import and export of agricultural
products (R) 52.0 31.1
123 21 Mar 1976 Workers' participation (I) 32.4 39.4
124 Workers' participation (C) 29.6 39.4
125 More equal taxes (I) 42.2 39.3
126 13 June 1976 Compulsory unemployment insurance (A) 68.3 34.5
127 Town and country planning (R) 48.9 34.6
128 Loan to International Development Association (T) 43.6 34.5
129 26 Sept 1976 Radio/TV legislation (A) 43.3 33.5
130 Federal liability insurance for cars (I) 24.3 33.5
131 5 Dec 1976 Money and credit policy (R)* 70.3 44.8
132 Control of prices (R)* 82.0 45.1
133 Forty-hour work-week (I) 22.0 45.2
134 13 Mar 1977 Foreigners, reduction of number (I) 29.5 45.2
135 Naturalization of foreigners (I) 33.8 45.2
136 Referendum on international treaties (I) 21.9 45.0
137 Referendum on international treaties (C) 61.0 20.5
138 12 June 1977 Introduction of value-added tax (A) 40.5 50.0
139 Harmonization of cantonal taxes (A) 61.3 49.9
140 25 Sept 1977 Protection of lessees (I) 42.2 51,6
141 Protection of lessees (C) 41.2 51.6
142 Air Pollution from cars (I) 39.0 51.7
143 Number of signatures for referendum (A) 57.8 51.6
144 Number of signatures for an initiative (A) 56.7 51.6
145 Free abortion during the first 12 weeks (I) 48.3 51.9
146 4 Dec 1977 Higher taxes on big incomes (I) 44.4 38.3
147 Civil service (A) 37.6 38.1
148 Exercise of political rights (R) 93.7 38.1
149 Balanced federal finances (R) 62.4 38.2
150 26 Feb 1978 Democracy in highway construction (I) 38.7 48.2
151 Retirement age (I) 20.6 48.3
152 Economic Policy (A) 68.4 48.0
153 Old-age pension act (R) 65.6 48.3
154 28 May 1978 Summer time (R) 47.9 48.8
155 Customs tariff (R) 54.8 48.8
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156 Abortion act (R) 31.2 48.8
157 University and research act (R) 43.4 48.8
158 Twelve Sundays a year without motor traffic (I) 36.3 48.8
159 24 Sept 1978 Creation of Canton of Jura (A) 82.3 42.0
160 3 Dec 1978 Milk supplies (R) 68.5 43.2
161 Protection of animals (R) 81.7 43.3
162 Federal security police (R) 44.0 43.3
163 Professional education (R) 56.0 43.3
164 18 Feb 1979 Vote at 18 (A) 49.2 49.6
165 Pedestrian trails (C) 77.6 49.6
166 Ban on liquor and tobacco advertising (I) 41.0 49.6
167 Nuclear plants (I) 48.8 49.6
168 20 May 1979 Introduction of value added tax (A) 34.6 37.7
169 Revision of atomic energy (R) 68.9 37.6
170 2 Mar 1980 Separation of church and state (I) 21.1 34.7
171 Supply of commodities (A) 86.1 34.5
172 30 Nov 1980 Safety belts and crash helmets (R) 51.6 42.1
173 Suspend cantonal share of revenues
from banking stamp tax (A) 67.3 41.9
174 Redistribution of alcohol tax receipts (A) 71.0 41.9
175 Price of cereals (A) 63.5 41.9
176 5 April 1981 Policy toward foreign residents (I) 16.2 39.9
177 14 June 1981 Equal rights for men and women (C) 60.3 33.9
178 Protection of consumer rights (C) 65.5 33.9
179 29 Nov 1981 Federal taxation (A) 69.0 30.4
180 6 June 1982 Penal code on violent crimes (R) 63.7 35.2
181 Law on foreigners (R) 49.6 35.2
182 28 Nov 1982 Control of prices (I) 56.1 32.9
183 Control of prices (C) 21.6 32.9
184 27 Feb 1983 Petrol tax (A) 52.7 32.4
185 Establish basis for federal energy policy (A) 50.9 32.4
186 4 Dec 1983 Revise nationality law (A) 60.8 35.8
187 Ease naturalization policy (A) 44.8 35.9
188 26 Feb 1984 Tax on trucks (A) 58.7 52.8
189 Highway tax (A) 53.0 52.8
190 Civilian service (I) 36.2 52.8
191 20 May 1984 Banking (I) 27.0 42.5
192 Ban on selling land to foreigners (I) 48.9 42.5
193 23 Sept 1984 End nuclear development (I) 45.0 41.7
194 Safe energy policy (I) 45.8 4L6
195 2 Dec 1984 Legislation on broadcasting (A) 68.7 37.5
196 Help for victims of violence (C) 82.1 37.6
197 Protection of motherhood (C) 15.8 37.6
198 10 Mar 1985 End primary school subsidies (A) 58.5 34.4
199 End federal public health subsidies (A) 53.0 34.4
200 End federal education subsidies (A) 47.6 34.4
201 Length of paid vacation (I) 34.8 34.6
202 9 June 1985 Right to life (I) 31.0 35.7
203 Suspend cantonal share of revenues
from banking 'stamp tax' (A) 66.5 35.2
204 Reduce cantonal share of liquor tax revenues (A) 72.3 35.2
205 Legislation on cereals (A) 57.0 35.3
206 22 Sept 1985 Standardized school terms (C) 58.8 41.0
207 Insurance against innovation-related risk (R) 43.1 40.9
208 New law on husband and wife (R) 54.7 41.1
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209 1 Dec 1985 Prohibition of vivisection (I) 29.5 38.0
210 16 Mar 1986 UN membership (A) 24.3 50.7
211 28 Sept 1986 Subsidized sugar production (R) 38.4 34.0
212 Subsidy for arts (1) 17.1 34.0
213 Subsidy for arts (C) 45.0 34.0
214 Guaranteed vocational training (I) 18.4 34.0
215 Tenants' protection (C) 64.4 34.0
216 Taxation of heavy trucks (I) 33.9 34.0
217 5 April 1987 Revision of political asylum laws (R) 67.4 42.4
218 Revision of law on foreigners (R) 65.7 42.2
219 Double yes' on initiatives with a
government counterproposal (A) 63.3 42.3
220 Right to referendum on all military expenditures (I) 40.6 42.4
221 6 Dec 1987 •Rail 2000' Project (R) 56.7 47.7
222 Stop Rothenturm military base
(to protect the moors) (I) 57.8 47.7
223 Sickness and motherhood insurance (R) 28.7 47.7
224 12 June 1988 Co-ordination of transportation policy (A) 45.5 41.9
225 Reduction of the age for receiving OAP benefits (I) 35.1 42.0
226 4 Dec 1988 City/country prohibition of real estate speculation (I) 30.8 52.8
227 Forty-hour work week (I) 34.3 52.9
228 Restriction of immigration (I) 32.7 52.8
229 4 June 1989 Protection of small farms (I) 48.9 36.0
230 26 Nov 1989 Abolition of the army (I) 35.6 68.6
231 Raise highway speed limit to 130 kph (I) 38.0 68.6
232 1 April 1990 Stop all new road construction (I) 28.5 40.5
233 Prevent highway between Murten and Yverdon (I) 32.7 40.5
234 Prevent highway between Wettswill and Kronau (I) 31.4 40.5
235 Prevent highway between Biel and Solothum (I) 34.0 40.5
236 Wine and import standards (R) 46.7 40.5
237 Revision of the federal judiciary law (R) 47.4 40.5
238 23 Sept 1990 Establish basis for federal energy policy (A) 47.4 40.5
239 10-year moratorium on nuclear plant construction (I) 54.6 39.6
240 End use of nuclear energy (I) 47.1 39.6
241 Increase allowed width of trucks 20 cm (R) 52.8 39.6
242 3 Mar 1991 Reduce voting age to 18 (A) 72.8 31.1
243 Transfer funds from road construction
to public transportation, esp. railways (I) 37.1 31.1
244 2 June 1991 Introduce federal VAT to replace
corporate tax and integrate with EC (R) 45.7 32.6
245 Decriminalize conscientious objection
to military service (R) 55.7 32.6
246 17 May 1992 IMF and World Bank membership (T) 55.8 36.6
247 Regulations governing involvement in
the IMF and World Bank (R) 56.8 36.4
248 Reduce amount of water reservoirs to
protect the environment (I) 37.1 38.4
249 Less drastic reduction of water in
reservoirs than in issue 248 (R) 66.1 38.5
250 Regulation of genetic technology (R) 73.8 38.0
251 Civilian service option for
conscientious objectors (A) 82.5 38.6
252 Decriminalize sex between minors, homo­
sexuality; define rape in marriage (R) 73.1 37.9
253 27 Sept 1992 Construction of cross-Alpine railway
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for automobiles (R) 63.6 45.9
254 Revised procedures for consideration,
publication, and intr. of laws (R) 58.0 45.4
255 Change of banking 'stamp' tax (R) 61.5 45.7
256 Farmers inheritance regulations (R) 53.6 45.7
257 Increase salaries of MPs and funding
for political parties (R) 27.6 45.6
258 Improved facilities and admin, services
for MPs (R) 30.6 45.5
259 6 Dec 1992 European Economic Area Membership (A) 49.7 78.3
260 7 Mar 1993 Energy tariffs (R) 54.5 51
261 Legalising casinos (A) 72.5 51
262 Anti-animal testing (I) 27.8 51
263 6 June 1993 Environmental protection in
military sites (I) 44.7 56
264 Against purchase of fighters (I) 42.8 56
265 26 Sept 1993 Against misuse of arms (A) 86.3 40
266 Change of border between Bern and
Basel-Landschaft (A) 75.2 40
267 1. August as a public holiday (I) 83.8 40
268 Measures against the raising health
insurance costs (R)* 80.6 40
269 Unemployment insurance (R)* 70.4 40
270 28 Nov 1993 Financial Regulation (A) 66.7 45
271 Contributions for improving Federal finance (A) 57.7 45
272 Maintenance of social insurance (A) 62.6 45
273 Special consumer taxes (A) 60.7 45
274 Decreasing the alcohol problem (I) 25.3 45
275 Decreasing the cigarette problem (I) 25.5 45
276 20 Feb 1994 Continuation of the road tax (A) 68.5 41
277 Continuation of tax on heavy
traffic (A) 72.2 41
278 Introduction of a tax on heavy traffic
dependent on power or consumption (A) 67.1 41
279 Protection of Alps from transit-traffic (I) 51.9 41
280 Aviation law (R) 61.1 41
281 12 June 1994 Law on promotion of culture (A) 51.0 47
282 Easier access to citizenship for young foreigners (A) 52.8 47
283 Swiss forces in peace-keeping (R) 42.8 47
284 25 Sept 1994 Lifting the customs exemptions of
domestic grain production (A) 64.6 47
285 Military Penal Code (R) 54.7 47
286 4 Dec 1994 Health insurance law (R) 51.8 44
287 Health insurance (I) 23.5 44
288 Measures in immigration justice (R) 72.9 44
289 12 Mar 1995 Environmentally healthy and competitive
agriculture (I) 49.1 38
290 Milk production (R) 36.5 38
291 Agriculture law (R) 33.6 38
292 Restriction of expenditures (A) 83.4 38
293 25 June 1995 Old age and invalid insurances (R) 60.7 40
294 Removal of old age and invalid
insurances (I) 27.6 40
295 Acquisition of land by persons
abroad (R) 46.4 40
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296 10 Mar 1996 Revision of language laws (A) 76.2 31
297 Change of borders between Bern and
Jura (A) 91.6 31
298 Lifting the tax on distilling equipment (A)
299 Lifting the cantonal authority on
personal equipment of army members (A) 43.7 31
300 Lifting the federal support for
railway station parking places (A) 54.0 31
301 9 June 1996 Environmentally friendly agriculture (I) 77.6 31
302 Government and administration (R) 39.4 31
303 1 Dec 1996 Illegal immigration (I) 46.3 47
304 Work in industry, business and trade (R) 33.0 47
Explanation of Symbols
A Amendment of the Constitution (mandatory referendum)
I Popular initiative
C Parliamentary counterproposal to a popular initiative
R Rejective (facultative) referendum on a law
R* Mandatory referendum on a urgent decree deviating form the constitution
T Facultative referendum on an international treaty
Sources: Kobach, Kris W. (1993): The Referendum. Direct Democracy in Switzerland, 
Dartmouth, Aldershot.
The Federal Government of Switzerland, Beme. (http:Wwww.admin.ch), December 
1996.
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